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Early Political Discord in Kenya: European Settlers’ Political Struggles in 
the East Africa Protectorate, 1902-1912 
Makhete Fall 
 
This study of European settlers’ political struggles encompasses a ten-year period (1902-
12) during which the foundations of Kenya’s modern politics were established. The 
dissertation follows political contestation originating from the East Africa Protectorate’s 
small European settler community during the administrations of four 
commissioners/governors. The politics of this period involved varied individuals and 
organizations that sought to move the colonial state in the direction of policies 
European politicians advocated in such critical areas as land and labor, the 
administration of justice, and in the system of government that applied to them and 
other residents of the protectorate. The settler politicians pushed for a voice in 
protectorate affairs on the way to the achievement of responsible government on the 
pattern of South Africa, from which so many of them came to the Kenya highlands. The 
drive to attain a “white man’s country” that marked this decade was thus very critical for 
future politics. The segregated system demanded by the Europeans had a huge impact 
on Kenyan history as did the types of organizations they founded and the tactics they 
adopted. Nevertheless, the European political struggles, while influential, never led to 
European political control and the establishment of a minority-ruled Kenya as the 
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Background to European Settler Politics in the East Africa protectorate, 
1902-1912 
Introduction 
Although now largely forgotten, the political history of Kenya for the first half of 
the twentieth century was dominated by the politics of race. The East Africa Protectorate 
(EAP), later the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, was a British colony characterized by 
a plural society. There were European, Asian and Arab minorities resident in the 
protectorate as well as the African majority. That diversity had the potential of creating 
a dynamic market and boosting commerce along the Uganda railroad and in the growing 
cities. Agriculture and trade were thought to be the pillar foundation for a rapid 
economic development beneficial to all parties present in the protectorate and mostly to 
Britain, the new mother country. Since Kenya stood as a Crown Colony (Kenya became a 
crown colony in 1920), it was normally from Downing Street, the political nerve center 
of the empire, where future policy towards the region was formulated.  
 Nevertheless, constructing an effective and fair administration of the protectorate 
from the metropolis was not an easy task. Apparently, the officials representing the so-
called “good intentions” of the British Crown in the region had their own agenda. 
Among them, Sir Charles Norton Edgecombe Eliot (1862-1931), the Commissioner of 
the EAP from 1900-1904, decided that the influx of European settlers would be a key 
factor for the future economic development of the region. Eliot thought that European 
settlement in the EAP, if well managed, would significantly reduce or even eliminate the 
British government’s subsidies to the protectorate. Throughout his tenure, he worked on 
encouraging European settlement coming mainly from South Africa. Eliot believed that 
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future policy in the EAP should be based on European primacy, which meant that 
European interests should override those of the African, Arab and Asian communities. 
Eliot did not last very long as Commissioner of the EAP, but he set the tone for nearly all 
the following officials who also felt pressured by the settlers’ persistent push for more 
political concessions. That mind set turned Kenya into “one of the most controversial 
dependencies of the British Empire.”1  There were always political problems in 
coordinating policies between London and the EAP. The ten years covered by this study 
(1902-1912) indicate that throughout the entire period of British rule, the colonial rulers 
as well as the inhabitants of the region struggled to find the most appropriate political 
structure for the colony. In Struggle for Kenya, Robert Maxon dealt with the issue 
arguing that: The CO  [Colonial Office] in London “struggled to maintain initiative and 
control in these years in the face of several, often contradictory, interested parties and 
pressure groups” among the most influential were “Kenya’s colonial state, the European 
settlers and Indian residents there, the India Office (IO) and the government of India, 
missionaries, humanitarians and capitalists in Britain itself, and the African majority in 
Kenya.” 2 
   An adequate political structure for the colony always included a prominent role in 
the apparatus for the European residents who were thought to be the exclusive agents of 
any potential economic development. The unofficial or European settler segment of the 
white population played a very critical role in the political struggles that marked the 
early colonial period. For example, the demands made by the European settlers have 
                                                 
1 Robert Maxon, Struggle for Kenya (London: Associated University Presses, 1993), 13.  
2 Ibid. 
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more often been interpreted by colonial and imperial historians as providing a target for 
protest from African, Arab and Asian political leaders. 
After the initial years of colonial rule, European settlers played the largest and 
most influential role in the colony’s political system. As late as 1955, for example, 
influential American writer John Gunther confidently predicted that Kenya’s first prime 
minister at independence would be a European settler. He affirmed that if he were an 
African, he would rather be under British administration than any other, for "Great 
Britain is the only colonial power that has as its official policy the systematic training of 
Africans for self-government.”3  He did not fully understand that the British did not just 
pour money into East Africa to lift up the Africans and show them a potential political 
path leading to future economic development. Self-government, moreover, in the eyes of 
the Europeans, referred to the possibilities of political independence for the settlers who 
wanted to control the protectorate for their own gains. The EAP was never like the case 
of South Africa, where the European settlers had self-government.  
From the time ministerial government was introduced in 1954 until 1969, there 
was at least one European in Kenya’s Council of Ministers. In light of this information, it 
is important to examine the early examples of European political activity in the region 
just before, and just after, the CO assumption of supervision over the EAP in 1905. This 
study will seek to provide such an examination in the period stretching to the end of Sir 
Percy Girouard’s administration 1909-1912. 
The 1902-1912 periods, though relatively brief, is nevertheless a particularly 
critical one in the history of Kenya. During this time, European settlement entrenched 
                                                 
3 John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York: Harper, 1955), 681. 
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itself as a major factor in the EAP’s economic and social fabric. These years witnessed 
the demand that land be set aside exclusively for European farming, known as the white 
highlands, and European agriculture began a struggle for prosperity. 
Those economic goals played a large part in European settler politics during this 
earlier formative period as settler leaders organized politically and began agitation for 
exclusive control of land in the highlands as well as favorable conditions relating to 
purchase and tenure. The settler farmers also mobilized politically in an attempt to gain 
the backing of the CS for markets and infrastructure and, most importantly, cheap 
African labor. Just as significant, these years also saw the emergence of demands for 
representation within the CS so as to have a voice in policy-making and as a means of 
turning the EAP into a white man’s country with all that implied in terms of economic 
and social policies. 
Thus, the period 1902-1912 deserves study as a significant foundation period for 
the European dominance that later came to characterize colonial Kenya and has had 
such huge impact on that country’s history. Just as important, these years witnessed the 
formation of the first political associations among the European settler community and 
the start of political agitation. The forms that these associations took as well as the type 
of political agitation and protest require careful study in this early period of colonial rule 
as many of the issues that featured then, such as single political parties led by wealthy 
and outspoken men and their political actions characterized by impunity and a lack of 
accountability, remain powerful factors in present-day Kenya politics. 
Research Objectives 
 This study will examine the political demands made by the European leaders and 
the reaction of the CS and the CO. The context of this analysis reflects Winston 
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Churchill’s famous description of his visit to the EAP in 1907. He noticed that there was 
an air of social stratification already blowing like a wind in the highlands of East Africa 
where race and color would be determinant in defining the political future of the 
protectorate. Churchill underlined it in his own words: “’We mean to make East Africa a 
white man’s country,’ cries, in strident tones, the CA on every occasion. [This is] truly a 
respectable and impressive policy; but one which seems, at first sight, rather difficult to 
achieve… where there are… fewer than two thousand five hundred whites and more than 
four million black aboriginals.”4 Churchill’s observation of the evolving political scene 
led him to ask a pertinent question. He wanted to know if East Africa could ever become 
a country for the white settlers’ convenience. He did not underestimate the fierce 
determination and dedication of the men on the spot who constantly pushed for more 
political concessions. He noticed that: 
Every white man in Nairobi is a politician; and most of them are leaders of 
parties. One would scarcely believe it possible, that a center so new should be 
able to develop so many divergent and conflicting interests, or that a community 
so small should be able to give to each such vigorous and even vehement 
expression. There are already in miniature all the elements of keen political and 
racial discord, all the materiel for hot and acrimonious debate. The white man 
versus the black; the Indian versus both; the settlers as against the planter; the 
town contrasted with the country; the official class against the unofficial; the 
coast and the highlands; the railway administration and the protectorate 
generally; the King’s African Rifles and the East Africa Protectorate Police; all 
                                                 
4 Winston S. Churchill, My African Journey (London: The Holland Association Press, 1962), 31. 
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these different points of view, naturally arising, honestly adopted, tenaciously 
held, and not yet reconciled into any harmonious general conception confront the 
visitor in perplexing disarray.5 
Churchill’s advice was not to side with any particular party in the evolving 
situation in East Africa. The settlers had no intention for cohabitation in a region where 
they were invited to partake in the process of economic development. From that 
perspective, the Europeans and their descendants believed that the other races must 
submit to them.6 The first officials who ran the protectorate also thought that any 
prospect of economic development had to rely on settler entrepreneurship and 
agricultural production. Such was the prevailing climate that existed between different 
interest groups in the early years of the protectorate, as epitomized in a 1907 address by 
the Pastoralists’ Association stating that: “The evils the Colonial Office intended to 
prevent were already in existence: ‘Monopoly, with all its abuses and dangers, is an 
acknowledge fact. The dummy system is a flourishing institution. Already there were 
signs that the Legislative Council is passing in its cradle days under the influence of one 
class of special interests. Already it does not pay the small man fearlessly to speak the 
truth in the public interest.”7  
In this atmosphere, there were some political organizations that emerged to 
articulate the settler demands (such as the Convention of Associations), and these will 
be a focus of study. These associations made persistent demands for political 
concessions. Some examples of the demands developed by the settlers include the 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 Brett L. Shadle, The Souls of White Folk:  White Settlers in Kenya, 1900s-1920s (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015), 5.    
7 Address of the Pastoralists’ Association, enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 9 December 1907, CO 533/33, cited 
in M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 94.  
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establishment of legislative and executive councils, the right to vote, no taxation without 
representation, an important voice in the development of policy directed towards the 
colony’s African population, and minority rule. All of these demands will be examined in 
this study. These demands seemingly indicate the type of political system that the 
Europeans desired was one in which only whites have political rights and participate in 
the governance of the colony. Other racial groups were not to be included in the political 
system. They were subjects. 
 The dissertation will also examine how these demands were met by the CS and 
the British government. Also to be examined is the question of the degree to which 
European political demands actually inspired those of the Asians, Africans and Arabs in 
the early period of colonial rule. The dissertation will thus establish the reasons for the 
success or failure of the numerous European political demands. It will also  consider the 
impact of the organizations and of their political protest during the respective times of 
the EAP and later Kenyan history. 
It is clear from this that in the early history of the EAP, the political aspiration of 
the settlers was high. They strongly believed that self- government, if achieved, was the 
best way to go. They wanted to be in charge politically and economically without taking 
into consideration the majority of Africans and Asian workers already present in the 
protectorate. These newcomers were not simply ambitious by nature. They had powerful 
advocates and supporters among the colonial administration. They had the sympathy of 
Eliot and most of his successors who tried vigorously to transform the highlands of East 
Africa into a white man’s country.  
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Background to the Study 
 The desire of transforming the highlands into a white man’s country was mainly 
based on economical reasons. Opening the protectorate for trade was vital for the 
British Government which had, since the early 1890s, been planning to build a railroad 
as a strategic measure to secure its presence on the Upper Nile River. The EAP officially 
became a part of the British Empire on 1 June 1895. The decision to establish a 
protectorate over Uganda led the British government to realize the necessity of linking 
the east coast to the interior for a greater penetration and exploitation of resources. On 5 
August 1896, the construction of the Uganda Railway started in Mombasa. The railroad 
marked the beginning of colonial conquest, justified on the basis of practicality and 
profitability. The building of the railway did not lead to profitability for the EAP. From 
1895 until 1913, the colonial administration was forced to rely on annual grants-in-aid 
from the British government. 
British conquest and interference in African societies was the logical consequence 
of the railway project. It also had an emotional justification. For those who believed that 
the Africans still needed protection against slave traders, a stronger British presence in 
Africa was quite understandable. Beside protection from the evils of enslavement, the 
civilizing mission found good ground in justifying the British presence in the region. 
Christianity was introduced inside East Africa to educate and turn the Africans away 
from their traditional beliefs. The advent of colonial rule reinforced and encouraged a 
greater propagation of the gospel. The missionaries set the stage for the westernization 
of East Africa by diffusing their culture and values. These were important vectors of 
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social change for the so-called “lower races.”  When numbers of European settlers 
arrived in East Africa from 1902, they embraced the same attitude.8 
Civilizing the non-white races, from the British perspective, was philosophically 
up-to-date in the beginning of the 1900s. John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940), in his 
work Imperialism: A Study, justified his choice of the term “lower races” because of the 
prevailing Eurocentric interpretation of non-white cultures. Hobson argued that the 
non-whites brought under imperialist rule were at the mercy of European powers who 
promoted their economic interests under the blanket of civilizing missions and 
philanthropy at any cost. For Hobson: 
The real issue is whether, and under what circumstances, it is justifiable for 
Western nations to compulsory government for the control and education in the 
art of industrial and political civilization of the inhabitants of tropical countries 
and other so-called lower races. Because Rhodesian mine-owners and Cuban 
sugar-growers stimulate the British or American Government to Imperialism by 
parading motives and results which do not really concern them, does not follow 
these motives under proper guidance are unsound, or that the results are 
undesirable.9 
 
However, he also admitted that the native races cannot be left alone; though he 
insisted upon the necessity of certain safeguards to avoid their exploitation for 
mercenary purposes. The British presence on the Upper Nile was not meant to protect 
de facto the Africans from exploitation, but rather to solidify Britain’s grasp in that very 
strategic part of Africa. Their presence in East Africa was practical and tactical in order 
to keep other European powers from monopolizing trade.  
  To maintain British leadership and economic predominance, new markets and 
raw materials had to be found and seized by force, or through policy manipulation of the 
                                                 
8 Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, 27-28. 
9 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1902), 228. 
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local people. For an empire that spanned the globe, pacification was considered a 
practical policy. The construction of the railway aided in the pacification of the interior 
and also facilitated the economic development of the interior. The line was completed 
on 20 December 1901. With the high cost of the project, the pressure to make the 
railroad pay for its investment rose.  
Sorrenson’s work pinpointed the high cost of the Uganda railway as a concern for 
some important British politicians. He noted that: “Chamberlain and those who 
accepted his idea of developing Britain’s imperial estates expected private citizens to 
carry the burden of development.”10   Any settlement that could reduce the financial 
burden of the British taxpayer was welcomed to justify the positive presence of the 
expanding empire. The railroad construction was considered as a public undertaking 
managed by a committee of experts in London. Sufficient investment became a burden 
because the capital costs were financed by British Treasury loans. There was 
disagreement about the sufficient budget allocation for building the line from Mombasa 
to Kisumu:  
In August 1895, when a vote of £20,000 for preliminary expenses was requested, 
the estimated cost of the line was fixed at £1,755,000. A year later, when the 
Uganda Railway Bill was introduced, the cost was raised to £3,000,000. This 
sum was not nearly sufficient: in 1900 the Foreign Office had to ask for another £ 
1,930,000 and in 1902 for a further £600,000. As the annual interest and sinking 
fund charges on these loans amounted to £319,112 the Treasury was to insist on a 
                                                 
10 Sorrenson, Origins, 76. 
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more rigid supervision of the East Africa Protectorate finances and the disposal of 
land than was normally the case.11  
With financial difficulties such as these, there was no time, energy or budget for 
any kind of regional conflict. The British expected revenues to cover the cost of the 
project once the trains started rolling. The question of profitability and economic 
prosperity became a priority for the Foreign Office (FO). 
 It was after the completion of the railroad that some British officials, like Eliot, 
decided to shape the economic and political future of the protectorate. Eliot “took the 
initiative in both formulating and executing a policy which had as its ideal the 
foundation of a white man’s country.”12  That would affect all parties in a plural society 
that resulted from Eliot’s invitation. Accommodating the settlers became a priority for 
him. It is important to understand that Eliot’s intention in promoting and regulating the 
settlement process was due to the fact that the first British adventurers who stepped foot 
in the region saw an apparent under-population. The new strategy emerged under the 
name of the “land distribution” or “the local partition of interior Africa” for the benefit 
of any settlers. The settlers seemed already to have developed a pattern of behavior in 
which they thought that they could settle anywhere, as they did in New Zealand and 
South Africa;  so why not in the “New Virgin Plains” of pre-colonial Kenya?   In his book, 
Sir Charles Eliot stated that, “We have in East Africa the rare experience of dealing with 
a tabula rasa, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do as 
we will, regulate immigration, and open or close the door as seems best.”13   
                                                 
11 Ibid., 20. 
12 M. P. K. Sorrenson, “Land Policy in Kenya 1895-1945,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2 eds. Vincent 
Harlow, et al. (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1965), 672. 
13  Sir Charles Eliot, East Africa Protectorate (New York: Barnes & Nobles, 1966), 103. 
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Nevertheless, before Eliot’s arrival in the protectorate, the idea of European 
settlement was not thought of as something to be encouraged. The first Europeans who 
carried out expeditions in the region did not think it possible or suitable for Europeans 
to settle down. There was a cloud of skepticism about the possibilities of being 
successful in the far interior. The early attempts at settlement during the Imperial 
British East Africa (IBEA) Company period resulted in great disappointment, before the 
railroad era. Some British citizens who attempted to settle in the highlands got 
discouraged. They packed and went back to their true native land in Europe. Sir Harry 
Johnston, an important explorer, linguist and colonial administrator, was among the 
early skeptics who did not believe that Europeans could adapt in the region easily. 
Johnston had long believed in the development of Africa in racial harmony, and so could 
speak of this land also as a possible “America of the Hindu.”14  John Dawson Ainsworth, 
another important actor, further espoused the same attitude as Johnston.  
  With all the incertitude and speculations about a European future in the region, 
Indian peasants and traders were thought to be the best alternative for settlement. Just 
before the completion of the railroad, Ainsworth suggested the idea of introducing 
Punjabi cultivators to back up African agriculture. Ainsworth’s view was to first develop 
agriculture in the region before any plan of European involvement in local economic 
development. On July 13, 1899, from his provincial headquarters, he wrote to acting 
commissoner C. Craufurd stating that “there would not be the same scope for European 
emigrants as is for Indians. For a large number of Europeans the country does not, at 
present, hold out sufficient inducements; naturally Europeans need to make more 
                                                 
14 G. Bennett, “Settlers and politics in Kenya,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2 eds., Vincent Harlow, et al 
(Oxford:  Clarendon, 1965), 265. 
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money than does a native of India.”15  Johnston saw the Indian alternative with a very 
positive eye, too. The Indian settlement proposal in the almost “vacant” highlands, if 
successful, would be the pillar foundation to encourage Europeans arrival and definitive 
takeover. Yet, such Indian experimentation in the highland was not well received by Sir 
Charles Eliot, who replaced Sir Arthur Hardinge as commissioner of the EAP on 
December 30 1900.  
 Following Eliot’s arrival, the settlement proposal that was going to encourage 
Indian influx into the region changed. For Eliot, the best plan was to deal with the 
tabula rasa by encouraging European settlement in the highlands and redirecting 
Indians into the lowlands. Any other aliens or indigenous group must stay away from 
the activity zone of the railroad. The policy of exclusion took shape under Eliot’s 
administration. The scheme was for people of European descent to have the best land 
for free, upon invitation, the Indian to be confined in the lowlands and the local people 
to accept the new socio-economic order. It was a clear scheme of segregation, 
discrimination and arrogance. In Eliot’s plan of regulating immigration, Europeans 
could come and settle down as long as they were white and Christian like Lord 
Delamere, one of the most influential early settlers. Under that indirect requirement for 
settlement, immigrants came from South Africa. Most of them had to be placated 
because Eliot promised land to whites coming from South Africa; and so they came, 
armed with a spirit of adventure. The promise of getting free land in the highlands was 
too succulent to resist.  
                                                 
15 Ainsworth to Crauford, 13 July 1899, quoted in Robert Maxon, John Ainsworth and the making of 
Kenya (Lanham: MD: University Press of America, 1980), 78.  
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 From Eliot’s time, European settlement was the means used to encourage the 
economic development of the protectorate. The authorities on location in the EAP hoped 
to make the railroad pay for its cost by accommodating settlers in the best areas possible 
along the railroad. Some of the Europeans, guided by a spirit of opening a new frontier, 
wanted land wherever they thought was most convenient for them. Europeans, 
Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans were informed about the prospect of 
enjoying a potential paradise in the EAP. Those invited to settle in the protectorate, were 
in one sense, unwanted people, during Britain’s great industrial revolution of the 
nineteenth century. Some of the Europeans from South Africa were Boers who already 
had a reputation of being racist. This attitude, de entrada, stripped away all hope of 
future cohabitation between settlers and Kenyans, spawning a disaster waiting to 
happen.   The socio-political upheaval caused by the influx of European settlers would 
later have its impact in Kenya’s political history. The seed of injustice was sown when 
the Africans started to realize that they were losing their land. For instance, the Kikuyu 
community that was affected the most by that phenomenon of land grabbing later 
described the process as such:  
When the Whitemen first came we did not understand that we were to be 
deprived of any of our land, nor that they had really come to stay. A small piece of 
land here and there was sold to a few of the first pioneers  and to one or two 
Missions voluntarily by its owners in the time of the I.B.E.A. Company. When the 
British Government took over the administration of the country we still were 
unaware that our possession of our land would be questioned of challenged.  
Then from about the year 1902 increasing numbers of Whitemen arrived, and 
portions of our land began to be given out to them for farms, until large areas in 
Kyambu, Limoru, Kikuyu, Mbagathi, about Nairobi, and at Ruiru and beyond, 
had been disposed of in this way. These land were not bought from their Kikuyu 
owners, and any compensation they received (for land actually under cultivation 
only, and at an extremely small rate per acre) was quite inadequate. The Natives 
on them had either to become squatters (on what had been their own land) or 
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else move off. Many of them to-day are squatters on up-country European estates 
and many have become wanders, moving from one estate to another. 16 
 
It was clear that from the beginning of European settlement in the EAP, the legitimacy 
of the process of land acquisition became a concern of the authorities in London. 
 The plan for the EAP was based on a “fair land policy” and legislation dictated by 
London. In the early settlement days, the British authorities, “very loyal to their Crown,” 
managed to define and acquire land through their legislation. With that mind set, their 
legislation allowed them to have the right to consider, and strongly believe, that all land 
in the EAP, apart from the coastal areas, was to be for the Crown. White settlement 
received paramount consideration, which meant that land policy favorable to them had 
to be pushed before any African interests.  
In the early EAP administration, the arrival of the European settlers left a 
considerable political and economic imprint. They vehemently tried to obtain 
representative government without inclusion of the others races that could just be taxed 
as subjects. John Lonsdale depicted it in this paragraph he wrote about the attitude and 
impact of the newcomers on the white highlands. 
White settlement was both the baronial consolidation of conquest and the chief 
threat to the politics of control. If it could not have politically dependent but 
independently productive small farmers, the Colonial Office came round to the 
view that it must have big capitalists instead. Big capital would provide the state 
with a different but equally controllable answer to the nervous ‘rhinoceros 
questions’ of African rights in expanded production. It was ‘no good trying to lay 
hold of Tropical Africa with naked fingers’. What was wanted was ‘tireless 
engines, not weary men; cheap power, not cheap labour’. Capital was the axe with 
which to cut a path through political jungles as well as nature’s. If only it could be 
                                                 
16 Extract From a Memorandum presented to the Parliamentary Commission in November 1924 by 
Kikuyu (Native) Association in William McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within (London: Frank Cass and 
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given room to exploit African land, then the state could ‘regulate in full and 
intricate detail’ the relations between capitalists and the few skilled workers they 
would need.  And the colonial state was indeed a cartographer; maps were its 
image of order. They showed strategic bases and frontiers zones, they marked 
property and the absence of it. White settlement filled in dangerous spaces with 
roads, fields and boundary beacons. The imagery should not be underestimated, 
and the reality hoped for, contented black labour on quiet farms with mortgages, 
producing payloads for a railway with a sinking fund [that] was itself the image of 
the civilizing mission, the self-justifying myth of the state as well as its mirage of 
calm.17 
 Meanwhile in London, totally ignoring African rights pertaining to the delicate issue of 
land was a question of concern. For Eliot, however, the matter was simple. Europeans 
were not to be compared with any other group of people in the region. They were on top 
of the developing situation and in control of the terrain. This attitude inspired much of 
the European political activity described in this dissertation. 
Study Area 
The arrival of the settlers caused a sudden transformation of the highlands when 
the early officials decided to open vast tracts of land for development. Generous 
subsidies were given to fortune seekers like Delamere for cattle ranching and cash crop 
production like sisal and coffee. The geographical characteristic and diverse climate of 
East Africa gave hope to a possible economic boost that would hopefully alleviate the 
burden on the Treasury from pouring more money into the protectorate. The new land 
must be opened for business. The highlands, situated perfectly in the central part of the 
EAP, were seemingly waiting for new owners to make them flourish. They were highly 
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Ochieng’, (Nairobi:  Evans Brothers, 1980), 25. 
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viewed as the ideal place for settlement. These highlands also stretch into the present-
day nations of day nations of Tanzania and Uganda. 
These spectacular elevations stem from the legacy of our planet reshaping itself 
through volcanic activities in the remote past. The mightiest highlands are the ones 
found in central Kenya, which is covered in the geographical context of this study. The 
eastern branch of the famous Rift Valley snakes its way throughout the highlands. 
Tectonic forces caused geologic movements that gave birth to the Rift Valley. Opposing 
parallel cliffs with various elevations, extending as far as the eyes can see, delimit the 
Rift Valley giving it a unique topography and climate that characterizes central Kenya: 
Kenya is about as large as France, with an area of around 582,600 sq.km, or 
225,000 sq. miles. Most of it is arid steppe, in some places virtual desert, usable 
only for extensive pastoralism by sparse populations. Not more than about 14 per 
cent, or 80, 000 sq. km, is suitable for agriculture or more intensive grazing. This 
high potential land is concentrated in the south-western corner of the country, 
400 km (250 miles) and more from the coast. It is enclosed by the 1,000 mm (20 
inches) for at least seven years in every ten. This is the area of the Kenya 
highlands, split down the middle by the Rift Valley. It was the scene of the second 
and third phases of the colonial conquest.18 The region is one of natural beauty 
and the first Europeans who surveyed this land marveled at it. The highlands of 
central Kenya later became the stage of important political and social 
developments because, in the process of territorial expansion, land became very 
important. Land was a valuable source of income and a good way to have social 
and political prestige. Consequently, land ownership became critical in Kenya. 
The amazing topography of inland Kenya and its nearly temperate climate 
triggered a land rush for British citizens. It also attracted settlers coming from 
South Africa. British officers assigned to the EAP decided to accommodate their 
compatriots, who logically chose to settle on the best land. New towns developed 
with the consolidation of power in the protectorate. Nairobi became the most 
important town in the interior with the highest numbers of settlers. 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 11. 
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Nairobi was founded in 1899 and owed its expansion to the railway that 
connected it to Mombasa. It became an important center of political decisions that 
would shape not only the economic destiny of the protectorate, but also its political 
future. Nairobi became a politically active capital. Settlers arrived and voiced their 
demands for economic assistance and total political control. Nairobi provided all the 
services that one could expect from emerging colonial town embracing a capitalist 
system at the expense of the Africans who lost their land and rights to be politically 
involved in the administration of the protectorate. In the growing town of Nairobi, 
African and Indians were relegated to the worst areas.19                                          
Structure of the Dissertation 
             Following this introductory chapter, this study of European political activity 
during the 1902-1912 period will be roughly structured around the administrations of 
the British commissioners/governors appointed to administer the EAP. These were 
short but eventful as each of the administrations, beginning with that of Sir Charles 
Eliot, dealt with similar issues closely related to European settlement, such as land, 
labor, and the settlers’ demands for a voice in administration of the protectorate. 
Nevertheless, each administrator approached his charge in differing ways and met with 
varied challenges in dealing with those and other issues. 
             This principle of organization has produced chapters of varying length for, as will 
be seen, all but one of these leaders served an incomplete term in charge. Thus chapter 2 
focuses on Sir Charles Eliot’s term in office that marked the start of European 
settlement and the initial European political activity and organization. The next chapter 
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focuses on the brief tenure of Sir Donald Stewart (1904-05) which was marked by the 
CO takeover of supervision of the EAP. Chapter 4 details European agitation during the 
turbulent administration of Sir James Hayes Sadler (1905-09) while the fifth chapter 
details the disastrous tenure of Sir Percy Girouard (1909-1912). The final chapter will 
provide a conclusion and perspective for the study.    
Review of Related Literature 
In the EAP, the European settlers’ quest for political dominance was inspired by 
the southern African–style minority self government that led to white supremacy in 
South Africa. It was clear that the political situation in South Africa translated into the 
political mind set of the settlers originating from the south. Their political aspirations 
were part of the settlement scheme started by Eliot.  When Eliot gave the best lands to 
the settlers to develop, the stage was set for the guests to enter into the political arena of 
the protectorate’s administration.  
The newcomers started echoing their voices in the affairs of the protectorate and 
the way local officials responded did not always please London, who had to recall some 
of them. The formulation of policy was often very controversial. The political effect of 
the settlers’ initial presence in the EAP has not been adequately examined. Today the 
critical primary documents of the communication between offices and officials in 
London and in the protectorate are available. The early political history of the EAP can 
now be reevaluated with tangible sources, which will be of great historical significance to 
the colonial and most recent history of the people of Kenya.20 
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A study of the settlers’ political demands in the EAP will mainly be based on the 
CO archives that are now accessible. Few scholars who were interested in the early 
political stage of the protectorate have touched these. Despite that interest, there are not 
many specific studies that have made extensive use of CO records for the period 
delimiting this work. This is due to the fact that the primary sources were not available 
when most of the studies about the settlers’ political demands were conducted. The 
economic history of the protectorate and its consequences seemed more worthy of 
attention in its own right. British policy in the EAP merited a more detailed study than 
had been attempted. Retracing the settlers’ political demands and their consequences is 
intended to be a new pedestal for further work to build upon; and that is why it is 
important to cover the critical ten year period before the protectorate became a crown 
colony. 
 Among the most prominent published works relevant for this dissertation are 
from Marjorie Ruth Dilley and George Bennett. They pinpointed the relevance of the 
political climate of the protectorate as soon as the settlers started growing in numbers in 
the protectorate. Their work represented a great attempt with good intention to 
recapture the British policy in the EAP. In British Policy in Kenya Colony, Dilley 
recognized the difficulties she faced in backing up her research.21  Prior to the 
publication of her work, she affirmed that there was a certain amount of unpublished 
material which she used during the course of her study but which she was not permitted 
to cite. Her work was done in the early thirties when access to the colonial records was 
not yet allowed. Dilley recaptured the nature and spirit of the newcomers who saw 
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themselves as frontiersmen entitled to lands and rights of their own. Dilley showed the 
key aspirations of the settlers, which was to acquire land, exploit it, obtain cheap labor, 
and indirectly impose a favorable political system for themselves without paying 
attention to the purpose and meaning of a protectorate. She shows that the term 
“protectorate” did not fully encompass the right of the Africans, Arabs and Indians. Her 
work would have been excellent if there was not a hold on the sources she needed to 
better express the political mindset of the officials who ran the protectorate.  
The work of George Bennett, Kenya’s pioneer political historian, on the same 
topic fell in the same category as Dilley’s.22  More work has been done about the 
administration of the protectorate. A detailed analysis of the settlers’ political demands 
has been overshadowed by the economic issues that the protectorate faced and also the 
question of land distribution and labor. Robert Maxon’s work, mentioned earlier, 
recaptured the power struggle over the control of the protectorate.23  Maxon showed 
that the CO did not always exercise total control over the region due to the fact that, 
most often the wrong officials, but with impressive credentials, had been sent to the 
protectorate, but had no idea or did not care about the political consequences of their 
actions. His work benefited from the use of available sources, but covered the years 1912 
- 1923. This period overlaps with this research that will start in 1902.  
 British Rule in Kenya by G.H. Mungeam covered the period of 1895 to 1912.24  
His work retraced the experience of the men on the spot. Despite his emphasis on the 
importance of British policy formulation enforced by commissioners, governors and 
other officials in a chronological manner, his work is more of  a biographical 
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compilation than a deep insight into  the political climate that existed between 
interested parties in the protectorate. Mungeam pointed out that British rule interfered 
with the African way of life and marked a beginning of change, but he did not develop 
the primary reasons for that mutation. Change had been triggered by the British 
presence in the region and had been accentuated by Eliot’s invitation extended to 
European settlers who were coming mainly from South Africa. As soon as they grew in 
number, they felt the need to organize themselves.  However, Mungeam’s book does not 
make settler politics its main focus, and neither does Origins of European Settlement in 
Kenya, by Sorrenson. 
Nevertheless, Sorrenson underscored how the problem of land distribution 
triggered the tension between the CO and the settlers. Massive land alienation for white 
settlement gave birth to political aspirations for a potential control of the protectorate. 
That meant gearing towards self-government. His work shows the concerns of the CO 
about the economic and political future of the protectorate. He focused more on the 
origins of land appropriation and the redefinition of the idea of pushing the frontier for 
settlement and its consequences. Settlers came from South Africa, and the CO that 
assumed responsibility for the EAP in April 1905 had to monitor them by formulating 
the right policy from the East African Department.  Sorrenson did not make the settlers’ 
political demands that followed settlement the main argument of his work.  
The origins of settlement had a direct connection with the question of occupation 
without taking full consideration of the African rights. The protectorate could become a 
country carved for white settlement, catering to their needs. Sorrenson considered 
arbitrary land grabbing at the expense of the African as a developing problem that could 
degenerate into a conflict in the region between newcomers and Africans. The idea of 
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establishing a white man’s country was on the horizon in the early administration of the 
protectorate. The work of some Europeans who also came as settlers flirted with the idea 
of a white man’s country in the making. 
E. Huxley’s most prominent work valued the entrepreneurial character of settlers 
like Delamere.25  Studies of the political changes due to settlers’ influence had not been 
extensive and objective at all. Nevertheless, a two volume biography of the most 
influential political leader among the settlers was written by Huxley. She introduced 
Delamere as a model among the settlers. She considered the presence of the settlers as 
beneficial for the protectorate. Huxley could be considered as a woman of her time 
whose parents came to seek fortune as well in the EAP. Her first book was a reflection of 
how some settlers like Delamere saw themselves in the early years of the EAP. Lord 
Delemere (Hugh Cholmondely, 1870- 1931) was a fortune seeker and pioneer before he 
decided to permanently settle in Kenya. He was a farmer and an active politician 
representing the settlers’ community. He loved hunting, land and power. He almost 
achieved all under the watch of weak officials who sympathized with his ideas. The 
success of Delamere was what most settlers were seeking. Huxley’s work praised the 
achievements of Delamere, who rubbed shoulders with important officials and almost 
all the governors sent to the protectorate. He used his reputation and charisma to 
influence the policy making of the protectorate for the benefit of the settlers. The settlers 
organized themselves around him. Huxley’s book about Delamere was published in 
1935, and paradoxically, a similar definitive work about another influential and 
eccentric settler was published long after the demise of the British Empire. 
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Delamere was not the only settler with a high desire of success and adventure. 
Ewart Scott Grogan (1873- 1967) was another flamboyant settler and adventurer who 
fell in love with the exotic character of Africa through readings while growing up in 
London. In 1896, he traveled from Capetown to Cairo. He arrived in the EAP in 1903, 
and rode the wave of settler support. He became the president of the Colonists’ 
Association  (CA) and then the Convention of Associations (C of A). Grogan served in 
the Legislative Council (Legco), and was not shy in confronting the colonial officials in 
Nairobi or even the British government itself. Nine decades after Grogan’s arrival in the 
protectorate and thirty-four years after his death, Edward Paice paid him a tribute by 
writing his biography.26  Paice portrayed him as a formidable adventurer, risk-taker and 
go-getter, despite the fact that Grogan advocated European political supremacy in the 
protectorate. Paice’s work followed the same line as Huxley’s book about Delamere. The 
biography of the settler leaders like Delamere and Grogan were mostly based on second-
hand information written by admirers of the adventurers. What makes Paice’s work 
important is that it brings back the context in which policy was formulated in the EAP, 
and the people who at that time were involved and the consequences that defined the 
political future of the region.  
 There is no doubt that biographical works about the newcomers in the EAP have 
been extensive; but again, they rarely retraced objectively the real political aspirations of 
the settlers. Most of these works did not use viable primary sources. Huxley and Paice 
never had the opportunity to interview the leaders of the settlers’ political movement. 
Their works glorified the determination of the daring settlers who truly believed in the 
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idea of transforming the political economy of the EAP and obtaining self-government. 
There were contradictions between what the settlers wanted and what the CO was being 
briefed. Reports of the political development of the protectorate to London did not 
reflect the true reality of how policy was being formulated by the men on the spot. There 
were favoritism and a laissez-faire attitude triggered by the tremendous pressures that 
the settlers’ associations exercised on almost all the governors who were sent to 
administer the protectorate.  
Bruce Berman captured the contradictions of policy within the CS when the 
settlers arrived and tried to survive and prosper in a new social, economic and political 
environment. In Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya,27 Berman used extensive 
primary sources, including numerous interviews with Kenyan and British participants to 
show these contradictions and their consequences. As Richard Waller pointed out in a 
review: 
Professor Berman argues that the colonial state was shaped by the 
contradictions between maintaining effective political control with limited 
coercive force and ensuring the profitable articulation of metropolitan and 
settler capitalism with African societies. This dialectic of domination resulted 
in both the uneven transformation of indigenous societies and in the 
reconstruction of administrative control in the inter-war period. The study 
traces the evolution of the colonial state from its skeletal beginnings in the 
1890s to the complex bureaucracy of the post-1945 era which managed the 
growing integration of the colony with international capital. These 
contradictions led to the political crisis of the Mau Mau emergency in 1952 and 
to the undermining of the colonial state. 28 
 
Berman’s work benefited more from the availability of extant archives than 
some earlier works did. Nevertheless, other important works from people who 
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witnessed the early political development of the protectorate should also be 
considered as relevant, but not fully satisfactory. It is complex to really know the 
motives that prompt them to denounce the way the protectorate was run by most of 
officials sent by London. The poignant records of a medical officer like Norman Leys, 
and also an official like McGregor Ross in the British administration in East Africa, 
ideally reflected the results of the impact of British colonialism on traditional African 
life. Norman Leys and William McGregor Ross witnessed the political development of 
the EAP and wrote about it.  
The publication of Kenya by Leys was a critique of the interference caused by the 
new system established in the EAP. 29  The British presence in East Africa brought 
change that led to a collision of cultures. Leys’ work was an effort to denounce injustices 
and mismanaged capitalism and its impact on Africa and Africans. Leys’ book was a 
radiant critique of European imperialism, contrary to many officials and settlers who 
thought that there was little worth preserving in Africa’s traditional social fabric that 
they viewed as “primitive.”  As the society changed with the arrival of the Europeans, the 
political affairs of the protectorate became more and more a concern for the CO and 
humanitarians like Leys. There was favoritism encouraged by the men on the spot due 
to the settlers’ constant push for more political concessions. Starting from 
Commissioner Eliot, all the governors that followed in administrating the protectorate 
fell under the pressure of the settlers who wanted more representatives in the Legco. 
Leys comments on these developments: 
Nominally the governor, who can dispose of an official majority in his councils, is 
under the control of the Colonial Secretary, who in turn is responsible to 
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Parliament. Actually the influence of the European colonists has hitherto been 
decisive of events. Governors are frequently referred to in public as the colonists’ 
defenders against the Colonial Office, and most recently, governors have 
acquiesced in such a conception of their position. The passage of the Duke of 
Devonshire’s dispatch, in which he dismisses the proposal of responsible 
government, is not taken seriously by the European Colony, but is regarded as 
one of those merely formal statements whereby humanitarian sentiment in 
England is satisfied. 30 
 
The Devonshire dispatch was a huge political blow for the settlers. Partisan 
politics was obvious in the protectorate and Leys denounced it in his work. He blamed 
the officials who sympathized with the settlers, who were a numerical minority, and the 
last to arrive in the protectorate. The newcomers wanted to be served first. That itself 
created concerns in London and also among some humanitarians like Leys himself. The 
problem with Leys’ work as being critical by directly pointing a finger at the officials 
formulating policy that benefited European settlers, and undermining the Africans’ 
rights, is that Leys’ political ideology was not sympathetic to the extreme capitalist 
system being set up in the EAP. Leys, therefore, was viewed as an unsentimental 
socialist who thought of the British rule of Africans as an unnatural monstrosity, a well 
packaged system that tagged capitalism at its worst. Leys’ work is often classified as 
belonging to the less sentimental groups of white critics of British imperialism. His work 
was geared toward the defense of African rights in the face of the evils of capitalism and 
extreme European interference that was a threat to traditional African societal settings. 
 Keeping up with political developments in Kenya became so captivating that 
Ross decided to keep track of it. He kept his records straight and wrote about Kenya. 
The publication of Kenya from Within in 1927 was an immense effort that tried to keep 
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track of the political developments in the protectorate.31  Ross, while in the service of the 
British Government, kept a dairy of all the political developments that were 
transforming the protectorate and its mixed population. Ross acknowledged the 
difficulties of his task while attempting to record the political transformation of the 
protectorate. He stated that:  “It is only to be expected that this book suffers, in places 
from faults inherent in accounts of heated political happenings written by one who 
played parts, varying from inconspicuous to prominent, in some of them, and who took 
a lively interest in them all.”32  Ross admitted that he tried to be accurate, and he 
modestly opened the door for any correction by any who might discover inaccuracy later 
on. Ross’ work had a great significance because it pointed out the direction to follow to 
properly understand the struggle within the protectorate among all parties involved. 
Ross’ major deficiency was the unavailability of primary sources to back up his research.  
The most recent work relevant to this study is Brett Shadle’s The Souls of White 
Folk: White Settlement in Kenya, 1900s-1920s. Shadle provides a detailed account of 
the early social history relating to Kenya’s settlers, including their views on their lives 
and experiences in the highlands. His conclusion that “White settlement was based on 
the equation of civilization with (a difficult to define) whiteness was emotionally 
enriched through notions of paternalism and trusteeship; appeared consistently under 
threat from Africans, colonial administration, judiciary, and fellow settlers; and was 
shored up daily through rituals of prestige, difference, humiliation, and violence” is 
important in providing and understanding for the attitudes adopted by European 
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migrants.33 While Shadle’s book sheds much light on the attitudes of Kenya’s early 
settlers, the book gives little attention to politics and political organizations. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presents a case for a need to reevaluate the political history of the 
EAP between 1902 and 1912. The challenge here is to chronologically follow the settlers’ 
political demands in the EAP according to each administration. This work will analyze 
the political demands of the European settlers, starting from Eliot’s time in the 
protectorate (1900-1904), being the first commissioner sacked by the CO, through that 
of Sir Percy Girouard, who also was sacked in 1912. The administrations of these two 
officials, who formulated policy that deliberately facilitated the interest of the settlers, 
provide the purpose of this work. The political arena of the protectorate, and what 
politically happened on that stage, per se, is worthy of  re-enactment,  taking into 
account the availability of the original nature of all the communication between Nairobi 
and London. It is well known that there were dispatches sent by the CO to intervene and 
readdress the political destiny of the protectorate.  Some of them brought news of top 
officials who were supposed to run the protectorate fairly and effectively, as being 
recalled. The political stage looked like a political fiasco because there was no room or 
will for a political co-habitation that would welcome all the people in the so-called 
“protectorate.”  Commissioners and governors sent to the protectorate during the 
decade under study did not last long.  
They did not administer the protectorate in a satisfactory manner that would 
have benefited all the people then present in the region. Navigating through the CO 
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records will finally help to reopen and reevaluate the early political history of the EAP, 
with the European settlers as the main focus. They tried in vain to achieve self 
government in East Africa, which they thought would be an exclusive white man’s 
country. As most of the works mentioned in the literature review did not use the CO 
records to shed light on the settlers’ political aspirations, this work seeks to 
chronologically re-navigate the critical political history of the EAP according to the 
successive line of British officials and their failed policies for an evolving melting pot of 
society. The settlers’ growing political influence and extreme aspirations raised 
fundamental moral and political issues concerning the existence of a timetable to fully 
implement African rights in the protectorate. 
The settlers’ pursuit of happiness, prosperity and full political rights turned the 
protectorate into a subject of national debate in the British parliament. The rights of the 
Africans, who supposedly needed “civilization,” were ignored by important officials like 
Eliot. The political developments following the building of the railroad and European 
settlement are worthy of a detailed study in order to understand the notion of empire 
and interference in what is often called the “Dark Continent” or “white man’s country,” 







An Open Invitation to some Conflictive British Outlanders into the EAP: A 




  The arrival and settlement of people of European descent in the EAP in the early 
twentieth century was mainly the work of Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot.  He promised 
land to settlers who were willing to come and help develop the region.  Settlers from 
South Africa took the lead and others came from Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand 
and other British colonies.  The commissioner did all that he could to attract settlers 
from different classes and backgrounds.  There were aristocrats, business adventurers, 
small and big farmers, Anglo-Boer war veterans and land speculators.  W.S. Churchill, 
who visited the EAP in 1907, took particular notice of them, describing the whole lot as 
typical “political animals”.34  The then under secretary for the colonies’ remark meant 
that the European newcomers were not just actively engaged in politics; but they were at 
the same time big trouble makers, very demanding and difficult to please. Their 
presence and political ambition in this new British dependency signaled the beginning 
of an era of ambiguous and contradictory policy formulations that solely benefited 
them.  The new situation became a mounting problem for the powers in London. That 
way of doing politics by leaving the majority population behind did not last forever, but 
it left an enduring legacy in Kenya’s political history. 
 The influx of European settlers brought a new socio-political dynamic to the 
protectorate.  With the commissioner on their side, they tried to define, develop and 
defend their interests.   The settlers saw the need to form political parties, a key 
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instrument for the acquisition and exercise of state power in a British colony.  They 
sought to use party politics to achieve their group and personal interests.  The future 
terminus of their political ambition was the attainment of self-government on the model 
of South Africa.  In other words, they progressively wanted total political control of the 
protectorate.  Their demands sparked a struggle between differing, competing and often 
antagonistic interests.  The rights of both the Africans and the Indians, who came before 
the European settlers, were to be taken into account by the FO.  
 Nevertheless, under the supervision of the FO and the eye of British 
humanitarians and the India Office, Eliot simply did not have all the power in his hands 
to formulate policies solely benefiting his preferred settlers.  Settlers’ political demands 
were not totally accepted by the FO, which sent the commissioner to administrate the 
protectorate.  Despite this limitation of power, he started formulating policy that he 
thought was the best for the protectorate.   Eliot’s failure to listen and report to the FO 
officials in London about the question of his arbitrary land allocations to some settlers 
led to his dismissal.  However, it remained manifest that the impact of his 
administration triggered a political contagion dominated by settlers’ demands that 
successive governors sent to make the protectorate profitable had to wrestle with.  The 
political struggle of the settlers was not yet over with the sacking of Eliot.  In fact, the 
settlers geared their political parties to channel their demands in order to protect their 




Sir Charles Eliot: The progenitor of European settlement in the EAP 
In December 1900, Sir Charles 
Eliot succeeded Sir Arthur Hardinge as 
Commissioner of the EAP.  In February 
1901, he arrived in the EAP.  He was also 
responsible, as the Consul-General, for 
the administration of Zanzibar, an island 
off the coast of East Africa.  He was a 
career diplomat who had served in the 
United States of America, Russia, and the 
Near East.  He thus had international 
experience that could potentially help 
him administrate the EAP.  That was the 
main reason why the FO sought him out 
as a replacement for Sir Arthur Hardinge.  The new commissioner was well educated 
and charismatic.   Eliot projected an image of being the right man on the spot, ready to 
defend British interests in East Africa.   
Most of his contemporaries thought quite highly of him, esteeming Eliot as one of 
the most able men for the administration of the protectorate.  As nice as the first 
accolades from the officials in the protectorate were, Eliot was not the most affable 
diplomat. Within a few months of his arrival, he complained that so far his subordinates 
had acted  “‘much as Consuls act in the Levant’, merely confining their duties to hearing 
complaints, redressing grievances and writing reports. They had done little to 
Image 1: Sir Charles Eliot. Source: Mungeam, 
British Rule, 70. 
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administer or develop the country.”35  Unlike these officials, the second commissioner 
displayed the zeal of a pragmatic administrator in his objectives to change the economic 
direction of the protectorate.  
However, Eliot did not receive any specific instructions to prepare him for the 
work of mainland administration.  He took initiatives to run the protectorate the way he 
thought was the best without seeking extensive guidance from the FO.  Eliot was very 
confident with his plan to bring positive changes in the protectorate.  The commissioner 
made suggestions for improving administration and investigating the commercial 
possibilities of the country.  The FO listened enthusiastically to him as he made his first 
moves towards developing the protectorate.   In addition he had gained “a most 
favourable impression’ of the prospects for European colonization in the highlands.”36   
 It was apparent that the commissioner seemed to have fostered a hidden political 
agenda, one that favored the European settlers above all others, like in South Africa.  He 
had a vision of transforming the highlands of the protectorate into a white man’s 
country.  Eliot argued “the interior of the Protectorate is a white man’s country…. It is 
mere hypocrisy not to admit that white interest must be paramount, and that the main 
object of our policy and legislation should be to found a white colony.”37 Eliot did not 
have to look far to find a model of success for European settlement in Africa.  As the 
European emigration to South Africa proved to be successful, Eliot decided to adopt the 
same strategy to create a white man’s country in East Africa.  He strongly believed that 
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the opening of the protectorate could give an avenue to European settlers who could 
later reproduce the South African model of self- government. 
  The commissioner’s energetic approach resembled those of the former autocratic 
governor of the Cape Colony, Lord Charles Somerset (1814-26), who in his intention of 
transforming that colony into a prosperous British holding declared that: 
Settlers possessing sufficient means were encouraged to engage at least ten able-
bodied individuals in agricultural pursuits rather than in the maintenance of large herds 
of cattle, thus forming a cordon of close settlement against the inroads of savage life. On 
100-acre allotments for each adult male emigrant ‘in most healthy and temperate 
climate in the universe,’ distressed labourer and aspiring lord would come together in 
the re-creation of their vision of English landed society. Free from ‘contamination of 
slavery,’ independent of native labour, and based on ‘mixed body of agriculturalists and 
mechanics,’ gentry and laborer would ‘reciprocally create and remove wants, and thus 
stimulate each other’ to increased productivity, social order, and social cohesion.38   
Eliot embraced Somerset’s idealism and strategy.  There was no need to reinvent the 
wheel. The formula was simple; it consisted on the paramountcy of the settler’s right to 
dominate the socio-economic and political fabric of the protectorate.  He had to pave the 
way for the settlers whom he believed would be the pillar foundation for his plan to 
develop and eventually run the protectorate.  His first step was to brief the FO about the 
potentialities of the region.  He informed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, that 
peace, stability and the advent of the railroad had transformed the EAP, which must be 
opened for business to generate revenue to balance the annual protectorate budgets.  
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Eliot’s vision was to turn the protectorate into a profitable and well-administrated 
crown colony. On 5 March 1901, he enthusiastically expressed the situation to 
Lansdowne stating that:   
I do not think you quite realise at home what an immense change has come over 
the East Africa Protectorate in the last few years. About 1895 East Africa was still 
what it purports to be —a Protectorate superintended by Consular officers. . . . In 
the last few years all this has been suddenly change by two events, the 
suppression of the Mazrui rebellion and the building of the Uganda Railway. The 
former broke the power and influence of the Arabs, the latter opened up a new 
country in which no one could pretend that British officials were Consuls 
supervising a local administration. The consequence is that the country has 
unconsciously grown from a Consular District into a Colony. . . . I felt—as every 
official out here must feel –as if I were administering a Crown Colony or an 
Indian Province. Unfortunately the Administration has not changed with the 
condition of the country; it is still organised on an old Consular theory; it still 
leaves undone the things which Consuls do not do but which people who are 
practically, if not theoretically, an independent Government ought to do.39 
Eliot’s letter to Lansdowne suggested that the FO and the people of England had 
no substantial information about the potentialities of the region.  According to him the 
main obstacles hindering development were the passivity of the British officials in the 
protectorate and their lack of vision.  Eliot vowed to rigorously administrate the region 
like a full grown crown colony.  Although Eliot gave an exaggerated and negative 
evaluation of how the protectorate was administrated to Lansdowne, he progressively 
made it his business to work on opening the door to the European expatriates.  By 15 
May 1901 he had visited the interior, he went on to describe the protectorate as if it was 
an el dorado consisting of a “’large area of highland with a cool and invigorating climate, 
fertile soil and wide pasture grounds.’ which he believed to be suitable for European 
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colonization.”40  Eliot officially manifested his inner desire to incorporate European 
settlers in the region ipso facto.  
Eliot’s Plan to introduce European Settlers 
  The idea of bringing European settlers into the protectorate was not new to the 
FO.  Before Eliot’s arrival, only a few Europeans were able to settle in the interior of the 
protectorate.  It was deemed precarious to remain isolated in the middle of the country, 
surrounded by Africans without British protection.  James McQueen, a blacksmith, 
immigrated there in 1896.  T.A Wood also settled in, and even opened a hotel in 1900, 
just when Nairobi was in the process of becoming the center city of the protectorate.  
Wood’s hotel later became the ideal meeting place for the Europeans who came in after 
the completion of the railway. Social gatherings at Wood’s hotel set the stage for the 
settlers’ future political claims and aspirations.41  The quasi-inexistence of a great 
number of European settlers in the interior was not a problem.  The FO could keep on 
relying on Indian labor.  After all, they helped to build the railroad and develop trade in 
the region.  They were good traders and the Africans knew who they were.  Some British 
officials and other European settlers, who were aware of the presence and value of the 
Indians, entertained the idea of encouraging them to permanently settle in the 
protectorate. They noticed that the Indians could cohabitate peacefully with the Africans 
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and help develop the protectorate.  In fact they were doing that long before Eliot took 
charge of the protectorate. 
John Ainsworth,42 an experienced official who knew well the protectorate, 
advised the FO to encourage Indian settlement.  Ainsworth served the protectorate well 
holding various positions from 1895 up to 1917.  He was sub-commissioner and later 
provincial commissioner of Ukamba, Naivasha and Nyanza provinces.  He was very 
familiar with the issue of African land rights and also acknowledged the important 
contributions of the Indians in the region.  Even before Eliot took charge of the 
protectorate, Ainsworth noticed the importance of having the Indians in the region and 
advised the FO to push for their permanent settlement.  “There would not be the same 
scope for European emigrants [sic] as there is for Indians…. For a large number of 
Europeans the Country does not at present hold out sufficient inducements; naturally 
Europeans require to make more money than does a native of India,”43 he asserted.   
Ainsworth knew that the Indians integrated well and developed trade and could play a 
significant role in improving the Kamba agricultural system.  European settlement also 
drew more skepticism from other officials like Sir Harry H. Johnston, Special 
Commissioner for Uganda.   In 1899, he wrote that “East Africa was unsuitable for 
European settlement but that in time there would be a great overflow of India into these 
insufficiently inhabited, uncultivated parts of East Africa now ruled by Britain and 
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Germany.”44 Johnston held the idea that a progressive incorporation of Indians would 
activate trade and agriculture for the development of the protectorate.  Indians could 
live without quarreling with Africans. There was more evidence that Indians were 
efficient and peaceful workers. The construction of the railway was the blueprint of their 
labor contribution and trade was their entrepreneurial endeavor. Unfortunately, Eliot 
came to change that dynamic.  He is credited with having initiated the policy of white 
supremacy in the British East Africa Protectorate. 
Eliot did not have to wrestle with the question of introducing European settlers in 
the protectorate.  For him the answer to a stagnant economy was a considerable influx 
of desirable capitalists who would be accommodated in the highlands.  There was no 
need for speculation on the part of the charismatic career diplomat.  The measure was 
simple for him.  Eliot truly believed that he had the key for a positive socio-economic 
change in the EAP.  According to the man on the spot, Indians should be confined in the 
lowlands and Africans dispossessed of their land, used as laborers for the new invaders 
and taxed to generate revenue.  The commissioner had come to the conclusion that the 
main issue the protectorate was facing was the completion of the railway and its 
economic implication.  It was crucial to make it pay.  For that to happen it was necessary 
to start collecting taxes from the local population.  In addition to that proposal the 
commissioner highlighted that the protectorate offered a “large area of highland with a 
cool and invigorating climate, fertile soil and wide pasture grounds.”45  The 
commissioner’s correspondences with the FO revealed the character of a diplomat who, 
from the early months of his administration, decided to have no mercy or consideration 
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for the Africans, regardless of their economic situation.  Also, Eliot took a stand in firmly 
believing that the highlands were the ideal ground for European settlement.   
The man on the spot was already proceeding quickly, envisioning the highlands 
to soon turn into many white settlers’ new destination and country.   Lansdowne 
expressed some criticisms about the levying of a hut tax suggested by Eliot.  It almost 
became a moral dilemma for London to enforce a taxation system from a “poverty 
stricken peasantry with a backward agriculture.”46  The Africans in the protectorate were 
just starting to recover from natural calamities they suffered a decade before Eliot 
arrived.  There was not enough land to support land-hungry migrants even though the 
region seemed apparently under populated. The paucity in the Kikuyu region, mainly 
along the railway, was due to natural disasters. The famine and smallpox epidemic of 
1898-99 ravaged the local population.  Eliot was not an exception among the 
intellectuals who drank from the cup of social Darwinism.  Africans, who might perish 
under any circumstances, were the ones who were not fit enough to continue in the 
protectorate.  Eliot had only a vague idea of the interior of the protectorate but kept 
trying to convince the FO of the need to encourage European settlement.  Of course, the 
FO had no exact, defined policy of developing the protectorate.  Incorporating and 
integrating European settlers was not going to be simple if the best land was going to be 
arbitrarily alienated for the newcomers at the expense of the Africans. 
Nevertheless, the commissioner negotiated his case for European settlement with 
the FO.  As there was no concrete plan from the FO to develop the protectorate, Eliot’s 
proposal then started to take shape.  He planted an idea in the officials’ minds in 
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London that something had to be done and something like his plan was better than no 
plan at all.  After all, in capitalism risks must be taken to generate revenue.  It should be 
a well-calculated risk.  In the case of the EAP, Eliot took an unfair calculated risk 
because it tended to undermine the incorporation and integration of Indians and 
Africans in the new system of production.  Eliot’s plan for the protectorate was the 
development and growth of a ruthless form of capitalism best illustrated in South Africa, 
solely based on European settlers’ production.  He envisioned the European settlement 
as his best choice to justify the theory of the fittest individuals in society whom in 
practice would benefit from his guidance and make the protectorate profitable.  His plan 
was to accommodate a “superior race,” the white man’s race in the protectorate, and 
gave them unlimited support to help exploit the region for the benefit of the British 
Empire. This was the agenda of a typical unethical rationale for a laissez-faire 
capitalism. “Sir Charles Eliot predicted that if his advice to found a European colony was 
followed the country would pay its way, certainly in ten years, perhaps less,”47 Dr. 
Norman Leys asserted.  That was a bold prediction, but it was surely comforting for the 
FO to see Eliot’s optimism.  Yet, the FO did not know about the dark intentions of the 
well-trusted commissioner to favor the settlers only and the future political 
consequences of such a policy.  Lansdowne ordered him to proceed with care, mainly 
with the question of land and taxation vis a vis the Africans.48 
New Rules under Eliot 
When Eliot came up with the idea of taxing the Africans as part of his solution to 
generate money for the financially stressed protectorate, Sir Clement Lloyd Hill, the 
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Superintendent of the African Protectorate Department (APD) at the FO, revised Eliot’s 
proposal for taxation and noticed that the success of any plan to administrate the 
protectorate depended on finance, but somehow he agreed with Eliot’s suggestion.  He 
informed Lansdowne on the matter.  Lansdowne responded with the following minute 
arguing that: “For the present the problem seems to be how to tap the undoubted 
resources of the country without assuming too many of the responsibilities of 
administration.”49 What Lansdowne did not know was that Eliot was on the way to 
assuming more responsibilities; he was paving a way for the settlers.  He started 
updating the FO with reports about the prospects for the protectorate.   
In June 1901 he dispatched his first annual report, again underlining the great 
potential of the protectorate suitable for European colonization.  He pushed hard to 
seduce the FO about the exotic nature of the well-watered protectorate with its 
comfortable climate that European settlers would find ideal.50  According to Eliot, the 
protectorate was a vast no-man’s land that could be transformed by the fittest European 
settlers.  At no time were the Africans or the Indians part of his scheme to resolve the 
financial equation of the EAP.   In his second annual report, he reiterated his strong 
belief of having encountered the perfect land for his upcoming discriminatory policy 
that was to take place once the FO took up his plan to bring in the European settlers.  
The commissioner exaggerated his description of the protectorate.  In his view, as 
described by Sorrenson: The Kikuyu country had a native population unusually dense 
for East Africa but claimed it was not too dense to prevent European settlement. “He 
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went on to describe the Kikuyu country as ‘one of the richest and most promising 
districts in the Protectorate.’ Njoro in the Rift Valley was considered as ‘one of the most 
favoured’ districts, with scenery ‘strikingly English.’  The Nandi country was described 
as ‘perhaps the most beautiful district in the Protectorate.”51  
The commissioner drew a similitude of the protectorate with other British 
colonies like Australia and New Zealand to make his case before the FO.  Under Eliot’s 
eyes, the EAP was not different from those countries that welcomed European settlers, 
but his comparison was not accurate.  Australia and New Zealand offered more land 
suitable for European settlement.  Land was more available in both Australia and New 
Zealand, which were less populated than the EAP.  Still for Lansdowne, full control of 
the protectorate had to be secured first.  That meant that money had to be channeled for 
military and police measures not for administrative concerns.  The confident 
commissioner promised that he could make the protectorate profitable if fully trusted 
with his plan to secure more revenue.  Eliot’s dedication to carry on with his scheme 
paid off when Lansdowne agreed to a careful levying of a hut tax and introduction of 
settlers in a wider and diverse aspect.  Lansdowne’s response to Eliot demonstrated his 
agreement with the general idea of introducing settlers into the country.   Of course, 
Indian settlers might be encouraged, especially with a view toward increasing the 
prosperity of some of the up-country stations.   The European settlers would also be 
welcome  as a useful source of revenue: “Speaking generally, His Majesty’s Government 
are most anxious to encourage settlers, and would welcome any well considered 
enterprises involving the expenditure of British capital and energy in the British 
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Protectorate.”52   However, he warned Eliot that lines of future development were not 
yet clear, and that great care should be exercised to avoid the difficulties likely to be 
created by excessive grants of land to would-be settlers.  And when military and police 
had become more efficient, and communication with Lake Victoria had been established 
with the completion of the railway, it would be easier, in Lansdowne’s opinion, for the 
Government to study and profit from the economic wealth of the country, which Eliot 
had so stringently emphasized.53   
         Lansdowne’s dispatch clearly mentioned the inclusion of Indians in Eliot’s intent to 
bring settlers in the country.  In addition to that, he made it clear to the commissioner 
that great care should be taken in the process of land allocation.  Furthermore 
Lansdowne manifested concern about the importance of security and stability for trade 
to carry on safely.54  That meant that Eliot should be fair and careful in the execution of 
his plan.   
Eliot understood Lansdowne’s instructions but putting them in practice proved to 
be very controversial.  The man on the spot was gearing towards a deliberately 
discriminatory immigration scheme.  He focused on the mission of inviting settlers of 
European descent by promising them land that they could develop. Eliot engaged 
himself into diffusing the good news of the opening of a quasi-virgin country where 
settlers of his choice could prosper. 
After the release of his first annual report that did not lack glowing accounts of an 
ideal territory of rich game consisting of beautiful highlands, with almost temperate 
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climate reminiscent of the cool weather one feels in Britain, Eliot still found it not 
ineffective.  The commissioner “prepared a pamphlet on settlers’ prospects and had it 
published by the Emigrants’ Information Office in London.”55  He reiterated the 
opportunities the protectorate offered to potential settlers.  Eliot was indeed moving fast 
and was not shy on formulating policies to assist the settlers from the get-go by 
“reducing freights on the railway and reducing customs duties on seeds and agricultural 
implements.  He created Agricultural and Veterinary departments to carry out 
experimental work on stock and crops, and provide services to settlers at subsidized 
rates.”56   In the midst of these first steps taken to change the economic direction of the 
protectorate from stagnation to miraculous rapid growth, while in London on leave, the 
commissioner was meticulously amending the land regulations to really attract and 
accommodate the potential European settlers who would take the initiative to resettle in 
the EAP. These first steps taken by the man on the spot and his earnest desire to count 
on a settlers’ influx indicated his own aspirations to gain more power for the 
concretization of a white man’s country that he firmly intended to create in the EAP. 
In fact, it was during Eliot’s absence from the protectorate in September 1902, 
that the Crown Lands Ordinance was introduced.  It made possible the sales and leases 
of land, but also the provision of licenses allowing temporary occupation of the then so-
called Crown land.  The ordinance clarified that the Crown had original title to land, and 
in case where the Africans vacated or deserted their land, they would de facto lose their 
property.  That meant that, out of the blue, any unsupervised African land, in any case, 
was considered waste and reverted back to the Crown to be technically given to the soon 
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coming settlers.  The condition for the sale of land was clearly determined not to exceed 
1,000 acres per lot without the approval of the Foreign Secretary.  Also, more power was 
vested to the commissioner who, after considering that the purchaser of a land did not 
occupy and develop his parcel, could declare that land forfeited.  As for the term of 
leasehold, the Ordinance provided that the settler-farmers would lease land for 99 years.  
That term replaced the 21 years land lease of the 1897 Ordinance.  That resulted to each 
settler obtaining 160 acres of land free of charge as an inducement to develop it.  The 
occupant could not transfer that land without the approval of the commissioner and was 
required to pay taxes to help build and maintain the infrastructure.  Eliot turned the 
amended ordinance of 1902 into a discriminatory law allowing leases for European 
settlers and supposedly gave temporary occupation licenses for Africans and Indians.  
Unfortunately for the Africans and the Indians, it proved impossible to obtain a license 
to occupy land to farm or develop a trading business.57  
By the time that the Crown Lands Ordinance was introduced in September 1902 
there were already some Europeans settled in the highlands. It was noted that there 
were only eight or ten settlers in the Kikuyu country, the most popular locality in the 
highlands.58   T. A. Wood, who was one of the rare early settlers, ran a hotel frequented 
mostly by other newcomers in the highlands. Wood’s hotel became their political 
meeting ground. George. Bennett noted the following: 
Early in January 1902 twenty-two Europeans met at Wood’s to elect a committee 
to encourage white settlement. Their letter to Eliot seeking government support 
epitomizes the future themes of the settlers in Kenya: Land, labour, and 
opposition to the Indians. They want land to be granted in freehold, help through 
the establishment of model farms and a forestry department, and the passing of 
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mining laws; they asked that the natives should be made more ‘amenable to 
European supervision’ and describe Asiatic immigration as ‘detrimental to 
European settlers in particular and to native inhabitant generally.59   
 
The commissioner took notice of their demands and promised to encourage European 
settlers to come to the EAP.   
                Looking closer at Eliot’s willingness to collaborate with the early limited 
numbers of settlers to meet their demands, it stands manifest that any further influx of 
settlers would increase their number and result in generating new aspirations for more 
concessions.  A stronger European settlers’ presence in the protectorate would be of 
great significance when the urge for self government claims emerged. The early settlers’ 
platform, generated at Wood’s hotel in Nairobi, and focusing on land, labor and 
opposition to the Indians, resonated without reason.   It was their first political 
manifesto.  They much sounded like a group, such as a political party, that made its 
appeal directly to the commissioner.  Churchill summarized it best in his African 
journey account.  He stated that: 
White settlement was both the baronial consolidation of conquest and the chief 
threats to the politics of control.  If it could not have politically dependent but 
independently productive small farmers, the Colonial Office came round to the 
view that it must have big capitalist instead. Big capital would provide the state 
with a different but equally controllable answer to the nervous ‘rhinoceros 
questions’ of African rights in expanded production.  It was ‘no good trying to lay 
hold of Tropical Africa with naked fingers’. What was wanted was ‘tireless 
engines, not weary men; cheap power, not cheap labour’. Capital was the axe with 
which to cut a path through political jungles as well as nature’s. If only it could be 
given room to exploit African land, the state could ‘regulate in full intricate detail’ 
the relations between capitalists and the few skilled workers they would need.60 
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White immigration sought to fetter Indian settlement and hoped to suppress any 
African initiative in organizing ways to be part of the system of production by reducing 
them to the status of squatters once their land has been alienated.  The EAP political 
future was being shaped by Eliot’s readiness to fully back up the European settlers.  
Following the gathering at Wood’s hotel, another event worthy of consideration took 
place in November 1902, when Frederick Jackson, the acting commissioner, set rules for 
the protection of native rights and care for all the inhabitants, protection of forest and 
development of holdings and fencing.  Nevertheless, many of the early settlers in 
Nairobi were not pleased with Jackson’s new measure, even though it was along the 
lines of the 1902 ordinance. That sparked an agitation among the settlers who 
demanded Jackson to withdraw the rules. The leader was the Church of Scotland 
missionary, Dr. D. C. R. Scott, who considered the rules detrimental to the settlers’ 
interests.61   Dr. Scott’s reaction signaled a will of self-aggrandizement, ironically, in the 
name of a larger moral cause.  The settlers were not to be held at the same level as an 
Indian or an African in the rise of a new developing socio-economic and political era of 
the protectorate.  The settlers had the commissioner on their side, embracing the same 
philosophy of occupation, domination, production and accumulation of wealth without 
integration or the sharing of the market with the so-called other races or new subjects.62 
 In fact, when Eliot returned from London, he went to meet with the early settlers 
who were not pleased with Jackson’s introduction of the new homestead system of 
settlement.  After hearing their complaint, the commissioner, without officially meeting 
with Jackson on the issue, withdrew the rules. It was noted that, “Under Eliot’s rules the 
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area of homestead was to be 160 acres but, if three-tenths of this was cultivated within 
three years, an additional area of 480 acres could be granted. The purchase price of Rs 2 
(2s. 8d.) per acre could be paid at once or spread over sixteen years.  A freehold title was 
to be granted on payment of the purchase price or after cultivation conditions had been 
fulfilled.”63  The new rule was intended to benefit the settler planter.  Also, the drafting 
of the rule opened the door for potential speculators.  Any land speculator and ordinary 
profiteers could fulfill their payment and obtain their land title without meeting the 
development conditions.  Eliot’s new rule was porous in its drafting because it read “or 
after the cultivation conditions had been fulfilled,” instead of “and after” fulfillment of 
the set requirements.64   
 Meanwhile Eliot had so far taken sides in favoring the first settlers, who knew to 
whom and where to direct their demands.  The cynical political agitation caused by the 
settlers in January and November 1902, combined with Eliot’s readiness to listen to 
them, marked the beginning of the struggle for the control of power in the EAP.  The 
first settlers also took notice of the way to proceed to defend their interests.  They were 
aware of the fact that a considerable influx of settlers, well organized, could put pressure 
on any official sent to run the protectorate.  Eliot triggered a land rush, opening the door 
for more eccentric settlers who accentuated the struggle for more concessions and 
political rights. 
Moreover, Eliot’s administration of the protectorate in the year 1903 was 
dominated by the extension of the homestead rules and the arrival of more settlers of all 
kinds who felt the need to organize themselves to defend their interests.  In Eliot’s 
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theory, unoccupied and sparsely occupied land could be reserved for settlers who would 
make good use of it.  He sought the approval of the FO, suggesting the making of land 
within the railroad zone available for the good cause of European settlement. Offering 
free grant of 640 acres, east of Nairobi from Mazares to the Machakos road, and west 
from Naivasha to Fort Ternan, and affordable grazing land at minimal, nominal rent 
outside of the railway zone, would attract desirable investors.  The FO naturally listened 
to Eliot because they knew nothing concrete about the African and the protectorate 
itself.  On the other hand, the Treasury first remained skeptical and insisted on the 
importance of generating revenue to cover the cost of the railway construction.  Land 
within the railway zone was a good asset for that cause.  After a short deadlock, the 
Treasury allowed Eliot to proceed with his plan in March 1903 under the following 
measure:  “The free grants were to be allowed in the districts Eliot had suggested but 
outside of the railway zone.  Inside the zone he was to be allowed to sell one-third of 
each 640 acre block and lease the remaining two-thirds. The price was to be substantial.  
Lansdowne instructed Eliot not to sell more than one-quarter of each block of railway 
land, but allowed him to fix the prices.”65 Once again, Eliot succeeded in convincing 
officials in London to accept his initiatives.  His work would benefit potential 
newcomers entering the protectorate.  In 1903 117 whites applied for land grant, and in 
a following year “599 immigrants made three hundred applications.”66 
European colonists’ response to Eliot’s settlement invitation 
Before the first considerable wave of settlers entered the protectorate to claim 
and occupy land in April 1903, talks about experimenting in settlement with other races 
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had long been discarded: “The state’s early essays in immigration had an air of 
desperation about them: Punjabi peasants, Finnish homesteaders, and persecuted Jews 
from eastern and central Europe; all had their passing attraction.”67 It was under Eliot’s 
administration when the protectorate saw the arrival of some eccentric settlers who later 
became charismatic political leaders defending their interests. The settlers who 
responded to Eliot’s invitation were from different social backgrounds, but nevertheless, 
their interests in obtaining land and political aspirations for the acquisition of power 
would eventually emerge and converge.  They felt the need to form political entities to 
secure leverage at a crucial time in order to defend their interests. That common 
denominator drove the settlers’ community into the political arena of the protectorate.  
As stated earlier, among the group of settlers who set foot in the protectorate, there were 
aristocrats, business adventurers, small and big farmers, Anglo-Boer war veterans and 
land speculators.   
The most prominent aristocrat and business adventurer was the third Lord 
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Lord Delamere was born Hugh 
Cholmondeley in 1870 at Vale Royal in 
Cheshire, England, and died in 1931.   
He was a pioneer European settler, 
farmer, and politician. Educated at 
Eton, at the age of 17, he succeeded his 
father as the third Baron Delamere of 
Vale Royal. In 1897, Delamere first 
entered Kenya on a big-game hunting 
expedition. In 1903, he returned to 
Kenya, where he remained for the rest 
of his life.  Historians have noted that, 
“Shortly after Delamere’s arrival, Sir 
Charles Eliot granted him 40,500 
hectares (100,035 acres) of land on a 
99-year lease in the White Highlands; 
subsequent land grants/purchases 
increased the size of his estate.”68 
Delamere’s peculiarity, spirit of 
adventure and ambitions soon caught 
the attention of the first government officials like Ainsworth and Jackson.  Note the 
following description in the account from Ross, Kenya from Within: 
One afternoon in 1898 the District Officer in charge of the inland station of 
Machakos was informed by his wife that there had just arrived upon the verandah 
a singularly dishevelled traveler who announced himself as Lord Delamere. After 
tea with this Mr. and Mrs. Ainsworth, Lord Delamere excused himself from 
returning for dinner on the grounds of the disrepair and scantiness of his outfit.  
He had not known when he first called that ‘there were any ladies in the station.’ 
He had come South through Jubaland and Tanaland by camel and porter 
caravans, and was now proceeding to meet the railway construction parties as 
they approach the site of Nairobi, and so go on to Mombasa. His camp exhibited 
all the evidences of a dashing and adventurous journey through wild country, and 
next morning he moved away Southward with his companion, Dr. Atkinson.69  
                                                 
68 Robert M. Maxon and Thomas P. Ofcansky, Historical Dictionary of Kenya, Third Edition (Lanham 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 73. 
69William McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1968), 59. 
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Delamere sure left an impression on Ainsworth, the main official who, to some degree, 
fought for the consideration of African rights to land and their incorporation in the 
economic system of the protectorate.  
        In 1903, a different Delamere again crossed the path of Ainsworth, but under 
different circumstances.  This complex figure was also an active political advocate for a 
white man’s country.  Even before settling permanently, he gained the sympathy of 
Eliot. When he applied for a government post under the motive of alleviating settlers 
struggles under official hostility, the commissioner created a position to fit him in his 
scheme of carving out a white man’s country: Eliot offered him one “specially charged 
with the affairs which concern the white settlers,” and recommended his appointment as 
a sub-collector, coupled with that of Land Officer as an experiment. He apparently 
accepted Delamere’s views, for he explained to the Foreign Office that Ainsworth, the 
then Land Officer, had too much to do and was “quarrelsome with the settlers.”  Before 
the appointment could be concluded Delamere was laid up as result of a riding 
accident.70   
        Delamere and Eliot strengthened their ties prioritizing white settlement to the point 
that Jackson, Eliot’s Deputy Commissioner, alerted the FO.  Bennett well illustrated it 
with Jackson’s dispatch to the FO.  Jackson claimed that: “The protectorate was 
becoming a country of ‘nigger-’ and game-shooters.”  He described one leading settler as 
“a well know filibuster,” saying that he and Delamere were “as thick as thieves.”  
Moreover, he believed that Eliot had come under Delamere’s influence and was kow-
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towing to the settlers, the majority of whom Jackson regarded as “a lot of scalliwags.”71  
Delamere went on to whole-heartedly believe that the opening of the protectorate was a 
period of enlightenment beneficial for the Africans that he viewed as inferior to the 
white civilized races and whom he thought, for a long time in history, remained in 
darkness.  He was a man of his time, a deluded social Darwinist.  By trying to justify the 
antiquated theory, he was undermining the Africans and Indians’ rights. Social 
Darwinism embedded in many Europeans’ minds. These were so-called “men of their 
time.” Delamere’s ideology did not stop him from dispossessing Africans from their 
land.  He permanently settled down in the protectorate and applied for land in 1903.  
Upon obtaining a good portion of land, he vehemently sought to succeed in agricultural 
and pastoral experimentations.   
Nevertheless, after permanently settling down in the region, Delamere became 
deeply involved in politics. His volatility and determination to transform the 
protectorate into a European settlers’ colony propelled him to become the political 
leader of the commissioners’ guests.  His political career was dominated by the defense 
and promulgation of white interests and the quest for political control of the 
protectorate.  As depicted by Maxon and Ofcansky, he hit the political ground of the 
EAP running. 
Within a year of arriving in Kenya, Delamere established himself in the political 
arena by becoming president of the Colonists’ Association.  In 1907, he was one of 
the first two unofficial members appointed in the Legislative Council (LEGCO). 
After his election to LEGCO for the Rift Valley in January 1920, Delamere 
became the acknowledged leader of the European settler community.  Apart from 
advocating the policy that excluded African and Asian landowners from the 
White Highlands, reserved for the exclusive ownership of European settlers, he 
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also led the campaign for a popularly elected unofficial majority in LEGCO (never 
achieved in his lifetime).72 
Among the early settlers, the aristocrat adventurer and settler Delamere had no 
parallel in his political influence, character, charisma and extremities, even compared to 
other aristocrats who were also present in the protectorate.   E. Huxley highlighted the 
very nature of many of the settlers who were entering the protectorate with the following 
description taking note that, “European settlement in Kenya has always had a strong 
aristocratic flavour: one of Nairobi’s hotels became known as ‘the House of Lords.’ But 
then, and for some years to come, Nairobi’s conditions were those of the frontier.  
Delamere himself appeared as the typical frontiersman, with hair flowing down to his 
shoulders, wearing disreputable clothes, and capable in irritation of locking the manager 
of that same hotel in the meat safe with several dead sheep.73  Delamere’s use of threat 
and violence to make an impact in the region would became a tactic that other vocal and 
volatile settlers would also adopt in their intent of dominating the region socially and 
politically.  
Another Briton, who arrived in the EAP in May 1904 and immediately immersed 
himself in settlers’ politics there, was Captain E. S. Grogan.   In a character and 
adventurous nature somewhat akin to that of Lord Delamere, Grogan came to be known 
as the “boldest and baddest of a bold, bad gang” of outlanders proliferating throughout 
the protectorate and making their marks in the region.  Grogan lived up to his 
reputation by violating the law in the protectorate without any severe consequences.  
Grogan had no regard for the rights of the Africans he thought that he owned.  In order 
to set an example, he dispensed cruel punishment to any of his workers whom he 
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thought misbehaved.  It was Grogan who opened the very chapter of the question of 
impunity in the protectorate.  Would the newcomers face the law in case of any violation 
of African rights? Would justice be served in any case of misconduct on the part of the 
settlers?  The answers to these questions depended on how London supervised the 
protectorate.  With the presence of the European settlers in the protectorate as a fait 
accompli, the question of the maintenance of law and order became a must for the 
authorities in London.  Settlers of the likes of Delamere and Grogan were politically 
active and conflictive. 
Grogan was not an aristocrat like Delamere.  However, he was a risk taker who 
gained his fame for being the first recorded British adventurer who successfully made 
the journey from the Cape to Cairo; and like Delamere, Grogan was familiar with the 
interior of the protectorate.  
Grogan, Ewart Scott (1873-1967). Explorer, farmer, entrepreneur, and staunch 
advocate of European settler rights. Born in London and educated at Jesus 
College, Cambridge. In late 1903, he arrived in Kenya and quickly acquired a 
considerable amount of land, including the Chiromo area of Nairobi, the Kilindini 
region of Mombasa Island, and a timber concession in the Rift Valley. 
Additionally, he was a coffee and sisal farmer. He also used his skills as a writer 
and orator to gain influence among Kenya’s European settler community as an 
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The news of Grogan’ accomplishment echoed in London and the rest of the 
colonies. When he came to settle in the EAP in 
May of 1904, he was not alone, and 
considering that Eliot was desperately in 
search of large or small scale investors for his 
scheme of European settlement to concretely 
materialize, the commissioner and Grogan’s 
visions quickly started to converge.  The two 
men entertained the belief that European 
settlers with some initial investment, could 
indeed, turn the protectorate into another 
white settler colony, parallel in standard to 
the self-governing system extant in South Africa.  The commissioner was quickly 
enchanted by Grogan’s entrepreneurial plan of engaging in a lumbering business in 
Lembus.  Lembus was a region of immense ecological importance, characterized by its 
rich forest land lying across the water stream separating the river systems of the Rift 
Valley and the western part of the protectorate. Although, the Nandi occupying the 
region remained to be dealt with militarily, Eliot allowed Grogan to inspect the forest, 
which should have been done by a competent land surveyor, not by an adventurer 
venture capitalist with an appetite for land acquisition.  He finally obtained the area of 
land he specifically wanted and was going to exploit it with African labor.  
Grogan was the prototype of the settler that the commissioner, as well as the FO, 
wanted to welcome for the development of the protectorate, investors with capital and 
clear ideas.  Grogan eventually settled and got involved in the timber industry in 
Image 3: E. S. Grogan. Source: Pace, Lost Lion, 126. 
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partnership with other investors from South Africa.   Lingham & Neame, a South 
African timber company based in Johannesburg hired Grogan in May 1904 as their 
agent.  They entered into an agreement with two of their compatriots, land speculators 
Charles Grant and George Fotheringhame, to exploit and export timber.  The 
commissioner opened the door for Grogan and accommodated him.  Like Delamere, 
Grogan permanently settled in the protectorate.  
Such was Grogan’s growing influence on the commissioner to the point that in 
March of 1904, he requested land to be reserved for his brother in law, E. J. Watt, who 
might visit and possibly settle permanently in the newly opened protectorate.  In this 
case the commissioner could bypass the FO.75  Although newcomers could easily apply 
for land of their choice, obtain their prize and settle down; Grogan’s request of 500,000 
to be reserved for Watt and other potential settlers coming from New Zealand was 
treated with caution. Considering the commissioner’s commitment to populate the 
country with European settlers, his response was more likely to be interpreted as a 
measure of caution vis a vis the officials in London about his flagrant violation of 
African land rights.  It was a matter of time before the FO found out Eliot’s illegitimate 
practices of facilitating land to his preferred settlers.  The commissioner attracted 
Delamere and Grogan, two of the most influential and conflictive settlers who 
contributed to the reason why the EAP became what some considered the most 
troublesome dependency of the British Empire.  Eliot had his own formula of land 
regulation that benefited the European settlers in general.  
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Widening the gate for more settlers 
The changes made on the 1902 land regulations opened an avenue for a direct 
settlement for those who would make the journey to the protectorate.  It was based on 
that power to manage land that in June 1903, Eliot promised to set apart land for Robert 
Chamberlain and A. S. Flemmer, who had helped in the scheme of attracting some 100 
farmers from South Africa.  Chamberlain and Flemmer wanted 100,000 acres of real 
estate as compensation for their effort in bringing in settlers.  In addition to this in 
August 1903, the commissioner took another step ahead to reinforce his campaign of 
inducing European settlers from the south of the continent to come make a fresh living 
in East Africa.  He sent his Collector of Customs, A. Marsden, to do the task of spreading 
the good news from the newly opened EAP.  Marsden did not fall short in describing the 
protectorate as a heavenly region, which was in reality a bubble of extrapolations.76 
  Eliot was ready to sell the most exotic and healthiest land of the protectorate for 
an unreasonably cheap price, which of course was a contradiction to the very logic of 
higher land prices for the most valuable land.  Eliot’s land policy attracted more 
speculators and also turned some regular farmers into speculators. The price of land 
bounced up. Ross underlined that: “One English farmer received a freehold estate of 
some 2,000 acres close to Nairobi, which he worked as a lucrative dairy farm for ten or a 
dozen years, and then sold for £20,000 as a building estate.”77  Eliot’s policy and 
promises of land excited other investors who thought of the protectorate as a potential 
region sitting on mineral resources that could be very lucrative if well exploited. Some 
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Englishmen gentlemanly capitalists thought of the EAP as maybe another South Africa, 
a region rich in gold and other minerals. They decided to claim big portions of land.  
 Some respectable investors from London and South Africa formed a coalition 
under the umbrella of the East Africa Syndicate in May 1902 and demanded a large 
portion of land to be prospected for minerals.  After a year-long expedition directed by 
Major Burnham, the search for minerals proved fruitless.  There were no considerable 
deposits appealing enough for any enterprise, because it may have involved risky 
investments. The project was abandoned but the desire of acquiring land remained 
intact. That burning aspiration led the Syndicate to push for land request.  Burnham 
entered into negotiations with Eliot about acquiring a vast agricultural land around 
Nairobi. Having again convinced the FO of the need of attracting investors, Eliot 
facilitated Burnham’s huge land concession with a cheap price.78  The commissioner was 
catering to some would be speculators and it was just a matter of time before the very 
officials that Eliot once viewed as mere English gentlemen lacking colonial incentive, 
reacted to his extravagant land alienation by alerting London about the reigning 
situation in the EAP. 
The number of speculators disguised as settlers could have been higher, if it were 
not for the constant concern of Lansdowne warning Eliot against large sales of land to 
grazers or land speculators.  As Sorrenson observed, in January 1904 G. V. Stewart, 
“who had established two settlements of Ulstermen in New Zealand in the 1870’s and 
1880’s, proposed to settle 200 families from ‘home’–presumably Ulster-in the 
Protectorate in return for an undisclosed fee.  Eliot decided that it was unnecessary to 
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pay Stewart to obtain settlers.”79  Eliot’s decision on Stewart’s proposal seemed to have 
been motivated by Lansdowne’s pressure for caution.  But in reality there was already a 
saturation of land demand in the protectorate. The local administration had to deal with 
the overwhelming land applications in a region that had not been properly surveyed.  
Eliot triggered a land rush that was out of proportion.  
It was not until May 1903 that it was deemed necessary to have a Land Officer for 
the work of the Land and Survey Department to be more effective, if it had ever been in 
any case.  R. Barton Wright, a railway surveyor, was appointed to the task while the 
influx of settlers from South Africa was at its peak.  To make the situation worse, more 
settlers, who knew their veldt pretty well and also understood the meaning of the South 
African political system, were coming to the EAP. “Every steamer brought its quota of 
intending settlers. The growing crowd soon overran the limits of Nairobi’s 
accommodation and a canvas village, locally called Tentfontein, sprang up near the 
Land Office in the valley of the river Nairobi.”80  That was an indicator of the birth of a 
new socio-economic dynamic that will be cemented by the settlers’ common interests in 
the furtherance of their political aspirations.  The settlers growing numbers and their 
political history experienced in South Africa, turned out to be important factors when 
the time to organize themselves around political entities arrived.  “One friend of the 
South Africans described them as ‘an exceptional stamp of colonist, accustomed to 
taking and giving hard knocks in life: even better still, [they] had mostly farmed in 
Southern Africa and fully understood the handling of native African peoples.”81 
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  The migration from South Africa was a minor repercussion of the Anglo-Boer 
War and post-war depression caused by the withdrawal of troops, a shortage of labor in 
the mines and the slow recovery of the war-torn economies.82 To many settlers from 
South Africa, the Anglo-Boer war was detrimental to their interests.  The war brought 
nothing new but the control of the mining magnates.  Some discontented settlers of 
British descent represented the first wave that came to start a new living in the EAP.  
The immediate post-war era and its consequences, coupled with the effort of inducing 
potential newcomers by promising land on easy terms, attracted antagonistic settlers 
from South Africa to East Africa. Sorrenson argued that: “The South Africans formed the 
most volatile, vocal and influential element in the pre-war settler population of the 
protectorate.  They were at first almost entirely of British descent.  Later, when the Boer 
‘Irreconcilables’ and another party of Boers under the leadership of J.A.J Van 
Rensburgh arrived, it appeared likely that the old South African antagonisms between 
Briton and Boers would be reproduced in the East Africa Protectorate. But the Boers 
took little part in Nairobi politics and most of them, characteristically, trekked to and 
settled the isolated Uasin Gishu plateau.”83  
Although, the highest number of migrants that settled in the protectorate came 
from South Africa, it is worthwhile to take into account another group of war veterans of 
the Anglo-Boer war that moved to the EAP.  They were Australians, New Zealanders and 
Canadians who could cohabitate with the South Africans of British descent and share 
the same political ideology and aspirations.  The desire to establish an exclusively white 
man’s country, by systematically excluding other races, undermined the basic rights of 
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the people whom the protectorate by righteousness, and responsibility was supposed to 
protect for the sake of revenue and good moral cause, to per-se, justify the need of 
expanding the Empire.   
The people who were not part of Eliot’s plan to develop the region were those 
who remained to be considered and qualified in the very darwinian context as the 
unwanted Jews, the undesired Boers, the feared Indian traders and the despised 
Africans. Such was the social nature of the country that the man on the spot, the well-
educated diplomat Sir Charles Eliot, was pioneering.  A country, as Hobley observed in 
1904, where the settlers stood “indifferent as to the line that the Administration took 
with regard to native affairs as in a very few years it was probable that the country would 
fall under the Colonial Office and that they would then insist on local autonomy and the 
formation of a legislative assembly, this body would then dispose of native rights in a 
very summary fashion and put the Masai etc. where they could not interfere with 
anyone.”84  To reach that stage in the EAP, the settlers started by the formation of 
political organizations to channel their political agenda. 
The start of European political organizations    
Commissioner Eliot succeeded in introducing settlers in the protectorate and the 
consequences of the social changes that came along with their presence led to a political 
conflict of interests.  A power struggle in the EAP started to be determined by the 
settlers’ relationship to the state.  As a group, the settlers’ capacity to define, defend and 
develop their interests would ultimately determine the meaning and use of power in the 
political context of a newly established social order.  The settlers whom Churchill 
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referred to as, “political animals”, during his 1907 visit to the protectorate, understood 
the process that could lead to the acquisition of power due to the fact that many were 
unconditionally familiar with the South African political system that left less to desire 
from the perspective, if even perceived, of the Africans.   
The settlers were able to define their interests by articulating and establishing 
them through the creation of political parties.  They knew how vital it was to protect 
themselves and their interests against any potential challenge because in Eliot’s white 
men’s country, divided and defined by the concept of race and class, any conflict of 
interests in that context consequently assumed a race and class character.  The 
safeguard and development of the settlers’ interests depended on how they organized 
themselves to first promote and expand their political influence in the protectorate to 
further reach the full stage of acquiring and controlling power.  The settlers influence as 
a group was felt early in 1902 when they gathered at Wood’s hotel to elect a committee 
to encourage white settlement and oppose an Indian presence in the region.  A group of 
settlers, of a number no larger than 22 members, was starting to be politically active.85   
In September that same year, the settlers gained political terrain and consideration 
when they pushed for changes on the homestead rules put in force by Jackson under the 
terms of the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance.  The rules were reversed due to settlers’ 
complaints, influence and Eliot’s support for their claims.  
The small European community gained influence, which directly depended on 
their relations with the commissioner who acted as if he was very keen on listening and 
advising the newcomers. That revealed a striking dissimilarity between his true nature 
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and the way he dealt with the settlers.  Eliot did not intermingle with the settlers very 
often.  He invited them to the EAP as a result of his vision of establishing a prosperous 
white men’s country.  He did not consult his subordinates or set any meeting before 
engaging in negotiation with the newcomers asking for their share of real estate. His 
subordinates obviously noticed the commissioner’s daring and unfair policy making.  
Some officials under Eliot took notice of the evolving situation with settlers growing 
influence in the protectorate.  Jackson and Bagge’s (then a sub-commissioner) 
opposition to the man on the spot dragged on and eventually reached its climax when 
they finally alerted the FO about the developing situation in the EAP where the political 
climate was dominated by the political shaping of what was intended to become a self 
governing country with successful and influential Europeans settlers.86   
 Settlers like Right Honnorable Lord Delamere, Lord Cardross, Captain Grogan, 
T. A. Wood, S. C. Fichat and few others present in the EAP during the early stage of 
Eliot’s administration gained considerable influence.  In the new social context of the 
EAP, it is important to draw the line between the control of power and influence.  For 
whereas the commissioner appointed by the FO to handle British interests in a 
supposedly dignified manner with regard to the subjects’ rights, had the capacity to 
formulate and execute policies which meant the exercising of power, political influence, 
which meant the ability to affect important political decisions making, rested entirely on 
a few settlers hands.  In the EAP, a small group of settlers had tremendous influence 
with Eliot and that passed in their circles’ as having the control of power itself, but that 
was a huge political misconception from their part because the FO was still in control of 
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the protectorate.  A laissez–faire policy violating African rights in the protectorate was 
not going to sit well in the England where the public opinion can shape debate in 
parliament and question the very meaning of the protectorate vis a vis African rights in 
Africa itself. 
The settlers’ socio-political capacity was rooted in their main collective group 
ability.  The settlers’ leaders had the organizational and institutional ability to match 
their agenda with the commissioner’s vision.  They understood the rationale for party 
politics, and that brought them to form key political structures which were the right 
locomotive that could carry them to the station of self-government sanctioned by the full 
control of power. As Bennett described it:  “In 1902 the committee to encourage 
European settlement had led to the formation of a Colonists’ Association, which Eliot 
had welcomed as a source of valuable advice. Delamere, on his arrival in January 1903, 
formed the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association. Concerned initially with the marketing 
of potatoes in South Africa, it soon turned to a more vital life in politics and superseded 
the older body.”87 An only white man’s political party was born to stay active and 
influential, not hesitant to raise hell and intimidate authorities. They posed proud and 
looked confident in the following picture with Delamere in the middle of everything and 
everywhere when it came to the political direction they should take.    
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Under Delamere, the association went active pressing for the best land to be 
reserved for white settlement.  Delamere, in particular, categorically opposed the 
presence, cohabitation or participation for economic development of any other race in 
the new region solely opened for white settlement according to his logic shared by the 
commissioner in person.  So influential was Delamere that he made it clear to the FO 
that the European settlers would go as far as necessary to oppose any interference that 
could threaten their hegemony or interests.88  Eliot advised them by pointing them the 
right direction to follow after the creation of settler political party.  Nevertheless, it was 
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not until 1904 that Eliot gave full support to the settlers for the initiative of a LegCo.  He 
suggested it in these terms: “One consisting only of officials, but in a final 
communication to the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association, he said that they must strive 
for ‘some local Government’: they could not expect representative government, but they 
could have a council with unofficial members.  He believed that such a council, with 
some financial power, could have taken the initiative in providing roads and services to 
intending settlers and thus might have prevented many of the difficulties of the past 
eight or ten months.”89  
           It was clear in his dispatch to the FO that political power meant the domination of 
the very institutions which were essential to carry on governance and insure social 
control.   Eliot’s suggestion was a total turn away from his passive approach first taken 
in 1902 when an earlier petition for Advisory Council with unofficial members was made 
by a group of Europeans and Asians in Mombasa.  He then dismissed the Europeans, 
just temporarily, and as regard to the Asians, it was a systematical and direct dismissal 
for any form of political hope.90 
For their part, the settlers engaged in a political party to achieve their group and 
personal interests.  Within the framework of their party’s focus, the European settlers 
believed that they could ultimately control or effectively participate in state power.  
Their party was a very important link to power to defend and promote their interests, to 
have the means of becoming their own group representative via elected or appointed 
members. The party also gave them an opportunity to hopefully participate in the 
determination of the East Africa white protectorate’s public policy and to ultimately 
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reach the level of being able to affect, for their own advantage, the power of distributing 
governmental funds, jobs or political positions.  The sharing of party patronage was 
crucial for the settlers’ interests, and Eliot did show signs leaning to that direction when 
he offered a position of sub-collector coupled with that of Land Officer to Delamere who 
opted instead to apply for land.  Delamere was best suited with being the president of 
the CA while possessing a big estate with quasi-free labor from the Africans’ who would 
remain as land-losers, forced to pay tax.  European settlers’ political aspirations echoed 
all the way to London and the FO had to intervene because of the obvious violations of 
Eliot regarding the issues of land promises, land alienations and segregationist policy 
that tended to exclude the African and Indians in the protectorate.  In 1904 the FO had 
enough of Eliot’s stubbornness and policy making.  The well-regarded commissioner, 
who only catered to European settlers, had to go.  Eliot himself knew that his fate was 
sealed.  He precipitately anticipated his departure by quickly tending his resignation to 
Lansdowne.  
The end of Eliot’s administration and its consequences 
Eliot’s resignation was the result of a clear mismanagement of land just to please 
some of his favorite newcomers.  From the beginning of his mandate, Eliot’s 
administration was mainly dominated by a policy of land alienation favoring the 
European settlers he invited to develop the protectorate.  The process of land 
distribution on easy terms was disorderly conducted.  Land was not properly surveyed 
and a laissez-faire of first come, first served policy followed.  Officials like Jackson, 
Bagge, Ainsworth and the land officer Barton Wright were overwhelmed by the 
situation.  No measure of caution was taken by Eliot not to infringe with African rights 
to land in the EAP. The Kikuyu and the Maasai were among the most affected. The 
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situation reached a climax when “in pushing ahead with the settlement of the Kiambu 
district, Eliot ignored the warnings of his local officials who reminded him of the danger 
of dispossessing the Kikuyu.  Because of the chaotic situation, the officials under Eliot 
could only manage to achieve “a haphazard division of the land between the settlers and 
the Kikuyu, with payment of compensation for dispossessed Kikuyu.  Eliot attempted to 
use the policy in the Rift Valley, this time in the face of protests by Jackson and Bagge 
who appealed to the Foreign Office, not merely over the Maasai rights, but also over the 
question of granting concessions in the Rift Valley.”91   
The commissioner went too far in his intention of creating a white men’s country 
ipso- facto without taking into account the Africans or Indians rights, at least as subjects 
by right in the same protected crown land to say the least.  Under Eliot the EAP 
highlands were reserved for the arriving European settlers.  Eliot felt justified in 
sanctioning large freehold grants of land to prospective speculators disguised as 
desirable investors without the full consent of the FO and the Treasury.  The case of the 
East Africa Syndicate that went to engage in negotiations with Eliot to cut what became 
their greatest land deal was a result of an effective scheme of persuasion used by one of 
their managers in London.  In the FO, Hill worked on behalf of the syndicate to 
persuade the Treasury to allow them a large concession because of their possible large 
investment.92  The protectorate was in need of money and big investors seemed to be the 
best answer for Eliot and officials like Hill at the FO, who was lobbying for the 
syndicate’s interests.         
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Sir Clement Hill fell under the influence of the syndicate’s London manager, 
Major C. H. Villiers, who sought Hill’s backing to bring the Treasury to come on board 
and allow their freehold deal to concretize.  Hill’s collaboration with Villiers was a clear 
indicator in his belief to the importance of attracting investors who could benefit with a 
grant of large concessions suitable for the development of their business adventure.   
Hill’s approach about revitalizing the economy of the protectorate was parallel to Eliot’s 
vision, which created the situation of having to fill up the protectorate with desirable 
investors.  Eliot did his best to widen the door for whoever he also promised land.  The 
commissioner was in tune with the big men who claimed land that was promised to 
them.  In the following case, Eliot circumnavigated the vigilance of the FO and Treasury 
to facilitate large portions of land to Chamberlain and Flemmer for their labor of 
bringing around 100 settlers in the region in 1903. 
In that case, it later resulted that the two South Africans that were working for 
Eliot to attract settlers were really interested in the business of land speculation. That 
was the reason why they wanted a large portion of land to make a maximum profit by 
selling back their real estate when the land prices soared up.  Jackson complained again 
to the FO about Eliot’s practices.  Lansdowne demanded explanation on that issue, 
thinking that the land deal for the case of Chamberlain and Flemmer was not yet 
concretized.  Surprisingly, “Eliot went on to admit, for the first time that he had 
instructed the Land Office to draw up leases with Chamberlain and Flemmer. They had 
signed the leases and, accordingly, the Law Officer, J.W. Barth, had established a prima 
facie claim.”93   
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That was it, when Eliot could not legally back track from Chamberlain and 
Flemmer’s land deal; he decided to face the FO with dispatches trying to justify his 
decisions.  His exit option was a precipitate resignation because he could not make his 
case hold ground before Lansdowne who in return may have to appear before 
parliament on issues related to the handling of the EAP territory.  Eliot completely 
disregarded the question of African rights to land; to him; no valuable land was an 
exception for alienation. With that firm belief, even the Rift Valley felt in the same 
sphere of territory to be purely and simply alienated.  Dispossessing the pastoralist 
Maasai from their grazing land and even eradicating them from the face of the earth in 
the process was, according to Eliot, a great service to humanity.  That was one of his 
argument points when in April 1904; he invaded the FO with a series of dispatches 
explaining the why of his resignation.94 
The resignation of this renowned intellectual and diplomat was not amiable at all.  
Eliot went on to play the victim’s card that seemingly meant giving the impression of 
being blamed by the FO for intending to accommodate settlers of his choice, even 
though during his tenure, the commissioner was far from being easy to approach by his 
new guests.  The commissioner held grudges against Jackson, Bagge and mostly Hill, 
whom he directly attacked in his evaluation of the whole situation.  Eliot was not shy to 
express his feelings and what he stood for.  His dispatches clearly reflected his firm 
belief in the necessity of forging a white men’s country at the expense of the Maasai and 
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the Kikuyu in general.  To the FO, Eliot sent his poignant letters of complaints, disgust 
and intent of self-justification.95 
The commissioner was a career diplomat with a monumental pride and having 
been by-passed by Jackson and Bagge, who were his subordinates, brought him to 
tender his resignation to Lansdowne.  Eliot took it as an insult, a despicable and 
disrespectful maneuver against his good intentions and initiatives towards opening the 
protectorate for European settlement.  Concerned with the probability that the delicate 
question of land grants and native rights could be raised in parliament, Lansdowne 
explained to Eliot the reason why Jackson and Bagge were consulted.  At first, 
Lansdowne did not accept Eliot’s resignation based on the criteria that the refusal of the 
Chamberlain and Flemmer land application was a measure of prudence. In the EAP, 
arbitrary land alienation was feared to lead to outrageous violations of African rights to 
their most valuable locomotive of subsistence.   For instance the pastoralist Masaai had 
long been using the Rift Valley to raise their cattle by seasonally grazing the highlands, 
conducting it up and down the interior of the region.  Considering that reality of Maasai 
tradition, a careful management of their territory was deemed necessary.  Lansdowne 
argued that caution and wisdom was the best approach in the conduct of land policy in 
the EAP. Lansdowne had to cover his back, in case that the subject of land grants and 
native rights in the protectorate was to be raised in the parliament.96 
The foreign secretary’s approach did not please the commissioner.  There was a 
paradox in the way that Eliot reacted after hearing from Lansdowne’s concern about the 
risk of possible swift alienation of Maasai land.  The man who felt by-passed by his 




subordinates did not in return inform the FO about the signed leasehold agreement in 
favor of Messrs Chamberlain and Flemmer.  Lansdowne instructed Eliot not to exceed 
1,000 acres of freehold land .  Eliot did not pay attention at all.  He had his own way of 
conducting business with the settlers.  At the beginning of the 1904, he claimed that; 
“Although Messrs. Chamberlain and Flemmer are nothing to me, I am quite determined 
to resign if I cannot do them what I consider justice”97 Doing justice to Chamberlain and 
Flemmer meant paying them with African land and Lansdowne did not want to hear 
that.  
Behind closed doors, the two gentlemen who advertised the EAP natural wonders 
in South Africa got their recompense. As Sorrenson observed, “Eliot admitted that their 
colonization scheme had been abandoned, but, as Lansdowne had instructed him to 
encourage ‘small capitalists’, he had offered them ‘moderate’ grants.”98  Again Eliot 
insisted on trying to justify his actions.  One thing was encouraging small capitalists, 
and why not big gentlemanly capitalists investors, and another was where to let them 
settle and how they were going to purchase a lot of cheap land.  Knowing that he had 
already exceeded his powers, Eliot blamed Jackson, Bagge and the FO for belittling and 
overruling him.  His dispatches were filled with rage.  One was a general defense of his 
actions and policy.  Still hurt by the Foreign Office consultation of Jackson and Bagge, 
or as he put it ‘overruled by my own officers’, Eliot believed that “there was ‘not a Head 
of a Mission in the Diplomatic Service who would not send in his resignation when so 
treated.’”99  
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There was no doubt about the fact that Eliot was an intelligent diplomat, not 
short of intellectual vision, but he seemed not to realize that he did by-pass the head of 
the FO with Chamberlain and Flemmer’s lease agreement.  There was no reason for the 
proud Eliot to be offended on that matter to the point of having to resign. The 
commissioner even went so far in his reflections and confession about the futility of the 
Maasai rights to land and their existence in general.  Eliot viewed the Maasai as a 
nuisance and believed in their extinction. The man on the spot was a man of his time 
who fully embraced social darwinism, after encountering so many non-British people, 
usually described as uncivilized subjects, he manifested a particular disdain vis-a-vis the 
Maasai.  In another dispatch, marked private but not top secret, because Hill later used 
it against the man on the spot, Eliot made a self-destructing remark. The content was 
shocking.  On April 1904, Eliot stated that: 
No doubt on platforms and in reports we declare we have no intention of 
depriving natives of their lands, but this has never prevented us from taking 
whatever land we want. . . .Your Lordship has opened this protectorate to white. . 
. . colonization, and I think it is well that, in confidential correspondence at least, 
we should face the undoubted issue --- viz., that white mates black in very few 
moves. . . . There can be no doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go 
under.  It is a prospect which I view with equanimity and a clear conscience . . . . I 
have no desire to protect Masaidom.  It is a beastly, bloody system, founded on 
raiding and immortality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbors.  The 
sooner it disappears and it is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the 
better.100  
 
That was a critical analysis and the commissioner missed the point of the very 
essence of social darwinism. If cruel, beastly and bloody as Eliot stated, the Maasai then 
would prevail and totally dominate the region. They would remain as the fittest, but with 
the presence of the newcomers that very darwinian theory was reversed and that meant 
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that white mates black in very few moves according to Eliot.  The commissioner’s 
confession bared enough evidences for the FO to clearly understand Eliot’s intention of 
again bypassing all African rights without any remorse, to create a country of white 
settlers.  Specifically, he envisioned how ideal it would be to see a final solution for the 
Maasai threat.  Eliot predicted that the mere presence of the Maasai in the highlands 
could trigger a clash with the arriving settlers aspiring to find good land.  He also 
pointed out that it could be a bloody affair of the same magnitude as the Jameson 
raid.101 Eliot’s reference to the Jameson raid sounded like a recipe that could well suit 
the case of the Maasai occupying valuable land suitable for European colonization.  
Eliminating the Maasai would not even have a repercussion worthy to be mentioned in 
the annals of African history. 
Eliot never seemed to fully understand how history would record a sudden 
extinction of the whole Maasai community without digging into the origins of such a 
tragic event.  If that was the case in history, archeologists would sure dig deep and ask 
questions about the dark history behind such a crime scene.  It does not take an 
extraordinary mind to realize that history would also have to write about how that 
terrible tragedy happened? Who were the perpetrators and what were their motives?  
The answer to that historical query would simply be:  land alienation and greed at the 
expense of simple African people who never asked for a railway to be built in their 
country and neither wanted to see some alien non- residents come and take their land 
by force.  If force could not be used to alienate land, there was another alternative.  
Legally agreed land leases’ on easy term would mean alienation as well.  In the case of 
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Messrs Chamberlain and Flemmer, if Lansdowne firmly rejected their land deal that 
could cause a scandal with grave legal ramifications that would sure get the attention of 
parliament.  As the syndicate land deal was approved, Eliot then considered it unfair not 
to let Chamberlain and Flemmer have their reward because after all they helped in 
bringing settlers in the region. Eliot was now an empty bag of policy formulation and 
sought to blame everybody but himself. 
The commissioner went on to blame Hill, who was the head of the APD, for his 
lack of competence and full assistance to him in his mission of land alienation.  He 
underlined to the FO that Hill was quarrelsome and not even apt for the job of managing 
the APD.  Eliot revealed that Hill confessed to him how he had respect and admiration 
for Coronel Ternan, who served as Deputy Commissioner in the Protectorate after 
Hardinge’s departure and before the arrival of Eliot, and how he acknowledged that that 
decorated military servant was a better choice for the APD.  Following the negative 
critique directed to Hill, the unrepentant commissioner called it quits by officially 
resigning in a letter where he wrote how he really felt, not his violations.  He put it this 
way: 
I have put my back against the wall & if I cannot give Europeans justice & if I 
cannot receive from your Lordship that confidence and support to which position 
entitles me, I am determined to go.  I can hardly exaggerate the bitterness or the 
regrets which I feel in thus leaving East Africa.  It was my hope to devote my life 
to giving it the position in the world which it deserves and I am conscious of 
having made a good beginning but I would rather leave it than be forced to 
manage it under the trammels imposed by those who have neither the knowledge 
nor impartiality. The Evil of East Africa is that it is not managed by your Lordship 
or by the F.O. as a whole but by a Department.  It is impossible for you to devote 
time to it yourself: the work lies apart from general business in London and it has 
lost touch with reality out here.102  
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          Eliot’s resignation letter underlined the importance of giving justice to European 
settlers and that translated into accommodating them on the highlands and 
paramounting their rights in the protectorate.  He criticized every department in 
relation with the protectorate and its officials but himself.  It was really the 
commissioner’s general attacks on everybody and specifically on Hill that bitterly ended 
his political career in the protectorate.  After Eliot’s deluge of criticism, and blame, it 
was time for the APD head, chief of all affairs as Eliot underlined it, to methodically 
formulate his response, and that was going to totally dismantle all the commissioner’s 
case.  
Sir Clement Hill, as head of the APD, had access to all the correspondences going 
to or coming from the EAP.  Not only that, he assumed the responsibility of analyzing 
and interpreting them for the Foreign Secretary who apparently did not have the will to 
spend his hours dealing with the internal problems of an infant protectorate.  Hill then 
gathered all the primary dispatches that Eliot ever sent during that ugly episode of 
complaints followed by his resignation and cross examined them carefully.  The dispatch 
of Eliot’s damaging confession about how he viewed the Maasai was a document of 
immense importance for Hill when it was his turn to defend himself. Conveniently, Hill 
used that confession document, as if he himself truly believed and cared about the 
importance of the protection of Maasai rights to land.  Paradoxically in 1904 , it was 
proven that Eliot’s departure did not prevent the signing of first Maasai treaty that 
meant direct interference with the transhumant activities of the Maasai and the 
shrinking of their ancestral land. It was indeed very hypocritical for Hill to have used 
what Eliot wrote to make his case, to an extent; Eliot at least truly believed in what he 
wrote and worked consistently to alienate Maasai land.  Hill was aware of the fact that if 
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the dispatch was fully published, it would have a great impact at home by awakening all 
kind of public opinion reactions.103 
 Hill meticulously explained to Lansdowne all the possible negative consequences 
that could derive from Eliot’s dispatch and its dangers.  Hill referred to a potential 
scandal of great proportion that could spread like wild fire within the press at home.  He 
then socratically presented to Lansdowne the case of what could be the resulting 
implications of a moral response to all these following questions. 
Is it likely that a Commissioner with such views will seriously try to do his duty 
and control the settlers? Is it just to oust the Masai from their ancestral lands 
because the latter are good to the eye, and because we chose to run a railway 
through them—not to develop those lands but because they are on the shortest 
route to Uganda? Is it expedient at this moment to risk a native rising and the 
massacre of scattered settlers, to say nothing of the slaughter of natives which 
would ensue? Is it politically wise, in the face of public opinion at home, of the 
international obligations imposed upon us by the Brussels Act and of our 
discussions with the Congo State, to take a step which will lay His Majesty’s 
Government open to serious charges of indifference to native rights which it will 
hard to refute?  And for what objects? To make revenue a little faster; to please 
South African settlers or speculators who are already hawking their grants in 
South Africa markets; to save the Commissioner’s amour proper; and perhaps to 
avoid claims for compensation arising out of his premature action.104 
 
           Hill’s strategy worked well, no official would like to face parliament to answer to 
those delicate questions about the violation of African rights.  As the whole problem 
facing the EAP was Eliot’s failure to plan well in administrating the budget, Hill 
convinced Lansdowne about the fact that the commissioner had no reason threatening 
to resign.  Hill won the battle of minds. His proximity with Lansdowne gave him 
advantage.  Eliot’s resignation was accepted.  It could be interpreted as such, meaning a 
resignation of Eliot based on principles and pride, or as an action taken by the FO in 
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order not to lose control of the EAP.  Nevertheless the protectorate was already turning 
into a political circus maximus with the few settlers already present in the region 
aspiring for power. When news of Eliot resignation reached the settlers’ community in 
the protectorate, opinions about the well educated, disciplined and reserved 
commissioner started to change. The settlers now re-embraced Eliot. As Sorresnson put 
it: “According to Grogan, the settler feelings were so high that they intended to call for 
Eliot’s resignation.  When they realized he had resigned on their on their behalf 
‘everyone realized he was right’, so they demanded an inquiry into the circumstances of 
his resignation.”105  
         The settlers’ support and sympathy towards Eliot took a new hype after his 
resignation. On one hand, settlers considered Eliot as their defender, a man who stood 
for their rights and would be missed. To say the least, that was quite a strange legacy of 
Eliot’s administration. The man on the spot made his mark in the protectorate. The 
settlers organized him a well deserved dinner at the Mombasa Club before he left the 
EAP for good in July 1904  
 Conclusion 
The arrival and settlement of the Europeans in the EAP was the ongoing work of 
the commissioner. In less than four years, the EAP saw the introduction of a conflictive 
group of people who not only wanted to alienate the best land, but also usurp political 
power. Their major obstacle was that they represented but a miniscule fraction of the 
EAP’s population.  Therefore, the powers-that-be in London could hardly consider that 
such a minority could be solely entrusted to develop the region. As the FO was still 
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concerned with the question of how to quickly recover the Empire’s investment in the 
railroad, and perhaps even show a profit from it, the commissioner insisted that the best 
way to lift the protectorate was through perpetuating the influx of European settlers and 
investment throughout East Africa. Nevertheless, not all the colonists who arrived were 
able to establish themselves without the support of the local administration. The “big 
men” were able to benefit from large alienated areas of land, but found it difficult to 
develop this acreage without African labor.  Legal land survey, acquisition and 
development became subjects of intense debate at the FO.  Eliot started his 
administration with the wrong approach, insofar as a discriminatory system within a 
British colonial protectorate was not going to prevail without political repercussions at 
the FO, ultimately responsible for supervising the region for the benefit of all His 
Majesty’s subjects. 
 The commissioner pointed the way to the newcomers who thought of running 
the protectorate along the model of South Africa, where the rights of the Africans were 
ignored. With Eliot’s backing and the settlers’ nature and aspirations, the stage was set 
for a long political struggle in the EAP.  Eliot’s legacy upon the protectorate would later 
have far more political consequences.  An economic plan of development based on race 
and excluding the Africans and the Indians was being hindered at every turn. 
Nevertheless, with Eliot’s administration, the stage was already set for political conflicts. 
The latecomers had their agenda, which was not suitable for the EAP; but they were 
determined to carry on with their dream of achieving- sooner or later- a self-governing 
country. The FO was being overwhelmed with news of the settlers’ demands for the best 
lands and racial privileges.  Changes were sorely needed for an equal and fair society. 
With Eliot’s resignation, the EAP was to enter a new phase.  Stewart was appointed 
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commissioner; and in 1905, the Colonial Office (CO) took over the protectorate to the 
relief of the FO, an agency whose officers found themselves too busy for dealing with the 












Shifting Gears: A new man on the spot, Colonial Office Takeover and 
European Settlers’ first Politics demands  
 
“ The question just here is not whether we are governing those colonies and 
subject races well and wisely, better than they could govern themselves if left 
alone, or better than another imperial European nation could govern them, but 
whether we are giving them those arts of government which we regard as our 
most valuable possessions.”106 
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In July 1904, Sir Donald Stewart107 succeeded Eliot as commissioner of the EAP 
upon recommendation of the CO.  The new man on the spot already had experience with 
matters concerning white settlers on the Gold Coast.  That experience was to be valuable 
in the handling of the political situation evolving in the protectorate.  The settlers that 
Eliot invited arrived and were pressing persistently for large land concessions.  This 
became a big issue with the Land Committee appointed by Stewart.  The FO instructed 
Stewart to pay special attention to the relations between the Africans and the latest 
white arrivals in the protectorate.  Even after Eliot’s departure, the FO was still 
concerned with the possibility of the European settlers’ takeover of the best land on a 
massive scale. 
  W. McGregor Ross emphasized that “the story, so far, has been one of the 
occupation by some Europeans of the property of African natives, and this with the 
assistance of Government, and the settlement of other Europeans upon vacant land to 
which Government gave them not only safe access but also secure titles.”108   That 
created a problem that Stewart inherited and had to resolve.  Ross asserted that, “the 
Government created a caste of landed proprietors a privileged class.  Its members can 
certainly not be blamed for accepting the chances of wealth which a British Government 
placed before them.”109  The settlers whom Churchill called “political animals” were 
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ready to fight for their interests.  In the midst of this new situation created by Eliot, 
Lansdowne reiterated that Great Britain had a moral obligation in looking after the 
welfare of the native population of the protectorate.  He told Stewart that: “The first 
question which must engage your attention on your arrival in East Africa is that of the 
relations between white settlers and natives, more especially in those regions between 
Nairobi and Lake Victoria which present a possible field for European colonization on a 
large scale … On its proper solution the future of the Protectorate will largely depend.”110   
That had to be a priority in Stewart’s administration of the protectorate 
However, the European settlers had their own idea about how the protectorate 
should be run. Talks of the primary interests of the newcomers were long entertained by 
Eliot and the European settlers even before Stewart’s arrival.111   It was not a surprise 
when, in 1905, after the transfer of the protectorate to the CO, the CA presented their 
first demands.  They desired a LegCo containing elected members and a crown colony.  
Since it was their first general political statement, it is important to analyze it well.  
Their aspirations gave birth to a struggle about the control and administration of the 
EAP.   In analyzing the loss and reassertion of imperial initiative in the EAP that later 
became Kenya Colony in 1920, Maxon raised a significant issue that the CO faced.  
Maxon explains that “the Colonial Office in London struggled to maintain initiative and 
control in these years in the face of several, often contradictory parties and pressure 
groups; among the most influential were Kenya’s colonial state, the European settlers 
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and the Indians residing there, the India Office (IO) and the government of India, 
missionaries, humanitarians, and capitalists in Britain itself.”112    
The root of the problem that Maxon stated took shape early when the CO took 
over the protectorate and when the European settlers articulated their first demands in 
1905.  As soon as the settlers’ demands went public, different positions and opinions 
started to emerge from the protectorate and London.  The CS and the CO were both 
involved.  Lord Hindlip supported the settlers in England. There were also the responses 
of Sadler, who succeeded Stewart as commissioner in 1905, and other officials as well as 
the reaction in London.  It was under this political turmoil that a Legco and a new 
constitution for the EAP were agreed upon.  The settlers had pressed for the transfer of 
the protectorate to the CO, believing that it would lead to a more sympathetic and less 
miserly administration.  They had their demands on the table and had to deal with a 
new commissioner.  This is the setting of this chapter, the purpose of which is to bring 
light to the nature of the early political struggle in the protectorate, sparked by the 
presence of the European settlers that Eliot attracted there.  They came to settle and 
fight for what they believed was their right to rule the protectorate based solely on their 
own interests.   
Stewart’s administration and the European settlers’ influence   
The appointment of Sir Donald Stewart as commissioner was the result of Eliot’s 
precipitate resignation due to the fact that he was stymied in his plans to assist the white 
settlers he had invited to the EAP.  Mungeam gave the following evaluation of the former 
commissioner’s administration, emphasizing that:     
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Although Eliot had only been Commissioner for three and a half years, he had clearly 
made his mark upon the Protectorate.  He had taken over a country in the throes of 
revolt, and had seen a measure of law and order established, and frontiers extended.  
Most important of all, when faced with the need for quick return to pay for the railway, 
he had turned to the deliberate encouragement of expatriates.  Through the 
introduction of the settlers he hoped to secure the rapid results that he believed the 
local Africans to be incapable of achieving by themselves. 113 
 
Eliot administrated the protectorate with a firm belief that Africans were incapable of 
developing the region and preferably should work as squatters in white men’s farms, leaving 
the public square to the European settlers.  Eliot was the progenitor of European settlement 
in the EAP and pushed for an establishment of a white man’s country in the highlands of the 
protectorate, thus undermining the rights of the Africans and the Indians altogether.  Eliot 
discredited the highest office of the protectorate with his own unfair policy that tended to 
favor the settlers who wanted free or cheap land, more political recognition, and participation 
in the internal affairs of the region.    
 Eliot’s plan did not sit well with the FO because any flagrant violation of African 
rights would make it difficult and even more embarrassing for His Majesty’s 
Government to justify their presence in the EAP.  For that reason, Lansdowne did not 
want to allow any more grants of large areas to individuals or syndicates although he 
was aware of the presence and continuing arrivals of expatriates who answered Eliot’s 
call.114   An adequate land survey was needed to prevent speculation and accumulation of 
land by a few settlers with capital.  The firing of Eliot, followed by the rapid appointment 
of Stewart, was a strong statement from the FO.  The FO’s intervention meant that 
London was still in charge of maintaining initiative and control of the protectorate in its 
early stage under British rule. 
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 Although Eliot was sacked, it remained clear that he made a lasting mark upon 
the protectorate by setting the stage for a tense political atmosphere that prevailed after 
his departure.  It was under his tenure that the EAP was becoming a hodge-podge of 
disparate ethnic groups, with the settlers scurrying to protect and advance their 
interests under London’s supervision.  That was an important aspect of Eliot’s legacy 
that carried within itself a ripple effect with which Stewart had to deal.  The troublesome 
relationship between Eliot and the FO about how to run the protectorate had a lasting 
impact in the executive office of the EAP before Kenya became a colony.   
For the first decade of the EAP’s administration, a series of weak or pro-settlers’ 
rights commissioners, and later governors, occupied the office and had to deal with the 
European settlers’ agitations and ever-increasing political demands.  Stewart was the 
man appointed by the FO to assess and control the situation in the EAP in 1904 and was 
not the last one.   Finally, Stewart’s arrival also meant that change was needed and 
following Eliot’s footsteps was not the right way to proceed. 
Stewart was called upon to run the protectorate because of his extensive military 
background and his experience in the Gold Coast where he dealt with other Europeans 
looking for wealth.  The CO considered him as a man well-suited to administer the EAP.  
His military background made him appear as the right man to continue potential 
military expeditions on the frontier.  At a time when Britain needed to strengthen its 
grip on the protectorate, Stewart’s credentials made the CO’s recommendation of him to 
the FO seem justifiable.   
The FO had the habit of shuffling officials from one colony or district to another 
without first considering if experience gained in another British territory would be 
valuable in the context of the EAP with its troublesome settlers, the majority of whom 
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came from South Africa.   It was along that trend of decision-making that stimulated the 
FO to send a man with military experience to administer the EAP.  Some officials like 
Alfred Claud Hollis, who served directly under Stewart, and interim Deputy 
Commissioner C. W. Hobley, expressed their opinions about Sir Donald Stewart.    
Hollis noticed that the new commissioner “was a very different type of man from 
Sir Charles Eliot.  Sir Donald Stewart was a soldier.  Though indolent, he was a 
disciplinarian, and he thought that no country could be properly administrated until (to 
use his own phrase) the natives had been ‘knocked into shape.’”115  He loved action in 
the vast wilderness far more than the details of administrating the problematic EAP.  
While Eliot, the educated diplomat, did not socialize with settlers, officials or military 
personnel during his tenure, Stewart was “a better friend to the military than to his 
officials; he frequently dined in their mess, and took part in ‘cock-fighting’ after 
dinner.”116    
Stewart was better-suited for a mission of pacification of the Africans than for the 
task of having to deal with correspondence or with how to turn the protectorate into a 
profitable enterprise.   Stewart was content to intermingle with other army officers who 
also welcomed the idea of the need to control the region by no other means but the use 
of force on the Africans.  They also enjoyed chasing after the Africans literally, for to 
them, it was a game of a bloody punitive expedition that could earn them promotions.117        
Hobley, a long-serving official who was transferred to the EAP from Uganda in 
1902, was quick to notice the character of the new commissioner.  Hobley described 
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Stewart as “a man of considerable force of character and shrewd common sense, but 
without business experience or training, except perhaps in the racing world.  He was 
what might be termed an illiterate man, having no knowledge of other than of the good 
side of life.  His powers of application were underdeveloped; he rarely read files, and as 
he went to bed late and rose late the affairs of the country had scant attention.”118  
Stewart was a military commander who adopted a militaristic approach when he had to 
deal with the day-to-day office work.  He simply relied on his subordinates like Hollis to 
do the administrative tasks while being loyal to him.  Policy formulation was difficult 
and confusing for him. 
  When it came to matters related to the presence and interests of European 
settlers in the EAP vís a vís African rights to land and self-assertion, both the CO and 
the FO did not do their homework before agreeing to send Stewart as the one qualified  
to administer the protectorate.  This was due to the fact that in the context of the EAP, 
Stewart’s experience with European settlers in the Gold Coast was not much help.   
Stewart was not a bureaucrat, a good negotiator, an economist or a politician who could 
devote enough time to European settlers’ grievances along with the need to turn the 
region into a profitable area for Britain.  Stewart was not prepared to deal with the 
settlers’ agitations and their push for political aspirations.  He had no valuable 
experience that could help him for the social, political and economic challenges ahead.   
The Europeans that Stewart dealt with in the Gold Coast were different from the 
settlers that Eliot invited in the EAP.  Settlers in the EAP had a reputation of being 
political animals and go-getters who imbibed prejudice.  In contrast, Europeans in the 
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Gold Coast had different goals.  They were not after land and power.  They were not 
inclined to own land there, as it was the case in the EAP.   European gold traders were 
not allowed to own land.   The Concession Bill of 1900 required the Europeans to pay 
rent to the chief or the community that owned the land.   In the Gold Coast, as its name 
indicated, gold was what the Europeans were after.  The gold-mining industry justified 
the presence of only a few Europeans, who were gold traders and were not permanent 
settlers aspiring for self-government.   
In addition to that fact, Europeans in the Gold Coast could not successfully settle 
in the interior of the region.  In any case, the interior of the region from the western 
coast of Africa was inhospitable for many Europeans and it had a reputation of being the 
white men’s graveyard.   This was largely due to the intense presence of malaria- 
vectoring mosquitoes.  There were other factors for white Europeans not to attempt 
settlement there.   In the Gold Coast, there were no speculations about the right 
economic direction to follow, because local production for export rested in African 
hands.119    
In contrast, the main economic concern in the EAP was how to make the 
protectorate pay for the railroad’s construction cost first and when faced with that need 
the departing commissioner Eliot called upon the European settlers.  Taking into 
consideration the settlers’ readiness to defend their interests through their political 
organizations, it remained clear that the FO rushed into judgment by appointing 
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Stewart.  The FO threw him in the midst of an evolving political struggle with the 
unavoidable question of African rights versus European settlers’ interests.  
  Stewart did not know the kind of settlers that were waiting for him in the EAP.  
Some valuable government officials who had been serving the protectorate since the 
early days of the Imperial British East Africa Company reported on the spirit and nature 
of the settlers present in the EAP.120   The latter were prejudiced in general.  In addition 
to that reputation, some of them were aggressive land grabbers, speculators and 
politicians who thought that Eliot fought for their rights to own land and was wrongly 
crucified by the FO.  The expatriates came to believe that any official sent by London to 
administer the protectorate should stand up to the FO, which was later replaced by the 
CO, and advocate for their interests.   They came to believe that every commissioner was 
another white man like them who should join their side as they felt Eliot did during his 
tenure.   
After lamenting Eliot’s resignation, they were anxious to know whom the FO 
would appoint and how the new man on the spot would run the protectorate.  Among 
the most eager to know about the new commissioner’s plan to run the protectorate were 
the radical settlers, vocal and volatile minded go-getters like Grogan, Delamere and also 
aristocrats of the class of Lord Hindlip, who vowed to defend settlers’ interests anyhow 
and anywhere. Delamere especially stood for the protection of the European settlers 
interests. 
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In 1903, Jackson, who was Eliot’s Deputy Commissioner, noticed the rapid 
increase of Delamere’s political influence in the protectorate.  Delamere, whom Jackson 
regarded as another “scalliwag” from the settlers’ camp, was rubbing shoulders with 
Eliot and seeking governmental support.121  With Eliot and Delamere’s entente, all 
political maneuvers were to encourage and benefit the settlers in the protectorate.  
However, from the beginning of Stewart’s administration, Delamere was skeptical about 
the new administrator and this time, Hollis took notice. 
 Hollis revealed that Delamere was not enthusiastic to meet with Stewart.  
According to Hollis, Delamere had his doubts about Stewart’s sympathy towards his 
compatriots.  Delamere confessed to Hollis that he “never knew when he went to 
Government House whether the A.D.C. would be instructed to give him a whisky and 
soda or to kick him down the steps.”122   This was a red flag.  It signaled the potential 
opposition of Stewart to settlers’ interests in the EAP.  Stewart could meet the CA’s 
leader’s demands with a strong response.  At the beginning of his mandate, the new man 
on the spot found it unnecessary to deal with the settlers’ nonsense, as he viewed it.  
Stewart wanted to enjoy life with his military peers in a beautiful part of Africa with its 
agreeable climate. 
The character of the new commissioner, who did not put up with nonsense from 
the settlers, paradoxically set the stage for an upcoming political struggle with settlers 
who were determined to use their influence to gain power.   A strong commissioner was 
needed to evaluate the situation and to stop possible arbitrary land alienations and 
violations of the Africans’ rights.  However, having a strong man in charge that could 
                                                 
121 Jackson to Sir Clement Hill, 25 May 1903 and 4 August 1903, FO 2/720.  
122 Mungeam, British Rule, 116.  
 94 
slow down or derail settlers’ political agendas and promote African rights had its 
consequences.   Any commissioner or governor sent by London to stand against the 
settlers’ attempt to politically dominate the EAP faced the expatriates’ agitations and 
pressures.  The settlers had no moral concerns for the well-being of the Africans and the 
Indians.  
 Stewart was about to face a group of European settlers who believed in the 
possibility of building a white men’s country at the expense of the Africans.  That meant 
pushing for transition to a self-governing dominion.  Reproducing the South African 
model of self-government was considered feasible to many European settlers who 
responded to Eliot’s call by moving to the protectorate.  Eliot’s vision of establishing a 
white man’s country was parallel with the European settlers’ expectations of reaching a 
status of a self-governing dominion.   
 The first step of the settlers, though not directly political, was to have ownership 
of the protectorate.  That passed for owning land a priori.   For many expatriates, 
acquiring the best and largest portion of land in the highlands was a matter of an 
undeniable right, sine qua non for a successful settlement.  They thought themselves 
entitled to occupy the highest echelon of the new social context and wanted land to be 
granted in freehold.  That was the mindset of most of the settlers who came to stay. 
Lansdowne instructed Stewart to pay careful attention to the evolving situation with the 
settlers’ objectives and more importantly, the issue of land.  Lansdowne recognized that 
although the settlers’ presence in the protectorate was a reality to accept, the idea of 
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prioritizing their rights in the midst of a region dominated by the presence of Africans 
and Indians would not be a popular one in London.123 
Stewart was instructed, therefore, to focus specifically on tasks related to the 
mainland.   His duties were many.  He was to administer the protectorate while having 
the responsibilities of dealing with internal affairs, especially with regard to arriving 
settlers requesting land, while also serving as the Agent and Consul General for 
Zanzibar.   Lansdowne hired Stewart “as Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief” of 
the EAP to attend to the relations between Europeans and Africans in the Highlands.124   
The presence of the settlers in the interior brought the need to limit the task of 
the commissioner who had to contain a big political crisis in the making.  Separation of 
power through decentralization from the coast to the mainland meant that the FO 
finally “recognized the increasing settler influence on the mainland, and the necessity of 
employing a man experienced, to some extent at least, in African conditions and 
European pressures at first hand.”125  Despite the FO’s acknowledgment of the situation 
in the protectorate, Lansdowne believed that Stewart was up to the task. 
Lansdowne gave specific instructions to Stewart underlining this contradiction.  
How best to harmonise their indisputable rights with the requirements of white 
settlers is a problem which will require your closest attention . . . . It is only by a 
most careful insistence on the protection of native rights that H.M.G. can justify 
their presence in East Africa, and the imposition of the taxes which are levied 
from the natives on the grounds of such protection . . . . The collection should be 
exercised with the greatest care, for whilst the development of the Protectorate 
revenues is of great importance on behalf of the taxpayer of this country, the 
primary duty of Great Britain in East Africa is the welfare of the native races.126 
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 The instructions Stewart received suggested that he had to do his best to make 
co-habitation possible in the interior of the protectorate.  For that to be possible, 
securing equal rights and justice for all people in the protectorate was fundamental.   
Despite Lansdowne’s good intentions to advocate respect of the Africans’ rights, as 
noted above, no efforts were made by the FO to follow up with that ideal.  The FO failed 
to publish Lansdowne’s instructions that insisted on the necessity to look after the 
welfare of the Africans. That was supposed to be the definite policy to follow in the EAP, 
but reconciling African rights with the interests of the expatriates trying to take over the 
protectorate was difficult. Thus it was clear that administrating the protectorate was a 
complicated mandate for Stewart because of the difficult nature of the European 
settlers.   Although the instructions of the FO to the new man on the spot seemed logical 
on paper, executing them was a monumental task. The reason for that difficulty 
centered on the fact that the real priority in the EAP was the need to generate revenue 
from the railway activities.  
  With the need to turn the protectorate into a profitable enterprise and to pay for 
the railways project, unnecessary expenditures had to be cut.  Economy was to be 
practiced rigorously and that required the participation of the Africans and the Indians 
as well as the settlers.   Nevertheless, with the superior attitude and the political 
background of the settlers, all expectations of rapid economic development were 
hampered.  The presence of the settlers was not a guarantee for peace or prosperity in 
the region.  It was rather the source of a perpetual political struggle that slowed any 
potential economic development.   In the EAP, as Wrigley stated, “everything then 
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pointed to European- directed agriculture, and thus to European immigration and 
European rights in land.”127   
The European settlers wanted large blocks of land to be set apart for their needs.  
The settlers’ expectations to obtain land in the best areas of the protectorate were 
illustrated in the Maasai move, which was a direct consequence of their presence.  
Mungeam pointed out that: “ Of all the problems connected with settlement, Lansdowne 
recognized that the most pressing was of the Masai.  He admitted that the entry of 
settlers into their grazing grounds was likely to produce friction, and recommended that 
Stewart should make his own investigation of the position.  On arrival in East Africa he 
should consult with local officials and with the Masai leaders, and report his conclusions 
to Lansdowne so that His Majesty’s Government may reach a decision.”128   In fulfilling 
this charge, Stewart relied on the work previously done by Hobley, who negotiated with 
the Maasai and convinced them to move into reserved areas.   As much had been done 
already by Hobley, and therefore Stewart did not want to complicate his work with extra 
investigation and papers.  
To Stewart, the prospect of the Maasai move was a done deal.  According to 
Mugeam’s account:  “Hobley, as Acting Commissioner, had prepared a series of papers 
which he laid before his new chief.  In these Stewart found that as early as December 
1903 Hobley has been brought down from Kisumu to Naivasha to be in charge of the 
Naivasha Province, and to study the whole Masai question.  In company with Masai 
elders Hobley has embarked on a series of tours in the Rift Valley, and as result of the 
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investigations, he recommended (with Ainsworth’s support) that the Masai should be 
moved to a reserve of their own on Laikipia plateau to the east of the Rift Valley.”129  
As a result following Stewart’s arrival in August 1904, both Ainsworth and Hobley 
presented him with the removal plans for the Maasai.  Stewart, therefore, relied on the 
advice of these two who had been working on the project.  In the discussions in 
Mombasa and Nairobi with the Maasai, Ainsworth served as the liaison, even though his 
knowledge of the Maasai language was probably minimal, at best.  In any event, a final 
treaty with the Maasai elders was achieved, to which Ainsworth served as a witness on 
behalf of the EAP.  Taken altogether, the final agreement was much in line with 
Ainsworth’s original proposals.  He could rightly be considered as the prime mover in 
the Maasai settlement scheme.130 
This was the best thing that Ainsworth, along with the assistance of Hobley, had 
thought of:  the safeguard of the Maasai rights, because their land was subject to total 
alienation, with the settlers as potential beneficiaries.  Carving reserve lands was 
thought to be the best option for the survival of the Maasai pastoralists.  The quickness 
with which the situation was dealt with took the FO by surprise.  To the FO, all 
information indicated that the Maasai were being rushed into a reserve, but that did not 
stop the concretization of the move.  The case of the Maasai move was the first example 
of how reluctant Stewart was to deal with the internal problems that the protectorate 
was facing with land being a major issue.    
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Stewart, the Land Issue and the Colonial Office Takeover  
  Stewart’s passivity lent itself to exacerbating the ever-growing land issue in the 
protectorate.  Stewart did not want to dedicate too much of his own time investigating 
the matter of land laws and their administration.  This, in his opinion, would be a task 
better suited to a committee, which he duly constituted on October 31st, 1904, for the 
purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the following questions related to land in the 
EAP.  The terms under which it was appointed appeared in the Official Gazette of 
November 1st, 1904.  
The committee was specifically instructed by the commissioner to report on: 
  (1.) The general terms and conditions upon which sales and leases of Crown   
         Lands should be granted.  
  (2.) The prices of Crown Lands. 
  (3.) The desirability of reserving lands for natives, Europeans and others. 
  (4.) The survey of land and the working and organization of the Land Office. 
  (5.) Native rights to or over land. 
  (6.) The rights of the Crown and individuals to and over land within the Sultan’s   
         dominions and elsewhere.131 
 
 Stewart also authorized “the aforesaid Committee to call witnesses and take such 
evidence as it may consider necessary and to add such persons to its number as it may 
think fit.”132 
At the outset, this committee was composed of three EAP officials:  Judge R. P. 
Cator as chairman, along with Judge R. W. Hamilton as honorary secretary and Crown 
Advocate J. W. Barth.  Of course, the members of the CA felt shunned and desired 
representation on the committee. The claim of the need to have representation in the 
land committee, although not loud yet, was indeed a crucial moment in the history of 
                                                 
131 “Report of Land Committee, Presented to His Majesty’s Commissioner, East Africa Protectorate, May 
1905,” in Great Britain, Papers Relating to British East Africa, House of Lords (HL) 158 (London:  His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 1907), 5. 
132 Ibid. 
 100 
settlers’ politics in the EAP.  It marks the beginning of the political struggle discussed 
earlier, with the constant settlers’ interest factor, versus Africans’ and Indians’ rights in 
the region.   
The problem stemmed from Eliot’s administration.  It was known that Eliot was 
the commissioner who invited and accommodated some settlers with a huge political 
zeal and pride.  But, Stewart, without knowing it, was the one who provided them with 
an opportunity that led to the settler’s adoption of an extreme political strategy.   
The CA thought that any of their demands had to be met and they pressured the 
officials in the protectorate and the CO consistently.  They were frustrated with the FO 
and some officials they thought were slowing them down.  They wanted to build a 
successful new white men’s country without hurdles in their way.  The CA used the 
formation of the land committee as a political testing ground.  Some members were 
ready to take action and stand for their aspirations.  It was then under the pretext of the 
last clause of Stewart’s reference that the association pushed for the nomination of 
Frank Watkins to serve in that capacity.  Lord Delamere, because of his image and 
influence in the protectorate, joined the committee through the back door.   
The committee went from three to five members but was reduced to four because 
Judge Cator was transferred to the High Court at Zanzibar.  Nevertheless, upon leaving 
to his new post, Cator expressed his views on the matter of how to best create reserved 
areas for white colonization.  Cator favored a proposition that suggested, “If an area in 
the highlands should be reserved for Europeans other areas equally suitable for 
agriculture should be reserved for Asiatics.”133  That was a reasonable plea for the 
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Indians’ rights to good land; but as noticeable in that proposition, the Africans’ rights to 
suitable land for agriculture and pastoral activities was not mentioned at all.  As a judge 
by profession, Cator seemed not to realize the importance of the question of protecting 
the Africans’ rights in the protectorate.  His transfer to Zanzibar opened the door for 
Delamere to promote the settlers’ rights with a pro-settler land report. 
 Delamere quickly maneuvered himself into the chairmanship of the committee 
with little opposition.  Apparently the others on the committee felt as if they were just 
going to fill some chairs and the committee work was only going to be another task they 
could gladly do without. Thus, Stewart’s efforts of appointing a team to look at the land 
issue gave birth to a very pro-settler land committee. In regard to the whole situation, it 
appeared as though Stewart’s lackadaisical approach to the land committee 
appointment resulted in his failure to inform the FO of Cator’s needed role in chairing 
the committee. Therefore, the colonial authorities ended up shooting themselves in the 
proverbial foot by moving Cator to Zanzibar. That allowed Delamere to be able to 
exercise his influence by influencing and altering the result of the report for the settlers’ 
interests.      
With Delamere now chairing the committee, it was rather like the fox guarding 
the hen house. The committee went to work right after the formation of their team at the 
end of the year 1904.  Although Stewart seemed to be collaborating with the settlers by 
entrusting them with a land committee of their choice, some settlers were not pleased 
with the new administration.  Settlers’ frustrations were constantly on a rise. 
In The EAP, the most vocal settlers maintained and expressed their belief that the 
protectorate had the potential of being a profitable country. Their frustrations were 
directed to the FO.  Mungeum noted:   “In January 1905 A. G. W. Anderson, one of the 
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leading European residents in Mombasa, addressed a long letter to the Colonial 
Secretary. In it he complained of the general system of administration within the 
Protectorate, of the type of men who served as officials, and the introduction of Indian 
systems of law and currency. He bemoaned the fact that Eliot-‘a most able and upright 
Administrator’- had resigned, and expressed the hope that Stewart would also do all he 
could to entice the new settler into the country.”134     
Anderson’s complaints reflected the early tension between the settlers and the 
officials in the protectorate. The settlers also blamed the FO for its passivity and lack of 
support for their cause.  The settlers found the officials in their way as they attempted to 
dominate the protectorate by occupying the best land of the Africans and by standing 
against the promotion of the Indian traders. The settlers’ perception of the officials’ role 
in the protectorate led to a struggle that grew and caught momentum during Sir Percy 
Girouard’s administration from 1909 to 1912.  The early European settlers’ political 
strategy was to protest when official policy did not suit their interests. In such cases, the 
officials often received the full benefit of the wrath of the most extreme settlers, when 
some of their immediate demands they considered important were not met in time. 
 In the early days of the EAP the field officers were the pioneers of empire left in a 
difficult situation, as it was impossible for any official to do all that was needed or 
demanded by the settlers. “The East African administrator, unlike his counterpart in 
West Africa or Uganda, was faced with the task of achieving cheap government through 
African acquiescence, and at the same time of meeting the growing demands of white 
settlers. These demands placed a heavy strain on the native agents and collaborators, no 
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less than on the administrator. And amidst all his dilemmas, central policy offered 
nought for his comfort, because it remained both ambiguous and inconsistent.”135  In 
the EAP, the presence of the settlers was a huge factor when it came to the right policy to 
follow to develop the region.  The newcomers resented the ever-present shadow of some 
officials serving in the region and also bureaucrats, politicians and humanitarians who 
did not appeal to their cause in England. 
Frustrated with the administration of the protectorate and the officials in place, 
the newcomers often bypassed the CS authorities. They did so by remaining active and 
made use of their association to push their agenda.  The CA convened a special meeting 
in January 1905 to devise a political strategy for advancing change in light of the new 
circumstances. 136  The action of the CA and Anderson’s complaint to the CO were clear 
examples of how the radical European settlers’ wing manifested their frustrations out of 
the protectorate. Nevertheless, the settlers’ discontent was met with criticism in the CO 
by some officials.  On 14 February 1905, CO official A.L.  Antrobus opinionated on 
Anderson’s complaint. He anticipated problems stemming from the settlers’ camp in the 
EAP. Antrobus warned that: “I am afraid that all the people who, like this writer, Lord 
Hindlip and others, are finding fault with the Foreign Office and saying how glad they 
are coming under the Colonial Office, will not like us any better when we take over the 
administration.”137    
Attitudes towards the FO supervision of the EAP left less to desire because 
progress was sluggish and the protectorate still was struggling to generate substantial 
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revenue.   The CO seemed to be the best alternative to supervise the protectorate and the 
settlers welcomed the idea of that very possible change with high expectations. The 
settlers hoped that a transfer from the FO to CO would be conducive to better overall 
administration of the EAP.  More than any other group, the white settlers were 
expecting changes in their favor.  They were looking for the new commissioner to 
formulate swift pro-white policies even in the face of opposition from some of the long-
standing officials in the protectorate like Jackson, Ainsworth and Hobley. The settlers 
claim was not a new source of struggle because since Eliot’s administration, they wanted 
land to settle down, land to develop, land for speculation and political power.     
Regarding the EAP land policy, the CO had been sending warnings to the FO 
about the dangers of arbitrary land alienation.  In July 1904, after an FO inquiry about 
the land application of two settlers (Woodhouse and Cameron) for 500 square miles of 
land in the Tana Valley, “the Foreign Office was advised not to grant more concessions 
until the land regulation were put on a more satisfactory basis. ”138   Despite the 
warnings, officials in the FO ignored the call for a measure of prudence when proceeding 
with issues related to land, specifically in an infant protectorate experiencing the 
increasing arrival of the so–called land-grabbers from South Africa.  The CO’s advice 
was seen by some FO officials as if it was a direct interference in their way of supervising 
the protectorate.   
Sir Clement Hill, who was the superintendent of the African protectorates from 
1900 up to his retirement in 1905, considered that a busy CO did not have much to say 
about the way business was conducted by the FO.  In addition to that, “Hurst, who 
                                                 
138 Sorrenson, Origins, 83. 
 105 
drafted the 1902 ordinance, denied that any Colonial Office criticisms of his ordinance 
were valid:  “It was working well as the local officials had not complained about it.“ He 
concluded that “until the C.O. take over the administration of the protectorate and have 
the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the facts, the assistance they can offer us 
cannot be of great value.’”139  That was a response meaning that the EAP was too 
troublesome of a region to administrate effectively.  
In April 1905, the CO was in charge of the EAP.  The CO was very familiar with 
the issues that the FO was dealing with regarding the protectorate.  A proper land 
distribution under the pressure of an increasing number of settlers applying for large 
concessions was a crucial issue with which the CO had to deal. Lord Hindlip, the British 
aristocrat, who clearly sympathized with the settlers, commented on the status of the 
protectorate. In his 1905 book, he argued that: “In East Africa you have a country where 
at present there are some five hundred white families; land questions are under 
consideration, the country is capable of supporting a large white population, and 
perhaps in the future it will rank among the food-producing countries of the world.”140 
Lord Hindlip believed in the possible economic development of the protectorate 
conducted by the white settlers who were in fact the minority group in the region.  
Lord Hindlip was even more enthusiastic about the end of the FO rule and had 
high expectations about the potential of the protectorate if the CO could collaborate and 
fully back up the settlers. Lord Hindlip welcomed the CO take over and stated that: “The 
country had emerged from the condition in which it was subject to the bureaucratic 
consular jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, and has passed under the experienced and 
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enlightened rule of the Colonial Office.”141 He also manifested a degree of satisfaction 
about the new commissioner’s first step in his attempt to resolve the ever pending land 
issue in the protectorate. He acknowledged that “Sir Donald Stewart is working for the 
settlers’ interests, and has even called meetings of settlers to discuss matters 
appertaining to the defense of the country; a Land Commission has been sitting, on 
which were appointed two unofficial members.”142  McGregor Ross, on the othr hand, 
noticed the very beginning of a political pattern in the administration of the EAP that 
was based on taking into consideration the opinions of the few European settlers who 
simply wanted land and power. Ross asserted that “from the earliest days the 
Government of the East Africa Protectorate displayed commendable willingness to listen 
to advice from local European residents. Critics of a sardonic turn of mind might 
perhaps interject that it had no option in the matter, the advice having been tendered in 
such strident tones as to compel attention.”143  The settlers’ general opinion on how to 
best run the protectorate grew to become their own political agenda. White settlers’ 
claims of the best lands in the protectorate were just the beginning of their struggle for 
the control of the protectorate.  They also progressively sought to gain full political 
rights so that in a near future, they would have total control of the region.  As noted 
earlier, these problems that the protectorate was facing were not new to the CO, which 
was often consulted by the FO before the transfer was effective in 1905.  
Before the transfer, the FO did not seriously take into consideration the CO 
advice about “the dangers of speculation in land and urged not to alienate large areas in 
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freehold.”144   One clear example of how the FO conducted business was the case of the E 
A S’s land application.  Sorrenson pointed out: “One result of the Eliot-Hill controversy 
was a renewal of Colonial Office apprehension about the Foreign Office administration 
of the protectorate.  There had been inter-departmental friction since 1902 when Hill 
and Hurst ignored Colonial Office advice in drafting the Crown Lands Ordinance,” 
adding that in November 1903, when the Foreign office was in the middle of 
negotiations with the East Africa Syndicate, “the Colonial Office drew attention to 
unsatisfactory features of the ordinance and suggested a New Guinea ordinance of 1899 
as providing useful safeguards for opening up a new territory.”145    Hill just carried on 
and pressed the Treasury to agree to the syndicate grant.  That was possible because of 
Hill’s influence and position in the FO.  Also, in the midst of doubt about the 
effectiveness of the Hurst’s land regulation draft of 1902, the protectorate desperately 
needed big investors with capital to help jumpstart the economy of the region.   
It is important to underline that on one hand, Hill’s scheme for the syndicate to 
obtain land was possible because the FO and the Treasury had no clear idea about how 
to pull profit from the infant protectorate.   Hill’s work for the Syndicate was then 
practical and justifiable because desirable capitalists were to be encouraged to invest.  
The expectations were that the Syndicate’s deal was going to open the door for more 
European settlers with big dreams and ambitions to invest in the protectorate.  On the 
other hand, Hurst believed that the drafted ordinance of 1902 was working well. 
 But, if indeed it did, it was because of Eliot, who relaxed the rules for the benefit 
of his favorite European settlers.  The settlers considered the rules as too rigid and 
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against their interests.   That was one of the problems that Eliot created and left for 
Stewart, the FO and later the CO to better sort out.  Though the CO tried to point out to 
the FO the right way to cope with the issues of land and settlers who wanted to 
transform the protectorate into a white men’s country, their suggestions were ignored.  
In fact, the CO was overwhelmed by the poor management of the FO, which left them 
with a mess to clean up.  
The FO turned the protectorate to the CO and no steps to facilitate a smooth 
transition were taken.  The FO did not keep the CO informed about the general affairs 
concerning the EAP.  Just after the transfer, the CO officials realized that what they had 
inherited was a mess.  As long as the FO was concerned, after ten years since the 
opening of the protectorate, all files were to be left in the disposition of the CO.  It 
resulted that “Only one volume was needed to file all the correspondence on matters 
affecting the transfer, and this dealt more with routine questions than basic questions of 
policy.  There seemed to be no evidence that Lansdowne and Hill ever prepared a 
comprehensive handover report for their successors.”146   
The passivity and lack of diligence on the part of the FO upset Churchill, who was 
the colonial undersecretary in December 1905, following the formation of the Liberal 
Government.  Churchill did not fall short in criticizing the FO for the chaos they left 
behind.  He noted, “The organization of such territory was not a work with which the 
department was acquainted or in which they have displayed aptitude.”   Once again the 
need to shuffle officials for better supervision of the EAP was felt by the CO that held 
“no executive power” but, was able to “exert influence on policy through approval of 
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colonial budgets, legislation, and appointments.”147   It was deemed necessary to 
restructure the whole East African Department (EAD) administration with new faces.   
The Colonial Office Takes Over 
Before getting into the details of the policies and positions of the CO, it is 
important to understand the initial changes that were made by the CO to better 
supervise the protectorate at the time of the 1905 takeover. Officials with experience 
from different British territories were called upon to form a team creating the EAD.  
According to Mungeam’s analysis: 
At the transfer a special East Africa Department was created with the Colonial 
Office, responsible for the Protectorate of East Africa, Uganda, and British 
Somaliland, and for the King’s African Rifles. At its head was R. L. Antrobus, one 
of the four Assistant under secretaries in the Office, who also had responsibility 
for the West Africa Department and West Africa Frontier Force.  Under 
Antrobus, in descending of seniority, were H. J. Read, drawn from the West 
Africa Department, W. D. Ellis, from the North America and Australasia 
Department, and W. C. Bottomley, also from the West Africa Department. These 
were joined on 1 January 1906 by R. Popham Lobb, seconded from service in 
West Africa in an acting capacity only.  At the head of the officials, as Permanent 
Under-Secretary, was Sir Montague Ommaney.148 
 
Following these initial steps of reorganization then underway in London with the 
transfer of the protectorate to the CO, the white settlers in the EAP were beginning to 
feel as if there was some hope on the horizon, that maybe some in the CO would begin to 
at least listen to their demands. Two weeks after the transfer of the FO to the CO, 
Grogan took the opportunity to make his voice heard about the status of the EAP which 
he considered a stagnant land of opportunity for the white settlers without a defined 
policy, paralyzed by incompetent officials and the lack of support from the Treasury. 
Grogan sent his frustrations to the editor of the Times in which he argued that: 
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In East Africa there is land sufficient to absorb enormous numbers of settlers-
land of first class quality, and owing to its various altitudes and rainfalls, suitable 
for the successful practice of every conceivable of the great primary industry; 
while the importance of a considerable concentration of British population on 
these highland plateau cannot be exaggerated in its relation to Imperial strategy. 
The underlying scheme of administration as initiated by the Foreign Office is 
essentially sound, but its lack of elasticity and the complete absence of Treasury 
response to the needs created by the sudden and rapid commercial awakening of 
the past year have induced what closely approximates to a complete breakdown 
in the administrative machine. The small staff which was considered sufficient to 
deal with a position the most important features of which were a few sporadically 
fractious natives and infinite hosts of antelope has suddenly been called upon to 
handle a rapidly developing colony with all its attendant problems of land- 
survey, cattle disease, and, above all, control of the relations between well 
intentioned, unsophisticated natives and white wastrel flight, which invariably is 
the van of any movement of population to a new country. 
The sole trouble is an absence of any clearly defined line of policy, and the lack of 
special knowledge of, and the organization to cope with, the problems which the 
unexpected awakening has evolved. This is due, not to any lack of local 
enthusiasm, but to a starved exchequer. On every side one sees not only that the 
country is severely handicapped, but that its future is actually imperiled by the 
local officialdom's fear of appealing to the stony heart of the Treasury.149 
 
Within the CO, however, some degree of pessimism with regard to the future of 
the EAP prevailed.  Secretary of state Alfred Lyttelton was among this skeptical group.  
He seriously questioned the significance of the EAP within the context of the global 
British Empire.  At best, the Protectorate could serve as an expanded “outlet for Indian 
emigration.”150  It is also clear that Lyttelton’s men shared in the secretary’s dour 
outlook on the EAP.  There was talk among them of displeasure with the FO’s prior 
concessions and land grants to settlers that had taken place under Eliot’s administration 
of the EAP.  In fact the appointment of a land committee by Stewart that was a response 
to the settlers’ displeasures provided an early challenge to the CO.  
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  The land committee formation that was a pro-settler team led by Delamere that 
had been working from its inception until May of 1905.  Beginning their work, they 
called for help.  They wanted some government officials in the protectorate, including 
planters, farmers, lawyers, merchants or whoever present, to give their opinions on all 
or some of the issues related to land regulations and their actual administration. In 
reality, their circular was directed only to the chief government officials and the settlers’ 
community and few Indians. No opinions were needed from the Africans.  The 
committee ended up hearing from 44 witnesses who posted written memoranda but the 
accounts of the witnesses were not included in the report they handed to Stewart. The 
question that remained pending was how anybody could know if these memoranda were 
of considerable assistance to the committee or not.  
Nevertheless, the committee held four sittings at Mombasa and fourteen in 
Nairobi.  Following is the list of the people interested in the development of the country 
who were consulted as witnesses:   
Table 3.1.  Names and Occupations of Witnesses Who Gave Evidence before the 
Committee 
Name Occupation Residence 
V. M. Newland Land Agent Nairobi 
D. O. Roberts Licensed Surveyor and 
Land Agent 
“ 
A. Flemmer Landholder “ 
W. J. King Manager, Colonial Stores “ 
J. Boyes Farmer Kiambu 
W. A. Gain Builder Nairobi 
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J. S. Elliott “ “ 
E. S. Grogan Landholder -- 
F. Knowles Settler Kamiti 
F. W. Krieger “ Kiambu 
T. A. Wood General Agent Nairobi 
H. H. Heatley Settler Kamiti 
B. G. Allen Solicitor Nairobi 
N. A. Macgregor Agent of Dr. Düring “ 
A. Linton Director of Agriculture “ 
C. N. M. Harrison Solicitor “ 
A. G. W. Anderson Director of B.E.A.T. & D. 
Coy. 
Mombasa 
J. R. Wood Settler Kiambu 
J. O. W. Hope Collector Dagoretti 
G. D. Longden Settler Nairobi 
A. S. Frew Licensed Surveyor “ 
W. McC. Wilson Secretary, Colonists’ 
Association 
“ 
P. E. Watcham Manager, Cotton Syndicate, 
Tana 
Nairobi 
John Ross Representing Mr. Ross Kiu 
J. Ainsworth, C.M.G. Sub-Commissioner Nairobi 
T. Kendrick Settler -- 
I. A. Grieve Settler Mbagathi 
R. Barton-Wright Land Officer and Chief 
Surveyor 
Nairobi 
A. Ortlepp Licensed Surveyor “ 
Dr. Radford Medical Officer “ 
C. F. Elliott Conservator of Forests “ 
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E. L. Waring Assistant Chief Surveyor “ 
A. Marsden Chief of Customs “ 
Premji Ranchodas Rep. Africa Hindu Union “ 
Umedbhoy B. Patel “ “ 
Rowji Visram Merchant “ 
Revashanker Shuckle Medical Practitioner “ 
O. Tonks Solicitor Mombasa 
R.  M. Byron “ “ 
C.  M. Dalal Pleader, Rep. I.T. 
Association 
“ 
Jaffer Dewji Jamal Merchant, Rep. “ “ “ 
Jewraj Khatao “ “ “ “ “ 
Haji Ismail Merchant “ 
W. H. Tanner Acting Director, P. W. D. “ 
Ali bin Salim Assistant Liwali “ 
Source:  “Report of and the land Committee,” 25-26. 
 
The table above is incomplete because the authors of the memoranda that were 
supposedly collected should have been included. Memoranda should have been filed 
and included in the report.  That should not have been a comfortable task, taking into 
consideration that the majority of the witnesses consulted were predominantly of 
European descent with favorable opinion of white colonization of the protectorate. E.S. 
Grogan and A. Flemmer were two notorious settlers whose occupations appeared in the 
list as landholders.  The table showed that being a settler was an occupation that 
consisted of occupying land.  Possessing land was a profession. “Solicitor of Land” was 
also an occupation.  No one was listed as speculator.  The African people were not 
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consulted by the committee. Ainsworth’s name was on the list, which was important.  
He had experience and was familiar with African affairs and land issues.  He helped the 
local authorities with the Maasai relocation, which he believed was a matter of 
expediency and a matter of common sense.  To Ainsworth, the Maasai move was a lesser 
evil than having to witness their extinction, as Eliot suggested.151  
At the end of 1904 he was asked to give his opinion about the whole issue of land 
for the land committee. His memorandum survived. Professor Maxom explained how 
Ainsworth reacted to the whole problem of land, European settlement and African 
right’s to land when he argued that:   
Not only was Ainsworth concerned with the Maasai in the Rift Valley during 
1904; he continued to give consideration to land and European settlement in 
Kikuyu territory near Nairobi. By the end of the year, he had concluded that 
European settlement had practically reached its limits there. In his memo to the 
Land Committee, he included a strong defense of what had been his policy of the 
previous two years of creating reserves. He wrote: ‘In my opinion it is more than 
desirable to reserve land for the natives of the country, and if we neglected it we 
would, in my opinion, be guilty of the most flagrant breach of trust. I am 
convinced that the safe-guarding of native rights and interests in this connection 
is practically our first duty when dealing with the land question.’152 
 
Ainsworth’s memo did not fit into the pro-settlers’ land report. The settlers did 
not want to hear about or mention matters related to Africans’ rights to land.  Instead 
they included a range of other issues that were related to their interests. They scripted it 
in their report, stating that: “In dealing with such a wide question as that of the land-
laws of the protectorate-it was inevitable that other matters should be mentioned, 
which, though not strictly within the scope of the reference, were yet so closely allied to 
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the main question that it was impossible for the Committee to pass them over 
entirely.”153  They further added that labor was particularly a question of great 
importance to tackle. They argued that: “The question of native labour in particular is so 
closely bound up with the interests of landowners and the development of the country, 
and many witnesses attached such great importance to it that it was felt that it would be 
impossible to do justice to the general question without referring at some length to the 
subsidiary one of labour.”154 
   It was obvious that labor was going to be a problem that the next commissioner 
would have to deal with. They foresaw problems and expressed that: “There is no doubt 
that the future success or failure of the country depends entirely on the methods that 
will be employed in dealing with native labour. The country must look for its 
development to the labour of the natives, and if proper steps are not taken with due care 
and forethought to render the natives contented and their labour easily available, and if 
the laws dealing with natives are not framed in a wise and liberal spirit and enforced 
with a firm hand the future prospects of the country may be irretrievably damaged.”155 
Labor was an issue worthy of its own committee.  Stewart’s reference did not 
recommend specifically that the committee bring the settlers’ extra issues, but rather, 
“to call witnesses and take such evidence as it might consider and add such persons to 
its member as it sees fit.”156  No additional member was added into the committee. The 
CA took total control of the committee from the get go. The clause was understood by 
the committee as an opportunity to lay the settlers’ many grievances in the report.   
                                                 





The committee was supposed to investigate the working of existing land 
legislation, as well as to investigate the operations of the Land Office itself.  It was 
supposed to inquire into the Africans’ rights to the land and to suggest areas to be 
sectioned off for African reserves.  It was also supposed to investigate the disposition of 
lands along the coastal strip.  In their final report, the committee addressed 87 issues. 
That meant 81 issues that were not strictly within the scope of the reference.  
  With Delamere at the helm, however, the final committee report, issued on 25 
May 1905, turned out to be nothing more than a document of pure propaganda for the 
white settlers’ cause.  In fact, the opinions expressed in the report were almost a 
verbatim copy of Delamere’s expressions two years earlier in his tract, Grant of Land to 
the Zionist Congress and Land Settlement in British East Africa.157  The report 
suggested that land should be reserved for the Europeans settlers and the Indians. The 
committee underlined that:  
There is, however, no doubt that while in practice it might be possible to exclude 
Asiatics from the areas reserved for Europeans it would not be possible nor would 
it be politic to restrain the energies and capital of European planters within 
limited bounds and not to permit them to be used for the development of the 
resources of the country outside those bounds. 
As a matter of fact there is an enormous area of land eminently suited to the 
needs of Indian agriculturists outside the area which it is proposed to reserve for 
European colonization, and it seems therefore detrimental to the best interests of 
the country to throw open to Asiatic immigration a small area suitable for 
European colonization whilst there is a far larger area suitable for Asiatics but not 
for the European colonization still awaiting development. At the present moment 
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a large block of land on the Guasa Ngisho [Uasin Gishu] plateau in an area 
suitable for European colonization has been offered for settlement to some Jews. 
The offer was first made in 1902 and since that date nothing has been done to put 
a term to the option or to insist on the development of the land. The option that 
was then offered still remains open. If it is possible to put a term to what appears 
to be an indefinite option it should be done as soon as may be and this block of 
land which is at present held up may then be thrown open to European 
colonization.158 
 
 In regard to any colonization effort, moreover, the report defined the 
government in terms of being a strict landlord maintaining an almost feudal 
relationship between itself and the holders of the land by objecting free transfer of their 
properties.  The committee outlined some of its concerns regarding the strict 
development clauses inserted into leases in the EAP, as well as restrictions on the 
transfer of leases and the liability of freehold land for forfeiture 117ort h non-occupation.  
Therefore, the report called for a decidedly more liberal policy to foster the development 
of land.  The committee stated that: “It has been raised as an objection 117ort h 
suggestion that transfer should be made easy that a great deal of land will, in a very 
short time, pass into the hands of Indians. There is of course no objection 117ort h 
general proposition that Indians should hold land in the Protectorate, but considering 
that only a comparatively small area of the Protectorate is suitable for European 
settlement and colonization it is desirable that land within the area should be reserved 
117ort he support and maintenance of a white population.”159  
The pro-settlers’ report also denied that there was any danger of speculation.  In 
the opinion of most settlers, already in possession of land, speculation was considered a 
good thing.  It was not 117ort  thought of as an unsavory aspect of capitalism, but rather 
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a healthy sign of activity. They acknowledged that: “Speculation and particularly over- 
speculation is not good for any country, but it should be remembered that the evils that 
it might cause are far outweighed by the impetus given to genuine business and the 
attraction held out to capital where the greatest possible security is given to title, and the 
greatest possible freedom to transfer of interests in land.”160 
The committee had little to say with regard 118ort h amendment of land 
regulations, i.e. rents, limitations on acreage, lease transfers, etc.  In other words, the 
committee had little to complain about.  It basically advocated for more of the same, 
only encouraging legislation that would perpetuate the homestead system through the 
immigration of more “yeoman farmers” and pastoralists into the EAP, 118ort h further 
alienate the Africans from whatever patches of land might remain 118ort he.  Alienating 
the Africans meant having separate locations 118ort hem.  The report insisted that 
“there is unanimity of opinion in favour of keeping locations in town district for separate 
races.”161 That meant separate and not equal 118ort h other races they considered 
inferior.  
 In the final section of their report, the committee expressed firmly the European 
colonists’ vision about how they wished 118ort hem economic growth, prosperity and 
stability in the region. They clearly stated that: 
The general future development of the country must be looked for in a 
combination of capital from abroad and native labour, and it is open to question 
whether it would be sound policy to encourage the immigration of Indian 
agriculturists on a large scale. So far as experience has shown, hitherto, the 
contact with the African native has proved but an indifferent blessing to either 
race. Should Indian agriculturists, however, desire to try their fortunes in the 
country there is plenty of land available 118ort hem, but the Committee think that 
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the settlement of Indian agriculturalists should be left rather to private and 
individual enterprise, as in the case with white settlement, than undertaken by 
the Government.162  
 
They finally concluded their report arguing that: 
The Committee desire to say the objects which they have had in view in 
making the foregoing recommendations are on the one hand a desire to see the 
country opened up as speedily as possible, difficulties removed from the way of 
settlers, and the future administration of all matters relating to land rendered 
as simple and as effective as possible, and on the other that the Government, 
while reaping a due benefit accruing from the development of the land, should 
be equipped with an efficient system for administrating it in the future in the 
interest both of the individual settler and the community at large.163 
 
The committee made a bold statement with high expectations. They hoped to 
gain total control of the protectorate. They suggested that an influx of capital, meaning 
foreign investments, coupled with a reliable and abundant supply of African labor, were 
the key elements to help jumpstart the economy of the region.  In their reasoning, the 
settlers believed that they were the only group in the protectorate capable of taking 
initiatives to build a prosperous country, profitable for themselves and the Empire.  
 The land committee considered the CS’s stance about how to run the 
protectorate as a direct interference insofar as their interests were concerned.  They 
viewed the system of administration as an impediment limiting them with senseless 
regulations under the FO supervision.  The committee’s land report also raised an 
important issue. They stated clearly the urgency of providing cheap labor once reserves 
were carved for the Africans and land alienated for the settlers’ benefits.  The 
committee’s foregoing recommendations were indeed an indirect proposal for building a 
white men’s country at the expense of the African labor force.  However, the demand for 
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cheap labor could be regarded as another starting point for conflict because the question 
of accessing African labor also was closely allied to the main issue of direct violation of 
the Africans’ rights on the same matter. 
 The land committee report’s indirect petition for cheap labor turned out to be a 
serious issue in the EAP.  Labor troubles later became a matter of struggles between the 
settlers and the CS. It was under the supervision of the CO that replaced the FO that the 
problem became manifest.  It caught momentum during Sadler’s administration but it 
was first and formally articulated in the pro-settlers’ land committee report that Stewart 
appointed on 31 May 1904.  Overall, the committee’s report delivered by Delamere, to 
many extents, was the prelude of the European settlers’ posterior demands when they 
formally articulated them on paper and sent it to London on 23 August 1905. Prior to 
the settlers’ decision to address their grievances to the CO, the commissioner finally sent 
his remarks on the submitted land report to the CO on 14 August 1905.  
Stewart’s dispatch was received on 16 September 1905. The commissioner started 
his remarks by pointing out the remarkable effort and good work that the land 
committee displayed in inquiring about the protectorate’s land question. He formally 
expressed to the secretary of state that: “With reference to the report drawn up by the 
Committee I appointed to enquire into the land question in the East Africa Protectorate, 
I have the honour to submit to you, herewith, my comments. I consider that the report 
on the whole is carefully thought out and excellently put together, embodying, as it does, 
the views of the many persons who gave evidence before the Commission.”164   
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The reality was that the report was carefully crafted by a pro-settler team.   The 
report was about what the settlers considered as vital for the promulgation of their 
rights and interests in the region.  Allowing land speculation, facilitating transfer of 
land, defining the term of native reserves and recommendations regarding the future 
administration of the protectorate were main concerns for the settlers. Considering the 
position of the settlers who felt that the protectorate would be better off if entrusted to 
them, Stewart provided his opinion on these matters and suggested the following:  
There is undoubtedly a strong feeling among the settlers that the conditions 
under which they lease land in the protectorate are too stringent, and the great 
complaint is that they have not the right of free transfer. There is much to be said 
on both sides. Free transfer would bring capital and increase speculation. The 
first comers, who have perhaps bought land merely as speculation, and have not 
done work on it, would receive a large profit by selling, and it is doubtful if the 
purchasers would do any more work than their predecessors. They might simply 
remain in possession of the land and wait for an opportunity to sell again at a 
profit.165 
 
Stewart’s views concurred with the land committee’s recommendations on free 
transfer of land and freedom for speculation. Stewart seemed to have not paid attention 
to the instructions of the CO that warned of the danger of alienating large areas of land 
at the expense of the Africans for the sole purpose of speculation. Allowing speculation 
was similar to encouraging a struggle for land accumulation between the settlers 
without the need of having to develop the acquired property. 
 In that process, land would pass from hand to hand and Stewart considered that 
“in the meantime, though, money is circulated by this method, the land itself is not 
developed.”166  A market of land speculators dominated by the European settlers was not 
a sustainable development plan to jumpstart the EAP economy. Speculation was not 
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going to repay the large investments of the British Treasury. Speculation was not going 
to generate or bring goods in the protectorate. Encouraging land speculation was going 
to expose the protectorate to a new conflict. The danger of possible mass land 
accumulations for the sole purpose of reselling at profit in a yet unfettered market was 
real. 
Regarding the issue of the transfer of land, Stewart replied that, “Whatever 
decision is taken with regard to the transfers they ought to be absolutely barred to 
Indians or natives in the districts suitable to European colonization.  There are 
enormous tracts of land in the Protectorate perfectly suitable for Indians to develop 
without encroaching on the comparatively small area suitable for European settlement.  
There is no objection to the small plots and gardens which have already been leased to 
Indians and natives in the Highlands, as they are generally far from European dwellings, 
and being of small extent, can be easily controlled.”167 
This was clearly a scheme to both isolate and alienate the Africans and Indians.  
The settlers did not wish for any integrative development of the protectorate if they had 
to surrender even one degree of European hegemony.  The preeminent status of 
Europeans in the protectorate was to extend to all spheres of influence and control.  To 
further this aim, the white settlers insisted on the formation of “native reserves.”  While 
Stewart concurred that the establishment of reserves was a good idea, his opinions on 
the matter of big or small reserves were fluctuating.  Said the commissioner:  “I have not 
been able to make up my mind from the evidence at my disposal as to which is the better 
method- large reserves far removed from centres of European population or small 
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reserves scattered up and down the country.  The opinions of settlers differ largely on 
this point, and whichever scheme is adopted it will require most careful consideration as 
to the locality, size, etc., of the proposed reserves.  The class of native, whether 
agricultural or pastoral, would also have to be taken into account.”168 
Once again, we see some degree of sympathy with the settlers on the part of the 
commissioner.  However, the placing of the Africans on reserves was an idea much in 
opposition to very concept of establishing a “protectorate,” which supposedly should 
guard all of His Majesty’s subjects against alienation through the appropriation of their 
very hereditary lands.  And this is in line with the very core political ideology held 
among the whites who decided to enter the EAP from South Africa with the objective of 
turning it into a so-called “white man’s country.” 
But there is a certain point where the interests of King and Empire come first, 
and the commissioner declared that,   “It would be very desirable to allow the ratepayers 
to elect their members of the Municipal Committee by vote, but a difficulty arises in 
connection with the coloured vote.  As long as the Indians and natives pay taxes, they 
ought to have a vote for their representative, but the white taxpayers wish to monopolize 
the right of voting, and I fail to see how this could be countenanced by Government.”169 
As much as Stewart shared some of the concerns of the white settlers, he realized that 
his ultimate responsibility was to the Crown.  Clearly, he could not allow the whites to 
exercise a monopoly of the vote at the expense of tax-paying peoples of color.  There 
could not be a future for the protectorate in the Empire if the settlers ended up 
disenfranchising the Africans and Indians. 
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Of course, the commissioner understood that the Africans’ rights were to be 
respected, if solely to keep the authorities from London and humanitarian groups from 
coming down hard on them.  To this end, Stewart recognized that, “The creation of a 
post of Commissioner of Native Affairs is a growing necessity, and I entirely concur in 
the recommendations of the Committee.  If this appointment is made, I have an officer 
in the Protectorate who is fully capable of carrying out the duties.”170 
The issue of creating a Commissioner of Native Affairs, like many other concerns 
in the protectorate, was deferred to others who had been in-country for a longer period 
of time, enough to garner sufficient experience to render wiser counsel.  For example, in 
going back to the problem of land transfers, Stewart noted that, “A  solution to this 
question may possibly be found in the proposal put forward by Mr. Ainsworth, which is 
enclosed herewith, namely to levy a tax on all unoccupied or unproductive land whilst 
allowing free transfer of freehold property.”171  His common sense prevailed in deferring 
some of the more controversial matters to his trusted subordinates. 
The primary recommendation given by Ainsworth for the development of the 
protectorate was the lifting of restrictions on land development.  He was of the opinion 
that “all homesteaders should be able to obtain a freehold title to the land they occupy, 
and should be at liberty to sell out if they so desire.”172  In other words, a free market 
would serve diminish rampant land speculation.  The restrictions were doing little to 
augment the economic development of the country, so their elimination would be a big 
step in the right direction.  But the problem remained that any proposal benefiting the 
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settlers would be interpreted by the CA as a step towards their goal of controlling the 
region for their benefit.  
During the same month of August, there was talk among the white settlers of the 
EAP actually becoming a full-fledged Crown colony.  This would entail the 
establishment of a real Legco complete with elected members. Lord Hindlip, standing 
for the settlers, argued that: “The greatest grievance among the settlers and the 
unofficial community, and a most natural one, is that they have no representation, and 
consequently no voice in the government of the country, or in the formation of 
regulations relating to matters of vital importance to their interests. Naturally for the 
present representative government is out of the question, but some kind of Legco in 
which representatives of the settlers and the unofficial community will have seats is to 
my mind an absolute necessity.”173 As the colonists quickly came to realize that the 
officials of the CO may not all be their friends, their leadership put together a set of 
proposals that was pressed both in Nairobi and London, where Hindlip was dispatched 
for this very purpose.   
The Colonists’ Association demands  
The actual CA demands to the secretary of state were received on November 13, 
1905.  In view of the transfer of the EAP administration from the FO to the CO, the 
colonists were taking the political lead in advancing their positions in London.  Clearly, 
they saw the transfer as a window of opportunity, hoping that the “paramount factor in 
Colonial Office rule is to govern according to the wishes of the governed.”174 
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The extreme nature of the CA, reflective of the inordinate white South African 
influence within its ranks, was also manifest in the document.  It was made amply 
apparent that the “wishes of the governed” was only reflective of the political desires of 
the white settlers and not for any other group(s) resident in the EAP when they wrote:  
“Our association, known as the Colonists’ Association of British East Africa, has been 
founded to advance the development of this country as a white man’s colony, and 
includes a great part of the white unofficial population in the highlands of East Africa, 
away from the coast.”175   
It was a case of the colored peoples be damned, insofar as the CA was concerned.  
The leadership of the organization was obsessed with impressing upon the powers-that-
be in London of the “magnificent possibilities offered by British East Africa for white 
agricultural settlement.”176  The document containing the association’s demands went 
on to frame this remark with a recitation of the vast tracts of fertile land suitable for 
farming and grazing that if placed under European management would yield substantial 
exports that would support a larger white population in the region.  The document also 
drew attention to the previously unforeseen benefits of the Uganda Railway in 
advancing white settler development throughout the entirety of East Africa. 
Despite the potential for prosperity through white settlement, the CA members 
lamented the lack of progress being made in advancing white settlement in the EAP.  
Their document notes that “while the stream of settlers has slackened, many good 
colonists, who had settled, are leaving in despair of making the land pay.”177  They 
wanted the new CO administration to promote policies that would augment white 





immigration.   They believed that this way was the only way to reverse the seeming 
backward trend that the EAP had been following under the FO administration.  The 
European settlers consistently associated the EAP’s struggle for a start of a strong and 
profitable market economy with the lack of trust vested on them by the local 
administration.  The extreme expatriates within the association firmly believed that 
turning the protectorate over to them was the only guaranteed path to prosperity and 
that became their main concern up to 1960.    
In addressing the issue of securing better markets, the association members 
suggested a two-pronged approach.  First, they wanted a lowering of transportation 
costs for their produce.  This would entail a joint reduction of railway rates on the 
Uganda line and steamer freights, which they deemed as cost prohibitive.  The other 
approach involved British East Africa’s entrance into the South African Customs Union.  
But one has to wonder where the loyalties of the CA members lay.  Why did many of 
them leave South Africa in the first place, if it was such a model country and fabulous 
marketplace? Eliot invited them with the promise of accommodating them. They came 
and found grounds to complain about the unfavorable existing conditions in the 
protectorate.  The association membership argued that they could not “find sufficient 
purchasers locally” for their crops, but that the “natural market for the country is South 
Africa.”178  It is then plausible to come to the conclusion that the South African political 
agenda of white hegemony throughout Africa trumped the internal economic expansion 
of the EAP, at least as far as the white settlers were concerned. 
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Yet another issue of political significance was the British importation of Indian 
laws in the governance of the EAP.  The document stated that the “East Africa 
Protectorate is governed as if it were a province of India, and a large number of Indian 
ordinances are applied to it.  Apart from the fact that in some cases the whole and in 
some, parts, of these Ordinances are inapplicable to East Africa, there is the greatest 
objection in principle to placing white men under laws intended for a coloured 
population despotically governed.”179   The Association document elaborated on those 
perceived discrepancies that existed between the manners in which whites were treated 
in India and East Africa, noting that “it is applied with more vigour to East African 
colonists than to European British subjects in India.”180 
The association membership also believed that they were unfairly taxed insofar as 
they were not afforded proper representation through any meaningful establishment of 
self-governance.  The section of the demands titled “Taxation without representation” 
stated: 
Next to the colonists’ objections to the laws of the Protectorate, though of 
equal importance, is their objection to the present method of administration.  
That method may be described shortly as taxation without representation.  Such 
a principle is, of course, alien to the British constitution, and is tolerated only in 
newly-organized territories until the number of white colonists justifies the gift of 
self-government.  But between one-man government and self-government the 
enlightened policy of His Majesty’s Colonial Office has provided many 
intermediate stages.  We would respectfully claim, Sir, that the advent of 
European colonists into East Africa justifies the bestowal upon them of some 
share in the Administration of their affairs.  If the Imperial Exchequer 
contributes a quarter of a million per annum, the burden of taxation borne by 
each colonist is far greater per head than that borne on account of East Africa by 
each Imperial taxpayer.181 
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Therefore, even when it came to questions of taxation, the white settlers were of 
the opinion that their skin color automatically entitled them to exemptions and special 
considerations.  Also on the economic front, the association members decried the ten 
percent value added duty and other fees they were required to pay on imports,182 as well 
as the use of the Indian rupee as an EAP currency in lieu of the British pound.183  The 
European settlers were for no taxation without representation and currency regulation 
for their own economic gains. 
One way in which the white settlers might introduce these change was through 
the facilitation of a transition of the EAP into a British crown colony, provided the 
changes made in the implementation of it were made with the consent and concurrence 
of the majority of the white colonists, naturally.184 The association membership was also 
concerned about the deployment of black and Indian police185 and military throughout 
the EAP.  In the document, the members expressed their desire to supplement this 
colored force “by raising a so-called Volunteer Reserve, consisting of white colonists, 
and official employes [sic].”186  
Especially insofar as the troop contingents went, the overall fear of the 
indigenous black population in uniform and armed was clearly stated in the document: 
“Upon this state of facts, the first suggestion we would throw out is, that in dealing with 
the aboriginal black races such as those to be met in East Africa, it is much the wiser 
policy, having regard to results, as well as much the less costly, to use white instead of 
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black troops.  A small number of high-class, well-paid white troops will yield far better 
results, and have a much more moral effect, than a large number of blacks.”187 What the 
white settlers wanted His Majesty’s Government to do in order to carry out such changes 
in the police and military structure of the EAP was to place effective command under 
“Burgher Councils,” as similarly implemented in South Africa, of course.  With this 
system in place, every white male between sixteen and sixty would be “liable for military 
service in his own district when called upon.”188  The white leadership realized that any 
coloreds under arms, especially blacks, even police and military, posed a severe threat to 
white hegemony.  If their agenda was going to succeed, gaining control of both the police 
and military was essential.  With regard to possible native uprisings, the document 
contained this prophetic statement: “The employment of blacks by the Government as 
soldiers and police to deal with white settlers is absolutely fatal to the maintenance of 
white prestige among natives, and must seriously hasten the day of black rebellion.  We 
stand practically on the edge of a human volcano, which may at any time burst forth in 
uncontrollable eruption and destroy us.  The day of that eruption no one can foresee, it 
may be today, it may be tomorrow, or it may be come years hence, but that it will come 
is an absolute certainty.”189 
In addition to this fantastic prediction, the association also demanded that more 
be done to protect and enhance the mining industry throughout the protectorate, as well 
as provide non-official Europeans moderate rates for treatment at government 
hospitals; and as for destitute Europeans, their health care would be free.  The 
association members also complained about the smaller fees for game licenses paid by 
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government officials.190 That was not all; however, they wanted to also limit the freedom 
of the Africans. Even in the area of semi-autonomous closed districts on some tribal 
lands, the association demanded a curtailing of black rights.  With respect to these 
“closed districts,” the document declares: “We feel, Sir, that it is not in the interest of the 
Government, nor in that of the settlers, that any districts or provinces should be closed 
owing to the inability of the Government to give protection to white traders and others.  
Not only is such an action a sign of weakness and fraught with danger of loss of prestige, 
but it is also a direct injury to the trade and revenue of the country.  In the ‘closed 
districts’ at the present time the savage is permitted to follow his own instincts and 
customs, and to disregard all civilized methods of law and order.”191  This was nothing 
but a disguised land grab.  Any perceived “acts of savagery” might be construed as just 
cause for land appropriation by the white settlers resulting in further land alienation of 
the blacks. 
As clearly indicated in the document, moreover, the colonists believed in the 
social contract theory, i.e. that government should act upon the “wishes of the 
governed.”   The governed, in this case however, referred only to white people.  The 
colonists wanted to impress upon the CO the importance of developing the EAP as a 
white man’s colony.  This, they believed, would ensure a bright future for the 
protectorate’s conversion to a self-supporting crown colony replete with valuable trade 
and “magnificent possibilities.”  The colonists felt that the CO was not doing all it could 
to tap into the full range of options that could make this miracle of progress happen 
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under their watch.  To make this happen, the CA came up with above-cited suggestions 
that can be summarized as follows:  
1.  Adequate and readily available markets needed to be established.  This could 
be done through the subsidizing of a steamship line and the already existing 
railway.  In addition, inclusion in the South African Customs Union would be 
helpful. 
2. The laws of white settlement should be amended to reflect English common 
law.    Their situation was not analogous to the British presence in India, so 
any so-called “Indian codes” need not apply to the EAP. 
3. Actual English currency was needed to replace the existing Indian currency 
then circulating throughout the EAP.192 
4. Some measure of participation in the actual government of the EAP was 
required insofar as the colonists paid license fees, rates and court fees. In 
other words, “No taxation without representation.”  To that end, the 
conversion of the protectorate into a crown colony would necessitate the 
creation of a Legco which at first would be imbued with limited powers of 
representation, but whose authority would expand over time as more white 
settlers arrived. 
5. The military and police forces needed reorganization.  The colonists did not 
believe that the military or police were providing enough protection for the 
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white population, who were supposedly living in constant fear of 
extermination by the natives. 
6. To develop the mineral wealth of the country, a Department of Mining needed 
to be created. 
7. The officials appointed by the CO should no longer enjoy special privileges 
over any other whites in the country, i.e. no special attention at hospitals or in 
the granting of game licenses at the expense of the settler class.     
While the motives of the CO in the EAP sought to be consistent with the noble 
aspirations of the British imperialists in London, the motives of the CA in the 
protectorate were solely self-serving. The bold advances by the CA were solely in line 
with the promotion of their narrow political and economic interests, riding rough over 
the concerns of the Africans and Asians in the protectorate, only usurping a doctrine of 
white racial superiority to justify their future brutality and exploitation. It did not 
matter what these peoples desired for themselves, those in the CA thought that they 
knew what was best for them. The European settler wanted the Africans and Asians to 
simply work for them.  This is the crux of the dichotomy that existed between the CO 
and the CA.  Of course, while both parties were in agreement that European civilization 
and norms should prevail in the EAP, the CO wanted to protect the rights of all His 
Majesty’s subjects while the CA wanted to squeeze them for all they were worth.  That 
was the reason why the newcomers put their demands on paper for the CO. 
The receipt of the CA demands at the CO began the process of consideration by 
the imperial government. Before the CO was prepared to make any comment or 
decision, however, they had to wait the views of the leadership of the CS. This process 
was complicated by the death of Stewart, and thus it was two months later before the CO 
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received the assessment of Jackson who acted as commissioner after Stewart’s demise.  
Jackson’s dispatch, enclosed comments from other leading administrators in the EAP, 
such as C. W. Hobley, John Ainsworth, and M. P. Espie. 
In his cover letter, of November 11, 1906, Jackson noted: “I have treated several 
of the questions in very plain language as I wish to urge that the greatest caution be 
exercised before any radical changes are adopted in the Administration of the 
country.”193 Jackson immediately recognized that some of the demands were 
reasonable, but most of them were not.  This was especially true in light of the fact that 
most of the settlers had not been resident in the protectorate for any significant amount 
of time to be qualified in making such demands.194   Insofar as the “possibilities” 
inherent in the economic and political development of the EAP were concerned, Jackson 
was quick to recognize this reality; but did not agree with the timetable advanced by the 
association.  Jackson stated that, “I believe, now (it is) generally recognized that East 
Africa is no country for a man to settle in unless he has sufficient money to enable him 
to tide over the period which he cannot reasonably expect a return on his capital 
outlay.”195  Jackson felt strongly that the majority of white settlers who had arrived so 
far were having too many difficulties due to the harsh realities they encountered.   
Regarding these settlers, Jackson stated “it is such people that form the majority, 
and are easily led by a few agitators into the belief that the Administration is responsible 
for their lack of success.  It is the country, not the defects in the Administration, that is 
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responsible.”196  As far as the alleged “lack of progress” being made in the protectorate, 
Jackson wrote that, “It is now three years since white settlers began to come into this 
country in any numbers, but with very few expectations they have contributed little or 
nothing towards its progress, and so far as they are themselves concerned they overlook 
two very important factors in which most of them are deficient – means and enterprise 
– and without a small amount of both a man need not settle in East Africa with any hope 
of success.”197 Jackson was puzzled by the Association’s incessant demands for opening 
markets in South Africa while totally neglecting even a mention of the European 
markets.  In addition, railway rates had already been lowered on various commodities 
also being produced by the colored population.  The competition from the Africans and 
Indians in the markets of maize and potatoes had already resulted in pushing some 
whites out of these crops insofar as the profit margin was slim.198  
Of course, “taxation without representation” was a big issue for the association.  
Their basis for a greater political say in the state of the protectorate’s affairs was based 
on their supposed payment of taxes, thus earning the right to more political 
participation.  However, Jackson dismissed this with the following remark: “I do not 
consider that we have yet reached the stage at which representative government is 
necessary or advisable.  The white settlers pay no direct taxes of any kind, and it appears 
unreasonable for them to demand the gift of self-government so long as they contribute 
so little, and the Imperial Exchequer so much in the form of a grant-in-aid.”199 
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In this “pay to play” atmosphere, it seems like the CA members did not even 
possess a hand that they could ante up with.  However, Jackson did not totally rule out 
the idea.  Nevertheless, he made clear the terms under which such a legislative body 
could be constituted: 
I am of opinion that a Legislative Council or Advisory Board would be beneficial 
to the interests of the country.  This Council should consist of a few of the senior 
Government officials, and I would not object to one or at the most two unofficial 
members being included.  I do not, however, consider that it would be wise to 
allow the settler the right of choosing the non-official members.  That privilege 
should rest with the Secretary of State.  I see no reason why gentlemen with large 
interests at stake who have really done something to benefit and help develop the 
resources of the protectorate, should not have a voice in the administration of the 
country.200 
 
        Being intimately familiar with the protectorate, it is not surprising that with regard 
to all of the Association demands, but particularly taxation and representation, Hobley 
was in agreement with Jackson. He wrote 
There are probably few countries in the world where the European inhabitants 
contribute so little to the cost of the administration:  no income tax, house tax or 
land tax is levied, and undoubtedly when the colonists attain greater prosperity 
one could with equity ask them to submit to slightly heavier taxation.   
To turn to the question of representation:  while the administration of the 
Protectorate is so largely dependent on the Treasury grant-in-aid, I consider that 
the claim of the colonists to participate in the control of the finances is not 
reasonable, but at this time I see no harm in the formation of a council of advice 
composed of the senior members of the administration and a few representative 
members of the unofficial community who would be chosen not by reason of their 
having the loudest voices but on the basis of having the largest interest at 
stake.201 
 
Hobley also concurred with Jackson that in all probability, the association 
demands were not at all representative of the views held by the majority of the white 
settler community.  He believed that among this cohort there were certainly a number of 
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“hardworking honest men” who did not identify themselves with the South African 
agitators and who, at the same time, held no sympathy for them.202  Hobley wrote 
concerning the settler community at large, allaying any fears they might have: “The 
officials of the administration are not antagonistic to the settler community.  All they ask 
is that the settlers will cooperate with them in a liberal spirit and assist them to further 
the progress of the country by just treatment of the natives and in other ways.  European 
and native interests are not really in opposition.  The natives are not in overpowering 
numbers considering the size of the country, and there is space for both.  Moreover, the 
various tribes have neither common ties nor fanaticism which would induce them to 
combine against the white men.”203 
The minutes of John Ainsworth were also generally reflective of the opinions of 
both Jackson and Hobley insofar as the association demands.  On the point of the 
formation of a legislative council, Ainsworth added: 
The petitioners demand a share in the government of the country- which at 
present is entirely in the hands of the Commissioner.  They profess that they 
would be satisfied with a Legislative Council in which officials were in the 
majority provided the minority were chosen with the consent and concurrence of 
the majority of the white colonists.   
This could only be carried out by some system of election, and this I think is to be 
deprecated.   
As Mr. Hobley points out, the claim of the white settlers to representation is not 
strong from a financial point of view.  He estimates that only some 2,500 pounds 
out of 82,000 pounds raised by taxation is paid by the white colonists. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the additional work and worry caused to the officials 
of the Protectorate by the introduction of a Constitution it may probably be well 
to introduce a Legislative Council with unofficial nominated additional members.  
It should not be too large and probably four officials, two unofficial nominated by 
the Crown for five years, with the Commissioner or Acting Commissioner will do 




for a start.204 
 
It is to say that what the officials in the EAP thought and suggested at that time would 
not stop the settlers from pressing for more political concessions. They wanted a fully 
recognized participation in the administration of the region. 
The reply of the CO to the settlers did not come until much later in the 
administration of Sadler.  It was contained in a dispatch to the commissioner, and 
clearly indicated that the settlers had run into a dead end insofar as dealing with the CO 
was concerned.   The secretary of state systematically shredded all of the colonists’ 
suggestions, leaving them with a sunken feeling of desperation.  But more on this will be 
covered in the chapter dealing with the Sadler administration. 
Conclusion  
The East Africa Protectorate was a purely political construct that for a few 
moments in time had to deal with a large influx of white settlers, largely from relatively 
nearby South Africa.  These settlers formed the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association in 
1903, that one year later became reorganized as the CA.  At first, the membership was 
largely concerned with the export of maize and potatoes.  But under the leadership of 
Lord Delamere and other racist firebrands, the CA soon became a revolutionary voice 
for “no taxation without representation,” ultimately pressing its list of demands all the 
way to the secretary of state in London in August of 1905.  The Association was trying to 
take advantage of the administrative transition of the protectorate’s control from the FO 
to the CO, where they hoped to find a more receptive ear.  Unfortunately for the 
colonists, their list of demands was deemed almost laughable in London.  The officials in 
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London probably wondered how such a small group of settlers could be so audacious as 
to present a list that not only alienated British subjects of color, but reserved to 
themselves special privileges solely based on the whiteness of their skin. The boldness of 
the settlers’ demands echoed to such a level that the humanitarian groups in England 
started to wonder about the question of the need to watch how the EAP was being 
administrated.  It was manifest the European settlers intent to monopolize power in the 
EAP was an unrealistic move.   
The colonists were out of step with the prevailing attitudes of their day; and as a 
consequence, their days in the EAP were already numbered.  Nevertheless, these 
European settlers that Churchill described as “political animals” would not accept the 
reality on the terrain.  They decided to put up a fight and stand for their rights, in that 
instance, they undertook frequent agitations. They did not hesitate to harshly criticize or 
threaten the serving officials, the commissioner or the governor.  They went on to even 
use violence against the local population.  These illegitimate and unjustified tactics from 
the settlers’ camp brought a new dilemma worthy of consideration. The EAP needed a 
stable administration in a healthy political climate in order to focus on tackling the main 
issue of how to turn the protectorate profitable.  However, after Eliot’s tenure followed 
by Stewart’s brief term and the mounting demands of the European settlers, the crucial 
issue was how to again find a strongman, capable of administrating the protectorate 
effectively under the CO supervision.  Appointing the right man for the task could only 
be done after an objective evaluation of Stewart’s short administration of the 
protectorate.  Lessons drawn from his term as commissioner could serve as valid 
indicator when choosing a new man for a job rendered difficult by the presence of the 




The age of conflicts and failures in Sadler’s administration, 1906-1909: 
European settlers’ violations of the Africans’ rights and intense political 





Sir James Hayes Sadler was 
the EAP’s third commissioner 
and first governor.  None of 
Sadler’s prior assignments 
would prepare him for 
working with the emerging 
white settler group in the 
EAP.  His inability to work 
with the settlers defined his 
governorship.  As already 
noted in earlier chapters, the 
expatriates were ever 
demanding.  Most of them 
hailed from the rebellious 
South Africa, where respect for indigenous rights was nonexistent.  Like the two 
commissioners that preceded him, Sadler would try to strike a balance between the 
wishes of the CO and the interests and the white settlers in the region.  That he failed to 
do so left a significant impact on Kenyan history.  
Image 6: Sir James Hayes Sadler. Source: Mungeam, British Rule Kenya, 
152. 
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During this period the ringleaders of the settlers, Grogan and Delamere, brought 
troubles to the administration of the protectorate. Two major incidents shook Sadler’s 
administration.  One was a case of a flagrant violation of the rights of some African 
workers. The other was an attempt to organize resistance and thereby depose the 
governor. Grogan staged a flogging of his workers in 1907, and the following year labor 
troubles reach its peak with Delamere orchestrating a mass action response from the 
settlers pressuring the governor not to enforce the new labor rules. With the intense 
political climate prevailing in the region, issues like the implementation of the land bill 
and labor regulations dragged on.  It was an era of continuous agitations and conflicts 
between the settlers and the administration that kept the CO as well as the officials in 
the protectorate at bay.  The EAP’s reputation of being the most troublesome 
dependency of the British Empire was well justified. With the actions of the European 
settlers, the stage was set for the debate about the very essence of impunity and the 
meaning of crime and punishment in a partisan political context. The European settlers 
made a resounding political mark in the history of region which traces are still visible in 
the Kenya of today.  
The appointment of Sadler: A familiar face in the EAP 
Stewart’s brief tenure left numerous unresolved issues for the next commissioner 
to deal with.  While Stewart did manage to secure African reserves for the Maasai, his 
military forays against the Nandi and Embu, as well as plans for further adventurism in 
the protectorate and possibly beyond, set off alarms among his political superiors back 
in London.   The bombastic and imperialist image created by these raids was the cause 
of embarrassment for the Empire.  The CO would have preferred a low-profile 
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commissioner, a rubber stamp for their more enlightened and humanitarian policies.  
This is where Sir James Hayes Sadler came to the fore.   
     Sadler had a military background, too; but he wasn’t a glory hound who made 
waves in the bureaucracy.  He was content to carry out orders as given.  Therefore, he 
was viewed by the powers that be in London as the perfect fit for the next EAP 
commissioner. With proven field experience in India, Somaliland and Uganda, the CO 
believed they finally found a man they could trust.  From 1901, Sadler provided 
commendable service to the Crown as commissioner in neighboring, but smaller, land-
locked Uganda.  Of course, Uganda’s climate is more tropical and does not lend itself 
readily to white settlement.  Therefore, this was really more a caretaking position minus 
the overwhelming political intrigue generated by a white settler class.  
     Stewart passed away only six weeks prior to Sadler’s assumption of command in 
December 1905.  Of interest to note, the EAP provinces of Kisumu and Naivasha had 
been administrative jurisdictions of Uganda up until their transfer in 1902, and 
therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that CO authorities looked favorably upon 
Sadler’s dealings with these provinces and their smooth transition to the EAP under his 
watch.  The CO was cognizant of Sadler’s excellent work with Eliot in redefining the 
western frontier of the EAP with the incorporation of both Kisumu and Naivasha.  By 
the time that Sadler actually assumed command as commissioner of the EAP on 12 
December 1905, he already had some detailed knowledge of the operational duties of a 
commissioner as well as some dealings with internal EAP matters and policies from his 
close work with Eliot in fixing new borders between the EAP and Uganda.205 
                                                 
205 G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1966), 152. 
 143 
     British colonial administrators and contemporaries of Sadler perceived him as 
an older gentleman with charming qualities.206   However, this would not be enough in 
dealing with the many problems engendered by white colonization in the EAP.  In his 
unpublished autobiography, A. C. Hollis wrote that, “Colonel Hayes Sadler differed from 
both his predecessors.  He was, it is true, a soldier such as Sir Donald Stewart; but, 
whereas the latter had seen much active service, Colonel Hayes Sadler’s career had been 
in the Indian Staff Corps and in the Foreign Department of the Government of India.”207    
Further elaborating on Sadler, at another point in his autobiography Hollis goes on to 
remark that, “He was very industrious, kind and hospitable, but weak and vacillating, 
and quite unable to cope with unruly settlers.”208  
  As we shall notice as the chapter develops, no love was lost between Sadler and 
the white settler community.  Lady Delamere, taking a cue from her volatile and verbose 
husband, once referred to Sadler as “Flannelfoot,” a name attached to weakness and 
indecisiveness that would haunt him for the rest of his life.  A commissioner needed to 
be resolute in carrying out the policies of the CO.  If he cannot fulfill this role, then he 
could follow Eliot’s course of white settler advocacy.  Remaining a fence sitter got a 
commissioner nowhere.  But most of all, it would certainly not garner him respect from 
any quarter.209 
     The CO, in taking into account the prevailing situation in the protectorate and 
Sadler’s prior experience, had high hopes that he would be the right man for handling all 
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of the onerous tasks ahead.  W. D. Ellis of the CO, a former New College scholar, was 
greatly influenced by humanitarian concerns and the prevailing liberal sentiments of the 
age.  In his minutes on dispatches from the EAP, he warned the incoming commissioner 
Sadler about the dubious intentions of white settlers pouring in from South Africa.  He 
did not believe that the white settlers had the best interest of the British Empire at heart 
in their vocalizations to create a “white man’s country” out of the EAP.  Rather, he saw 
these settlers as political opportunists and greedy land grabbers, certainly uncaring for 
any indigenous rights.  In other words, all the talk about a “white man’s country” and 
“civilization” were just talk, a pretext for pushing out the Africans and creating another 
“Natal” out of the best lands of the EAP.210  Ellis’ evaluation of the situation was right 
because Delamere, who until Sadler’s arrival was the leader of the settlers, firmly 
expressed the common aspirations of the CA.  
In 1906, Lord Delamere resigned as president of the CA and Frank Watkins took 
over. That change in the leadership position within the CA did not mean a change of 
mentality or agenda when it came to the settlers’ determination in promoting their 
interests.  Frank Watkins stated that: “In unity and rectitude lies our strength”211 while 
Delamere, the outgoing president was firm in his belief that the protectorate needed his 
fellow expatriates for any hope of economic development. Before leaving the CA 
presidency, Delamere concluded that: “in time it will be found that without the white 
colonists this country would stagnate and possibly degenerate into a black man’s 
country.”212 That was quite a statement because the EAP was a black man’s country and 
could only remain as such, regardless the nature of the European expatriates’ political 
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aspirations. The settlers that Sadler was about to deal with were well organized and 
knew how to use their influence even in England.213    Sadler probably looked at this new 
assignment as just another line in his resume.  He apparently ignored the CO officials’ 
warnings, just expecting to clock in some time and then move on to a plusher position 
elsewhere in the far-flung empire whence the sun never sets. 
If Sadler had paid closer attention to Ellis, he perchance may have avoided many 
of the obstacles that the white settlers would place in his path.  Ellis’ also indicated 
conflicts that existed between the CO and the FO over EAP white settler policy.214  
Clearly, Sadler had no idea of the hornet’s nest he was about to bump into.  Ellis, 
working in the CO, decried that the office was not doing enough to adopt a policy for the 
EAP that would secure the rights of Africans and Indians already there.215  As far as the 
white population was concerned, Ellis did not believe that the EAP could sustain more 
than 3,000, but mostly of the capitalist class.216   If Sadler was going to advance any 
white interests, in Ellis’ opinion it should be those of the planters, and not the small 
settlers.  In the CO’s EAD, Ellis took note of the consistent record of failure on the part 
of the small settlers in developing commercially successful enterprises in the EAP.  All 
the small settlers did was whine to various colonial authorities as to their ever-
increasing demand for government services and cheap labor. Ellis clearly understood 
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that the EAP could not logically be compared to Australia and New Zealand, these then 
considered as “white man’s countries.”217   
        Nevertheless, he turned to them in search of various and appropriate models of 
policy and legislation for Sadler’s consideration.  This would definitely lead the 
protectorate in the wrong direction, insofar as taking workable policies from other parts 
of the Empire and assuming that they would have equal applicability and efficiency 
when applied to any other random region under British governance.  Clearly, the EAP 
had its own set of unique problems that needed to be addressed with engaging policies.  
     If the situation on the ground was relatively tranquil, then Sadler could have 
probably put together a set of policies with something to satisfy all of the classes 
concerned by borrowing, as it were, snippets from other crown colonies’ policies and 
legislations that had proven successful.  After all, he had done so in Uganda, albeit with 
a much smaller white presence.  In the case of the EAP, however, Sadler would be faced 
with an entirely different set of problems, particularly in defining new sets of policies 
appropriate for facilitating a better, overall administration.  
In attempting to achieve this, Sadler found that apart from the many military 
commitments that he inherited from Stewart, it was the domestic affairs of the 
protectorate that would take up most of his time and tax his administrative abilities to 
the utmost degree.  To address the internal issues, it was necessary for Sadler to work 
ever more closely with the CO in the task of formulating new and appropriate policies 
for the protectorate.218  One hindrance that Sadler faced in establishing new policies that 
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would find concurrence in the CO were the incessant and ever increasing demands of 
the white settlers.  
Although the white colonists were small in number, they were the “squeaky 
wheel” that pushed the CO to shine a bigger than usual spotlight on the affairs of the 
protectorate.  By the time that Sadler had assumed command in the protectorate on 12 
December 1905, the official address and demands of the CA had already been forwarded 
to the CO, along with the attached commentary from various officials of the EAP.219   In 
addition, CO S of S Lyttleton was himself aware of the settlers’ demands, having read 
them in London newspapers in August 1905, one month before receiving the official 
copy of the CA address as an attachment to the 18 October 1905 correspondence from 
Jackson.220  
Of course, Jackson, who took charge in the EAP upon Stewart’s death, in his 
correspondence succeeded in placing the CA demands in their proper perspective.  He 
noted that the association’s declared views, for the most part, were unrepresentative of 
the majority of white settlers arriving in the EAP, being mostly reflective of the more 
outspoken South African contingent.  In addition, Jackson pointed out that while there 
were approximately 600 known white settlers in the EAP, the CA counted on a 
membership of approximately 200.   And even of these, there was most likely some 
dissension in the ranks with regard to the formulation of various demands.221 
Jackson also believed that it would be totally unfair for the CO to place any 
inordinate measure of consideration to the association’s demands insofar as the Empire 
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must forever be cognizant of its vast amount of colored subjects in the formulation of 
policies, if for nothing else but to be fair.  In the EAP he cited the following demographic 
for 1905:  8,000 to 10,000 Indians and 2,000,000 to perhaps 4,000,000 Africans.  How 
politically expedient would it be to formulate policies that favored maybe 200 recently 
settled whites, mostly from South Africa, over the interest of millions of other crown 
subjects?  Who would be calling the shots in the EAP, the CO in London or very small 
cohort of disgruntled settlers?222 
To Jackson’s reasonable voice were added those of other stalwarts in the EAP, 
Ainsworth and Hobley.223  All three concurred with Jackson’s expressed view that, “To 
endeavor by legislation or otherwise to make any portion of this country exclusively a 
white man’s country is in our opinion doomed to failure.  There is a great future before 
East Africa, but it is as a mixed race country.”224  In addition, the EAP administrators 
also found themselves in agreement concerning white settler political representation, 
i.e. that it should be limited solely to an advisory capacity or what Hobley referred to as 
a “Council of Advice.”225  Hobley took this position because he felt it was in the Crown’s 
interest to defend the rights of His Majesty’s African subjects against certain white 
settlers to the EAP arriving with less than pure intentions.  He described these as 
nothing more than “adventurers and speculators.”226  Ainsworth even felt that these 
settlers should be restricted to the lands they already held, not being permitted to 
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encroach on other EAP lands which rightly should remain under the control of the 
administration in order to safeguard them for future development by the African 
peoples and the peaceful development of the protectorate on its path to one day 
becoming a crown colony.227  However, no matter what concessions could have been 
granted to the white settlers, they could always be counted on to continually press more 
demands for the attainment of political power. 
Sadler may not have been fully cognizant of the CO’s concerns regarding this 
matter, but in less than one month since he stepped into office, he became well aware of 
the CO’s concerns regarding the association.  Back in London, Ellis heartily supported 
the recommendations of Jackson, Hobley and Ainsworth.  There was no way in Ellis’ 
estimation that the EAP was going to evolve into some kind of white man’s country like 
Australia or New Zealand.  If anything, it might eventually emerge as a mixed racial 
community, something akin to some of His Majesty’s Caribbean colonies.  And since 
African people would always be the majority population bloc in the EAP, it would be 
foolhardy for the crown to allow the protectorate to be ruled by a “handful of white 
settlers.”228   
The small group of white settlers present in the EAP was seeking wealth and 
power.   They were impatient and unhappy with the pace with which the local 
government and the CO were handling their primary demand- the implementation of a 
representative government. The settlers expected Sadler to be sympathetic to their 
pleas, despite the fact that Sadler had to answer to the CO.  They wanted a pro-settler 
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commissioner reminiscent of Eliot.  They wanted a commissioner who would cater to 
them; although “it had long been established that major policy initiatives, whether 
involving legislative or administrative action, had to be approved by the S of S.  
Moreover, the CO often laid out general policy to be followed and suggested the 
administrative aims to be accomplished, for example on appointment of a new governor, 
in the colonies it supervised.”229  Sadler knew that this was the policy and it was his 
responsibility to implement it.  There were two issues of particular importance in the 
EAP that presented challenges to his administration. These were land issues, specifically 
the report of the land commission appointed by Stewart in October 1904, and the CO’s 
response to the address of the CA of August 1905. 
The Colonial Office, Sadler and the Settlers 
After the appointment of Sadler as the new commissioner in the EAP, the long-
awaited response of the CO to the pro-settler land committee commissioned by Stewart 
was issued from Downing Street on 23 March 1906. The dispatch conveyed the 
observations of the S of S on the land report and on Stewart’s comments about the same 
topic on 14 August 1905. The S of S, in his initial remarks, pointed out that the whole issue 
of land in the protectorate had to be re-evaluated. To some extent, he considered some of 
the land committee’s suggestions to be logical. However, Lord Elgin, the new Secretary of 
State in Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government was not yet ready to give his full 
pronouncements on many other issues regarding the potential development of the region. 
With reference to the report, Elgin formally expressed to Sadler the following: 
I recognize the care and ability shown in the compilation of this report and in many 
points I am in agreement with the conclusions of the Committee. Thus, I fully 
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concur in their recommendations that a survey of the Protectorate should be taken 
in hand without delay; and, as you are aware, a large provision has been made in the 
Estimates of next year for this service, and some of the surveyors selected for the 
work will leave this country for East Africa in the course of the present month. 
There are, however, other questions upon which I am unable, as at present 
advised, to concur in the proposal of the Committee; and, having regard to the 
immense importance to the future prosperity of the Protectorate of adopting a 
right policy in questions related to land, I have decided to take no further action 
in regard to those proposals pending the report of the officer whom it is proposed 
to appoint under the title of Commissioner for Land, and whose selection I hope 
to be able to announce to you at no distant date.230  
 
Adding to his first remarks, Elgin stressed the necessity of enlarging the Survey 
Department’s staff and also suggested the appointment of an assistant crown advocate. 
The S of S believed that these changes would lead to the resolution of the delicate 
question of land ownership in the protectorate.  
 As much as Elgin understood the many proposals of the committee, he could not 
allow land to be allocated to the settlers insofar as he felt that they might be more inclined 
to resell their properties than having to develop them. The settlers wanted all restrictions 
on the transfer and forfeiture of land to be lifted. They claimed that government 
interference on freedom of transfer discouraged many capitalists who might otherwise 
invest in land without worrying about the insecurity of their acquired titles. Nevertheless, 
the S of S had in mind the consequences of a laissez faire policy that would lead to a land 
rush, inspired by nothing more than speculation and greed.  He realized that his ultimate 
responsibility was to the crown and to all its subjects.  On the dangers of speculation, Elgin 
expressed the following:   
I would observe that while I am as anxious as the Committee can be to encourage 
the settlement and development of the Protectorate by persons either of large or 
small capital, I consider the evils of unrestricted speculation in land much more 
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serious that the Committee appears to regard them as being. It is not merely the 
question of the discreditable incidents which characterize the periods of inflated 
speculation known as “land booms,” or the losses to individuals who happen to 
purchase land at artificially enhanced prices. If this were all, the dangers referred to 
might be incurred, as the Committee appears to suggest, in view of the advantage of 
attracting settlers and capital to the country, even by speculative attractions 
partaking of the nature of a lottery. But the evils of allowing land in a new country to 
be transferred freely, without any regard to the intention of the transferee to utilize 
within a reasonable time the resources of the land, are not confined to the period of 
depression and stagnation which inevitably follows a time of inflated speculation, 
but have a wider scope.231 
 
In backing up his point, Elgin gave a brief history lesson to the land committee. He 
emphasized the same point that Ellis made, warning that if land tenure was not well 
supervised by the CO, the office could face the same problems of arbitrary land 
alienation that occurred in Australia and New Zealand. 
 Elgin was cognizant of the reversed land policy that plunged Australia into a 
country of land speculators dominated by influential colonists with unlimited power to 
purchase large areas of land to divide them into smaller tracts for sale at higher prices. 
The S of S argued that: 
The policy of His Majesty’s Government in the first half of the last century was 
directed towards restricting the alienation of land in Australia by imposing 
conditions of tenure, such as cultivation of land or maintenance of a certain 
number of labourers, by putting a comparatively high price (£1 an acre) on the 
sale of lands in fee simple, and by granting leases only for short periods. The 
policy was, however, strongly opposed by an influential section of the colonists, 
especially by those who occupied large areas under temporary licenses, which 
they wished to convert into freehold tenure. These persons fought for what was 
known in New South Wales as the ‘three F’s’ : Fixed tenure, fixed rents and free 
sales.232   
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Elgin realized that if unchecked, the EAP land market could be controlled by the 
colonists to the disadvantage of the crown. The CO did not want to take any risk by 
allowing the settlers of the EAP to indulge in land alienation for speculation. It was from 
this point that Elgin considered that the land committee should have known better 
before pushing for the relaxation of the terms under which land could be transferred in 
the protectorate.   
Regarding the settlers’ intent to repeat the patterns of land usurpation as it 
transpired in Australia and New Zealand, the S of S surmised that he was not alone with 
his views.  Elgin reminded the committee to look into the recent past of those colonies. 
He wrote:  “I am not aware whether any members of the Committee have had occasion 
to acquaint themselves with the history of the land question in Australasian Colonies; 
but it appears to me that history contains some useful warnings for other countries in a 
similar position.”233 
The second issue of importance was related to the CO’s response to the address 
of the CA of 23 August 1905.  After considering this address, on 8 June 1906, Elgin 
sent his response to Sadler who, in return, had to inform the settlers.234  Of the 
demands presented by the European colonists, the most important of all was the one 
addressing their political rights in the region and their participation in the 
administration of the protectorate. But the deepest desire of the European settlers 
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was to monopolize the whole political apparatus of the protectorate.  Any degree of 
political representation granted to the settlers would open the gate for yet more 
demands. They considered the ultimate safeguard of their interests as existing only 
within the context of the full attainment of political power. On this political matter, 
Elgin informed Sadler: 
The Association proceed in the next place to state their objections to the present 
system of government, which they describe as one of taxation without representation, 
and they claim that the advent of European Colonists into East Africa justifies the 
bestowal upon them of some share in the administration of their own affairs.  It does 
not appear, however, that more than a small proportion of the revenue raised by 
taxation in the protectorate is contributed by the European Colonists, and for other 
reasons I do not consider that the time is ripe for the introduction of electoral 
institutions.  But I agree that it is desirable that the Officer Administering the 
Government should be assisted by a Council in making laws, and I propose to advise 
His Majesty to issue Letters Patent providing for the establishment of a Legislative 
Council in which, although the Government would have a majority, there would also 
be unofficial members appointed by His Majesty, who would be chosen to represent 
as far as possible the different interests of the community.235 
 
But as to the question of representation, there appeared to be some partial 
condescension in the CO toward the settlers that the CA might be able to exploit at some 
future date.  While Read and Antrobus did not agree with most of the settler demands 
and they did not want to cede power to “a handful of white settlers” to rule over millions 
of Africans, they nevertheless believed that the crown should come part way in meeting 
the settlers’ position in the establishment of a Legco with a minority of nominated 
unofficial members.236 To the leadership of the CA, this was opening the way for them to 
get their proverbial “foot in the door.” 
Since Lyttleton was the retiring Secretary of State, reflecting the views of the 
Conservative Party platform, he would naturally concur with both Read and Antrobus 
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that the formation of such a Legco in the EAP was a reasonable one.237  Therefore, upon 
the change of command at the CO, it was Lyttleton’s recommendation to Elgin that 
Sadler be provided with instructions to create such a Legco in the EAP at the soonest 
possible date.238  Inasmuch as the CO could not budge on any other of the CA demands, 
it appears as though a faction in the office was willing to provide for some representative 
outlet for the settlers, hoping that it would be enough to pacify them.  Elgin, despite his 
appointment under the new Liberal Party government, believed it would be permissible 
to follow the Conservative Lyttleton’s recommendation insofar as such a Legco would 
prove to be powerless and nothing but a token gesture.  Therefore, Elgin instructed 
Sadler to establish the council in the protectorate.239  Unfortunately, no one in the CO 
solicited Sadler’s opinions about the council.240  
This did not mean, however, that Sadler did not have his own ideas about the 
establishment of a Legco.  The local press was full of reports from London, reporting 
that Churchill had suggested in the House of Commons that a Legco be created in the 
EAP.  Regardless of the CO not asking his opinion on the matter, Sadler took it upon 
himself to share his thoughts on the subject with Elgin before any decision would be 
reached so impacting his new role as the EAP commissioner.241  While Sadler was not 
averse to the idea of a council, he suggested that unofficial members be precluded from 
the exercise of any executive control.  And he also maintained that there should be two 
councils, an executive council formed solely of officials to advise the commissioner on 
the application and execution of past enactments, especially concerning African affairs, 
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and a Legco to “discuss and advise His Majesty’s Commissioner in regard to all 
ordinances and rules having the force of law, which it is proposed to enact, and if 
necessary to obtain public opinion thereon.”242   In the Legco, he advocated for the 
inclusion of both white settlers and Indians.  However, he demonstrated a political 
weakness when he pointed out his lack of experience in working with bi-racial councils 
and requested that the CO provide him with information on the workings of such 
assemblies in other parts of the Empire.243  Said Mungeam of Sadler’s letter to Elgin: 
“Such an expression of ignorance, although no fault of Sadler’s, was scarcely a 
propitious way for the new Commissioner to begin dealings with a Council, and his 
words almost seemed to foreshadow trouble in the future.  By the time Sadler’s dispatch 
reached the Office, Elgin’s reply to the Colonists’ Address had already been drafted.  
Sadler’s views thus had no bearing on the decision to create a Legislative Council, for the 
decision had already been taken before his opinions were known.”244 
 The CO did, however, subsequently agree to Sadler’s proposal for the 
establishment in the EAP of an executive council, probably as insurance in preventing 
any of the CA members from gaining any executive control/authority. The CO also 
stated that they did not believe that the protectorate was ready for elevation to the status 
of a crown colony; but that Sadler’s title as commissioner should be upgraded to that of 
“Governor,” by which he was eventually addressed.245 
 The settlers, no matter what they may have thought of the now “Governor” 
Sadler, were pleasantly surprised at Elgin’s decision to create a legislative council in the 
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protectorate.246  They formally expressed their gratitude to the S of S. From Nairobi on 
19 July 1906, the honorary secretary of the CA, W. MacLellan Wilson, sent the following 
note to Sadler to be forwarded to the Elgin.  Wilson wrote: “Sir, I have the honour to 
request that you would kindly communicate to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State 
for the Colonies the gratitude of this Association for the concessions which he has made 
in answer to the Address sent by this Association on 23rd of August of last year.”247 
A relative peace fell over the EAP for the remainder of the year and early into 
1907.  Elgin’s decree appeared to have the predicted calming effect on the white settler 
class.  But before such a deliberative body could be established in the EAP, an 
unfortunate incident occurred in Nairobi against three Africans, inspired and carried 
out by white supremacists within the settler community.  As it will come to be shown, a 
deep wedge was driven between Sadler and the settler community as the result of this 
incident, creating a chasm that Sadler would never be able to breach. Whatever peace 
there was in the EAP rapidly disintegrated before Sadler’s eyes.  Radical, eccentric and 
volatile settlers’ leaders like Grogan and Delamere were busy going about and mucking 
up the waters.  These two big men were political agitators who caused so many problems 
for Sadler. 
The politics of violence, the meaning of Grogan’s flogging of African servants in the EAP 
In 1907 the EAP European settlers were still yearning for sufficient cheap labor 
and political power. Their sense of superiority and what most of them had witnessed in 
South Africa regarding the mistreatment of Africans and foreign workers drew them to 
believe that they could break the law, if necessary, for their interests and without 
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consequences. Such was the mentality of most of the settlers that represented the CA, 
and that was reflected on the political stage of Nairobi, the now capital of the 
protectorate.  
In March 1907, Nairobi residents witnessed the violation of the rights of ordinary 
Africans at the hands of Grogan.  Abuses suffered by workers under the watch of greedy, 
bad and bold employers were frequent. To the eyes of many expatriates who were 
supremacists, these inhumane practices were normal and turned into a form of seasonal 
tradition. In the EAP political agitations and violations of African rights from the 
settlers’ camp often occurred during the month of March. It could be called the EAP 
“political March madness tradition.”  It was Ross who asserted that: 
Attention has already been called to the fact that many excited actions by 
European immigrants have taken place in the notoriously touchy months of 
February, March or early in April. Psychologists might suggest that what is 
specially wanted for Europeans in Kenya in the trying months is an emotional 
outlet, such as dancing, theatricals and musical festivals, while for school 
children an avoidance of examinations and a lightening of school routine should 
be arranged. In the absence of some active measure of relief, preferably such as 
may stimulate the artistic sensibilities, it will probably continue to be the case 
that some slight contributory cause of worry may precipitate unbalanced mass-
action on the part of European immigrants.248 
 
 In other words, it might be seen as a type of seasonal affective disorder. As in the 
history of Rome, when you build an empire, you need to know how and when to 
entertain the masses to keep the people’s attention away from the political and 
economic realities of the day.  If not, frustrations could rise up and burst into an 
uncontrollable firestorm. 
 In the EAP incidents like the flogging of African workers or mass protest from 
the CA challenging the local government happened during the notorious month of 
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March. Similarly in neighboring South Africa, where most of the settlers came from, 
such was the prevailing situation. Harsh punishments were inflicted on defenseless 
subjects of the crown.249  The political madness from the expatriates during the month 
of March became a tradition in the EAP to the point that some high ranking officials 
noticed it half a century after the opening of the protectorate. S of S Oliver Lyttleton 
stated in 1954 that: “The political tangle here is baffling.  Europeans with the low whisky 
prices and high altitude pressures, are both irresponsible and hysterical. This is the 
worst season of the year and even in normal times tempers are at their most brittle in 
March. One cause of this rather disheartening irresponsibility of Europeans is that there 
are no Unofficial Members of the Government. Elected European members are thus in a 
permanent opposition and feel able to pound the government whenever they feel 
nervous.”250   The often-reckless behavior of the white settlers was constant during these 
periods. They were masters of disorder and chaos, always and zealously pressuring the 
administration.  
The colonists’ view of Africans and the officials was generally negative. Jackson, 
the acting commissioner during Sadler’s leave, reported to the CO about the tense 
climate that reigned in the protectorate and the attitude of the European settlers vis a 
vis the Africans. His dispatch underlined the issue of Africans’ rights and the provision 
of labor for the settlers. Jackson raised the question of human rights, labor provision 
and morality summarizing all in these terms: “‘to deny the native any rights whatever’ 
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and that ‘the labourer shall be not a labourer but a helot, not a servant but a slave.’”251 
These were concerns that raised attention among officials in the CO. Jackson’s dispatch 
was in fact a reaction to the abuses suffered by simple African employees at the hands of 
Grogan.  
      Captain E. S. Grogan was a familiar face in the EAP.  He attained notoriety 
across the British Empire through his 1898-1899 expedition from the Cape to Cairo.  
This was the first time that a white man had traveled the total distance overland.  But 
what he saw on the journey left no good impression.  He came to the stereotyped 
conclusion that Africans were steeped in a “primitive savagery” to such a point that they 
were literally beyond redemption.  Unfortunately, his initial experience in Africa would 
extend to and inform his career decisions and actions in the EAP, whence he arrived in 
May of 1904 to engage in the running of a timber mill.252  Grogan had to prove himself 
as a tough settler who would stand for the colonists cause to turn the protectorate 
administration in their favor.  Grogan did not hesitate in challenging the government of 
the EAP.  
On 15 March 1907, the new president of the CA instigated and led the public 
flogging of three Kikuyu servants in front of the Nairobi Court House. As a prelude to 
the incident, Grogan’s sister and a family friend took a rickshaw out to the Nairobi 
hospital to visit with Grogan’s wife.  According to the two women, the three Kikuyu who 
were employed by Grogan as rickshaw drivers had been drinking heavily.  On the way to 
the hospital, the employees allegedly began to bounce the vehicle on purpose by running 
it too quickly, thus tossing the passengers from side to side.  The women then 
                                                 
251 Jackson to Colonial Office, 23 March 1907, CO 533/28. 
252 Edward Paice, Lost Lion of Empire (London:  Harper-Collins, 2002).  Paice provides an extensive 
biography on the life of Grogan. 
 161 
complained to the Africans.  However, the Africans did not take too kindly to this, and 
supposedly pulled the women roughly out of the rickshaw and let them walk the rest of 
the way home, thus forcing them to abandon their plans of visiting the hospital.253   
 So when they arrived back home in Chiromo in the afternoon, Ewart Grogan 
asked them why they did not go to the hospital as planned.  The women related their 
account of the Africans’ alleged rudeness; and Ewart went into a fit of rage.  He grabbed 
a whip and right away set out to find the Africans.  However, by the time the sun had set, 
he still had no luck in the search.  But with the rising of the sun, the Africans had 
reported to work on time.  Grogan tied them up and locked them away while he ate his 
breakfast and pondered what to do with them, automatically presuming them to be 
guilty.254  After all, if two white women said they acted rudely towards them, then that 
must be the absolute truth, Ewart Grogan reasoned.   
 Rather than take them to a judge for an impartial ruling, Grogan decided that it 
was time for a little “vigilante” justice to be meted out.  So he strolled over to a 
neighbor’s house and informed him that it was his intention to take the young men into 
the center of Nairobi and publicly flog them.  He did not believe that the Nairobi 
Magistrate would do anything to help him; so he was determined to take matters into 
his own hands, punish the miscreants and thereby set an example for any other Africans 
who might decide to step out of their place at some future time.255 
 It was about 9:30 a.m. when Grogan set out with his captives to downtown 
Nairobi, reaching the front lawn of the Nairobi Court House approximately half an hour 
                                                 
253 David M. Anderson, “Sexual Threat and Settler Society: ‘Black Perils’ in Kenya, c. 1907-30,” Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 38:1 (2010), 49.    
254 Ibid., 50. For the detailed correspondence surrounding the incident see Great Britain, Correspondence 
Relating to the Flogging on Natives by Certain Europeans at Nairobi, Cd. 3256 (London: HMSO, 1907). 
255 Ibid., 50. 
 162 
later.  A curious crowd of about fifty whites gathered around Grogan and the Africans.  
Of course, the whites in the crowd had immediately assumed the worst, noting that 
Grogan was carrying a large hippopotamus-hide whip and that the Africans were in his 
custody and tightly bound.  All sorts of imaginings passed through the minds of the 
white spectators who were anxious to see what Grogan was going to do to the Africans 
with that whip.   
Grogan briefly explained to them what the Africans had done, at least according 
to his mind, and that he was going to flog them as an example and discouragement to 
any other Africans who might dare offend any class of whites in the future.  Grogan, to 
his credit, at least informed the crowd that the Africans did not molest the women 
sexually, but rather insulted them by their refusal to carry on with the task of taking 
them to the hospital.  If he had not clarified this matter, the crowd would probably not 
have been satisfied until the Africans were lynched. 256  
 The commotion outside the courthouse attracted the attention of the magistrate 
himself, E. R. Logan, who came out and tried to dissuade Grogan for going any further.  
Nevertheless, Grogan was defiant.  The whites in the crowd demanded justice and now 
Grogan felt that he would lose face if he backed down and complied with the 
magistrate’s wishes.  Being shouted down, Logan quickly returned to the courthouse, 
whence a police captain Smith emerged and walked over to Grogan and the assembled 
mob.  Smith forced his way through the crowd and made it through to where Grogan 
was standing.  He placed a hand on the arm with which Grogan was holding the whip, 
and tried to persuade him that this would not be the way to settle the issue.  The crowd 
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was angry, however, and pushed the police captain away from Grogan and threatened to 
harm him if he tried to stop Grogan from going through with the whipping of the Kikuyu 
men.  Being so outnumbered, Smith retreated. At this point, the three Africans were 
lying prostrate and barebacked on the ground.257  
Grogan, together with two fellow settlers, Bowker and Gray, took turns in 
punishing the Africans.  Each one received twenty-five lashes from the hippopotamus-
hide whip, locally referred to as a “kiboko.”  Grogan made sure that a Kikuyu translator 
let the Africans, who also began to gather around this sorry site, understand what the 
workers were being punished for and that this flogging was to serve as warning to “their 
people that white men could not stand any impertinence to their women folk in any part 
of the world.”  Whether or not Grogan realized just how much global attention this 
incident would generate, he made his point.258   
 Ewart Grogan was milking the incident to gain political advantage.  In Nairobi, he 
was a nominated member of the municipal committee and a visiting justice in the town’s 
jailhouse.  He was also one of the largest landowners in the EAP, a big man with a big 
ego.  Just two months previous to this incident, he was elected as the president of the 
CA.  For the time being, the association was merely a self-proclaimed representative 
organ of the settler class and had no official government recognition.  But Grogan had 
higher ambitions for this group and his political status in the future of the protectorate.  
From the dais of the association, Grogan took great pleasure in railing against the 
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colonial government and he was going to parlay this incident for all the political gain he 
could siphon from it.259   
       Grogan’s challenge to the status quo was a reaction to what he perceived as a 
sluggish administration that failed to meet the settlers’ grievances. According to 
Paice:  
Grogan’s single biggest bone of contention with Whitehall was that the Colonial 
Office had, by the end of 1906, done nothing to address the problems caused by 
the Foreign Office having pursued a ‘policy of drift’ in the Protectorate. There 
were still no signs in Britain of a public and categoric definition of whether the 
country was to be principally governed with what were perceived as the interests 
of the African population to the fore, as was the case in neighbouring Uganda; 
or as a province of India; or as a territory which would continue to encourage 
settlement by Europeans. This oversight not only caused considerable confusion 
but triggered a competition for rights between the settlers, the Indians and the 
African population that was to last for the fifty years of Grogan’s active political 
career and beyond, to Independence.260 
 
 This was the incident that gave impetus to fears of any possible black uprising.  A 
survey of local newspaper columns in the months immediately following this incident 
gave credence to the high priority that white settlers placed on getting the colonial 
government to establish a greater degree of law and order in the protectorate.  Basically, 
this meant that the enforcement of the law would be highly subjective.  Africans would, 
therefore, suffer because of the law’s inordinate application and enforcement.  There 
were three settler concerns with respect to the issue of law and order:  the elimination of 
Indian jurisdiction, greater white control of the constabulary and increased settler 
political representation through constitutional changes.  All of these concerns focused 
on the eventual transformation of the EAP into a “white man’s colony.”  These are the 
issues, of course, that Grogan, as the CA president, was most vocal about.   
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As more women came to join their husbands as white settlers in the EAP, the 
majority of the association membership, at least, was in agreement with Grogan that the 
enactment of these policies would strengthen law and order throughout the protectorate 
and provide their women folk with a greater sense of security.  Seeing that they brought 
their wives and daughters to this new land literally surrounded by millions of Africans, 
they most likely reasoned that while it was probably the very least they could do, it was a 
sufficient start.  With regard to Indian jurisdiction, the crown determined that the EAP 
was subject to the Indian penal codes as administered by the Court of Appeals from 
Zanzibar.  The settlers argued that this was inappropriate insofar as having any Indians 
or Indian laws holding sway over any “white man’s country,” such as they perceived East 
Africa to be.261  In April 1906, the CO had, in Shadle’s words, “extended to whites in East 
Africa the right to trial by juries of their peers-their only peers being other non-official 
white men.”262 
The issue of greater white participation in the constabulary also harkened to the 
maintenance of European superiority in the protectorate.  If more whites were serving in 
the constabulary, they could keep a more watchful eye on the activities of the African 
policemen, or “native Askaris,” making sure that they were not even detaining any 
Europeans, let alone arresting them, on any charges.  And lastly, there was the matter of 
increased white settler political representation.  Of course, at the recommendation of 
the CO, Sadler was authorized to grant this to the settlers to a limited degree.  The 
construct and nature of this legislative council would become a hot topic at the 23 
January 1907 meeting of the CA, the same meeting where Grogan was elected president.  
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Now Grogan felt he could push the envelope, so to speak, and force the hand of Sadler, 
and the CO, in granting the fullest political accommodations. Clearly, the issues of law 
and order in the EAP were contextualized in the concept of white racial superiority.263  
Since the majority of these settlers hailed from South Africa, where a relatively small 
white settler community maintained a strong racial code of punishment, it is not 
surprising that the CA would press for the enactment of similar laws and practices.  
Clearly floggings and corporal punishments in general had racial character as 
indicator in the EAP and the entire British Empire. News reports of the flogging of 
Africans or workers imported from Asia were commonplace in South Africa.  The 
Advertiser (Adelaide, SA: 1889-1931) reported on many of these occurrences. In one 
edition, it stated that, 
….a heated debate took place in the Commons yesterday on the motion of Mr. 
V.P. Byles, liberal member of North Salford, disapproving of the action of Lord 
Milner, when High Commissioner of South Africa and governor of the Transvaal, 
in authorizing the flogging of Chinese miners, and on the amendment moved by 
Mr. Winston Churchill, the Colonial Under Secretary, condemning in general 
terms the flogging of Chinese as a breach of the law. The amendment invited the 
House, in the interests of peace and conciliation in South Africa, to refrain from 
censuring individuals.  Mr. Byles, in submitting his motion, contended that if 
Lord Milner’s action was condoned ‘every prancing pro-consul would be 
encouraged to play the little autocrat.’  Mr. J. Chamberlain, amid much 
interruption, brilliantly and passionately defended Lord Milner. He seathingly 
denounced what he called the ‘persecution of a great public servant possessor of a 
splendid record for a single error of judgment’. Lord Milner’s opponents were 
vindictively trying to humiliate him, while they were afraid to impeach him. Mr. 
Chamberlain explained that the suggestion for the infliction of corporal 
punishment had come from Mr. Evans, the protector of Chinese in the Transvaal. 
In that suggestion Lord Milner had verbally acquiesced. In conclusion, Mr. 
Chamberlain characterised Mr. Churchill’s amendment as ‘cowardly and 
contemptible, being framed to catch votes by attacking without naming Lord 
Milner.’ Mr. Winston Churchill stated that it was clear that Lord Milner had been 
guilty of a grave dereliction of public duty in sanctioning illegal flogging.  While 
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admiring the moderation of Mr. Byles’ motion the Under Secretary of the 
Colonies the practical utility of formally censoring a man who had ‘served the 
Empire strenuously, faithfully, and disinterestedly, and who is now merely a 
retired Civil servant without a pension or even gratuity’. Besides it was contrary 
to usage to censure a man unheard. Was it worth the while of a strong party to 
pursue him further? If the motion was passed it would aggravate the social and 
racial animosities prevalent in South Africa.264  
 
From this account, it is clear that news of what was happening in South Africa 
was not being contained there.  On London’s part, efforts to monitor and constrain the 
imposition of corporal punishments in the colonies arose out of the parliamentary 
debates that swirled around prison reform in the British Isles throughout the 1890s.  
Joseph Chamberlain, S of S from 1895 to 1903, was particularly concerned about the 
political repercussions that might arise from the excessive use of corporal punishments 
both at home and abroad in the colonies and protectorates.  Chamberlain held the 
opinion that should punishments have to be imposed, the treatment of offenders 
overseas should not deviate too far from those practices that prevailed on the home 
turf.265   
Of particular concern to the colonial secretary were the reports of extreme 
punishments emanating from South Africa.  Chamberlain was particularly drawn to a 
flurry of cases from the Natal Province that had reached his desk in London.  In these 
cases, it was apparent that corporal punishment was being more freely resorted to than 
in the United Kingdom.  Chamberlain was clearly disheartened by this.  He commented 
that, “there has been in some instances perhaps a tendency rather to widen than to 
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contract the scope of its application….  There is apt to grow up a perverted public 
opinion satisfied with keeping order by the lash.”266   
The political repercussions Chamberlain had in mind transcended other aspects 
of the flogging and larger issue of corporal punishment.  For while such corporal 
methods may have seemed both effective and inexpensive, other issues rose to 
prominence when the “offenders are for the most part of a different race and colour 
from those who are placed in a position to control and to punish them,” and also where, 
“there were not the ‘checks and safeguards’ against abuses which exist in more highly 
developed countries.”267  
In other words, the issue of race was the elephant in the room that very few were 
willing to recognize; so Chamberlain has to be credited with at least having the fortitude 
to come out and frankly admit it.  Chamberlain hesitated to use the race card as a 
pretext for giving license to “men of rough fiber”268 in administering the laws of the 
empire in her far-flung possessions and territories.  After all, perception is just as 
important a factor as reality itself.  A flogging may serve to restore a modicum of 
discipline and order in a colony, but the long range effects spanning a global empire 
could prove disastrous.   
Chamberlain would have to address the issue of flogging again in 1902, after he 
reissued his 1897 directive, but offered draft legislation that reduced the number of 
strokes that could be awarded under any sentence of flogging.  In the intervening years 
since his 1897 directive, the colonial secretary was unable to restrict the frequency of the 
punishment.  His new strategy was therefore going to be one of reducing its severity.  





His new and so-called “Flogging Regulation Ordinance” reset the number of strokes that 
could be applied to 24 as the maximum punishment to be inflicted for either single or 
combined offenses.  No prisoner could receive more than 24 strokes of the lash.  And the 
only one having the authority to implement this punishment would be the colonial 
governor, with females being exempt from all forms of capital punishment 
whatsoever.269 
David M. Anderson notes that:  
By the time this Ordinance was applied to Kenya (then the EAP), there were 
already other laws in place permitting corporal punishments.  The Indian Penal 
Code, which was applied in East Africa from 1897, contained wide-reaching 
provisions for corporal punishments.  The power of corporal punishment was 
originally given to the courts under the Native Courts Regulations of 1897, 
section 72.  The terms of this legislation now seem chillingly severe:  floggings of 
40 lashes and more were not uncommon, and multiple punishments might be 
allotted to a single prisoner.  In the Chief Native Court, punishments up to 100 
lashes were sanctioned.  Without a proper prison system in place, ‘the kiboko (a 
whip made of hippopotamus hide) was regarded as the ordinary corrective 
measure to be generally applied in all cases where the delinquent was a native.270 
 
Overall in the EAP, however, social and racial animosities existed only due to the 
presence of the European colonists who came from South Africa. The concern of the CO 
was to avoid the violation of the Africans’ rights in the protectorate. Nevertheless when 
there were violations like in the case of Grogan’s flogging of his servants, no effective 
sanctions were taken, at least in a timely manner.  The reality concerning the violations 
against Africans was downplayed in the EAP.  The High Court had become so concerned 
with floggings that “were still at times unnecessarily awarded” in the EAP that by 1912 
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Chief Justice Hamilton issued a strongly worded circular to all magistrates on the 
subject and corporal punishment in general, severely limiting its application.271  
Nevertheless the South African’s tradition of flogging workers was common in the 
EAP. In the same year as the Grogan incident, “one in every 400 African adult males in 
Natal (a province in South Africa) was subject to a judicial flogging- a figure that takes 
no account of the extra-judicial punishments administered to labourers on the farm 
without resort to the courts.”272  As in South Africa, so it was in the EAP.  Here the 
settlers strove to forge a community identity through the generation of a self-image of 
being true “frontiersmen,” the vanguard of European civilization in Africa, the heart of 
darkness.  The settler farmers augmented this perception insofar as they saw themselves 
as paternalistic plutocrats, lords and masters of their manors, estates and the Africans 
who worked them and over whom they presided. 273  
The expatriates held the final say in the disposition of any African that had the 
misfortune of being tied to their land, or so they thought, and not any colonial 
government fraught with liberal frailties.  Of the CO, the settlers, through their 
association, decried it as being distant, parsimonious and unimaginative.  They saw the 
bureaucrats in London as being more concerned with the rights of Africans than those of 
white British subjects.  The settlers saw themselves as the builders of the country, and 
thus reserved the right to dictate policies to the Africans to themselves, and not the 
Crown.  David M. Anderson best summed it up when he wrote that, “The right of the 
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settler to discipline his African labour in Kenya, as in Natal, came to be viewed as the 
cornerstone of the political independence of the colony itself.”274 
  By all rights, the British officials had the authority to deport Grogan and his two 
partners in crime.  Churchill, who was in the EAP during October 1907, heartily 
endorsed the EAP in taking deportation measures against the offenders.275 Churchill 
penned a famous memorandum concerning this incident:  “We must not let these first 
few ruffians steal our beautiful and promising protectorate away from us, after all we 
have spent upon it- under some shabby pretense of being a ‘responsibly governed 
colony.’  This House of Commons will never allow us to abdicate our duties towards the 
natives- as peaceful, industrious, law abiding folk as can be found anywhere.”276  
However, Grogan and his pals got off with but a reprimand and slap on their wrists.  
Potential deportation hearings were consistently delayed and eventually lost in the 
bureaucratic shuffle of the EAP courts due to inside influence by the CA members in 
high places.  Additionally, the CO was most likely sick and tired of both hearing about 
and dealing with this nasty business.277 
In exercising this right to discipline African labor, Grogan touched off a political 
issue with both immediate and far-reaching implications. The CO provided an 
immediate impact of the flogging as officials there learned of the incident from press 
reports. Elgin authorized an immediate telegram to Jackson, acting as commissioner 
while Sadler was on leave in Britain, requesting further details.278 Jackson quickly 
responded with a number of telegrams and dispatches. He assured the CO that he was 
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on top of the situation and that the CS was taking measures to prevent any group of 
Europeans from further taking the law into their hands and checking a potential African 
uprising. He dismissed the latter, which was an immediate concern of the CO was that it 
would bring about a severe and violent reaction from the African population, as pure 
speculation as there was "absolutely no foundation" for reports of an African uprising in 
the making. He assured the CO that most settlers in the EAP were not concerned about a 
possible black racial uprising. He described the measures he took as precautions, 
including a proposal to set up a defense committee and provide arms to Europeans who 
felt threatened. Jackson pointed out, however, that only one settler came forward 
expressing a desire for assistance, but he only required ammunition as he had enough 
armament at his farm.279  The incident shook the EAP and produced negative 
reverberations in Britain where condemnation arose in the press, public and parliament 
as well as in the empire. Jackson provided details of the incident in a dispatch on 25 
March with which he forwarded Hobley's observations as well. Jackson reported that his 
investigation of the incident showed it was the work of a few hot heads whose 
motivation was political. Grogan and the others wanted to make an example of the 
Africans, hoping that it would serve as an affront to the EAP administration and 
augment Grogan's growing popularity among the settler class. Jackson also noted that, 
in his opinion, the alleged infractions of the Africans of bumping and shaking the 
rickshaw so as to offend the two white ladies, were not as serious as Grogan and the 
others made them out to be. He decried Gorgan's taking the law into his own hands in 
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response to the young men's allegedly inappropriate actions. The acting commissioner 
further maintained that the irresponsible reporting of some of the Nairobi newspapers 
was an important factor in 
stirring up the settlers. Both 
he and Hobley raised the 
question of whether the 
planned establishment of a 
legislative council should go 
ahead in light of the actions of 
the head of the CA.280  
Grogan's actions 
eventually led to his arrest 
along with his two 
companions on a charge of 
unlawful assembly. Jackson reported in April that at the trial Grogan, as the ringleader, 
was convicted and sentenced to one month in prison, which was served under house 
arrest, and a fine of 500 rupees. The other two defendants received significantly lesser 
sentences.281  The issue of whether or not to establish a Legco as planned was worked 
out between the CO and the CS.282 Grogan’s action had its impact. It resonated loudly 
within the settler community in the region and their supporters in Britain. 
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Significance of the Grogan’s incident 
The significance of the Grogan incident, despite being dismissed by Jackson, was 
important for four reasons.  First Settlers in the region and advocates of unregulated 
British expansion in Britain saw Grogan’s action as a good example to follow. Grogan 
was praised for his actions, while some authorities in London and in the protectorate 
rebuked them. Paice argued the following: 
What did divide the public opinion was the question of whether Grogan’s 
defiance of the Empire’s authority was excusable. There is no doubt that this 
skirmish was won by Grogan’s adherents throughout the Empire, and marked a 
significant watershed in the relationship between colonists everywhere and their 
detractors. Headlines in the Protectorate’s Star, Times and East African 
Standard proclaimed ‘Grogan Shows The Way’, and letters of support poured in 
to colonial and domestic newspapers. ‘If ever there were a sane and heroic mind 
in a brave’s man body it is Grogan’s’ read one; ‘one of those who have made our 
Empire what it is – not by diplomacy, but by forceful strength of character’ read 
another. Ethel Cockburn, the matron of Lady Dudley Nursing Home where 
Grogan had recuperated after his operation in 1903, wrote ‘I hope you suffered no 
ill effects from the gaol, we are all so proud of you here [in South Africa]. Lord 
Hindlip campaigned vigorously on Grogan’s behalf in the Lords, as Sir Charles 
Eliot in Whitehall. The pressure was less on Grogan than on the British 
government’s management, or mismanagement, of it colonies.283 
 
The colonists and their supporters seemed to have made their mark in the region, all 
thanks to Grogan’s daring action. The colonists emerged as winners here while “the 
incident attracted some attention in the House of Commons, the government eventually 
producing a parliamentary paper from dispatches outlining the events; these 
undermined the wide claims for self–rule the colonists were making and “again alerted a 
few sections of British opinion conditions in the protectorate.”284 
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Secondly, it caused the convening of the new Legco to be temporarily postponed 
at the behest of both the EAP government and the CO.285 It would not be until August 
1907 that the council would hold its first meeting, and this only at the behest of Elgin 
who by then assumed that enough time had elapsed to let the Grogan incident just blow 
over.  
Thirdly, but just to be on the safe side and hoping that more reasonable minds 
would prevail, the CO stipulated that Grogan was not to be nominated to this new 
council, even though he had served as the CA president.286  And finally, the incident cast 
a huge shadow in both the protectorate government and the CO regarding the future 
prospects of white settlement in East Africa.  Jackson noted in a confidential dispatch 
that the incident could best be understood in the context of the work of a small band of 
settlers, largely South Africans, who should have never been allowed to settle in the 
protectorate.  He viewed them as professional agitators whose express purpose was, “to 
deny the native any rights whatsoever and to strip him of his land and cattle.”287 
 Jackson further explained that in all probability the Grogan incident was but a 
pretext that allowed this insidious group of rabble-rousers to stir up a black uprising 
that they could exploit through acts of cruelty and oppression, to seize the opportunity 
for confiscating the Africans’ possessions.288  Before the power of the extant association 
leadership grew any more in the EAP, Jackson believed that the EAP and the CO needed 
to come together and develop a definite and workable African policy that would serve to 
protect African rights. Along with his dispatch, Jackson enclosed a letter from 
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Ainsworth in support of the formulation of just such a policy.289  In this letter, 
Ainsworth highlighted the duty of a protectorate to safeguard all of His Majesty’s 
subjects that reside within its borders.  This would include the maintenance of their 
personal security as well as their rights.  Noted Ainsworth: 
The EAP contains approximately three million native inhabitants, and about fifteen 
hundred non-official whites.  Yet with all of this, in so far as I am aware, no definite 
native policy has been laid down, while the whites maintain in and out of the press that it 
is a white man’s country.  That white men have come here to stay we must accept as fact.  
This being the case, it should, in my opinion, be the duty of the Government to lay down 
in a definite manner, so that there can be no misunderstanding on the subject, exactly 
what the native policy is to be.290 
 
 Churchill, now Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, was also in agreement 
with Jackson and Ainsworth. Describing the South African cadre at the core of the 
association as nothing more than “a few ruffians,” he regretted that the day might arrive 
when these men would walk off with the colony under the pretext that they were going 
to more responsibly govern it than either the EAP administration or the CO had been 
able to do.  Churchill commented that, “The House of Commons will never allow us to 
abdicate our duties towards the natives- as peaceful, industrious, law-abiding folk as can 
be found anywhere.”291 
 Elgin was in general agreement with the sentiments expressed by Jackson, 
Ainsworth and Churchill.  However, he felt that British policy would be judged by the 
practical application of measures taken to protect the Africans and their rights rather 
than by the mere exposition of platitudes and abstract principles.  To make this happen, 
Elgin was determined to keep shuffling the administrators around in the EAP until a 
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suitable team could be assembled.292 S of S Elgin was also of the opinion that the 
preservation and maintenance of African rights should be paramount in the 
protectorate.  In regard to Grogan and those of his ilk, Elgin understood that the 
continued expansion of more rabid settler power would not serve the interests of, “the 
natives (constituting as they do an immense majority of the population), but also of the 
innocent white inhabitants; I am determined to restrain and punish those who commit 
such acts.”293   
It was clear, however, that Ewart Grogan had sympathizers. Many settlers, feeling 
so outnumbered, began to view the local black population in terms of a peril to their 
continued existence in the EAP.  Sadler’s weakness in the face of such opposition to the 
EAP government and the CO only further emboldened the white settler class.  In fact, 
after the flogging incident, it was the other radical leader, Delamere, who was now in the 
driver’s seat at the CA.  The international heat generated by the incident could only 
bring the wrath of the whole British Empire crashing down on the association.  So 
despite the preference by the South Africans in the association for Grogan, they 
prudently opted to reinstall Delamere, who had served as their leader from 1905 to 
1907, the term before Grogan’s.294  In other words, the changes in the association were 
merely cosmetic in nature.  As the adage goes, “You can put lipstick on a pig, but it’s still 
a pig.”  
At about this time in the EAP, the young Churchill’s observation was revealing. 
He noted in his account of his 1907 visit that “Every white man in Nairobi is a politician; 
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and most of them are leaders of parties.”295   On the internal politics of the EAP, 
Churchill sided more with the aims of the Pastoralists’ Association than that of the CA.  
The Pastoralists were opposed to the Colonists’ practice of applying for extra land 
allocations in the names of their dependents and also of the undue influence gained by 
the CA in the newly formed Legco.  The Pastoralists were largely centered in the 
highlands where they first organized themselves into an association at Nakuru.  The 
Pastoralists were under the leadership of Robert Chamberlain, who from his arrival in 
the EAP, spoke out vigorously against Lord Delamere with his vast landholdings and 
undue political leverage.296  
Chamberlain thus offered a moderating alternative.  Should the settlers follow 
Chamberlain’s lead, they might secure an improved standing with colonial officials.  But 
following the incident, it was apparent that the settlers were divided.  What future would 
they have in the EAP without an effective spokesman to clearly articulate their demands 
from a unified political base?   Could they rely on Delamere, whom they largely 
distrusted because of his elitist heritage, or should they place their bets on Chamberlain 
and his London-favored Pastoralist wing?  Getting right down to it, the majority of 
settlers, mostly of South African origin, would have preferred that the flamboyant and 
rabble-rousing Grogan remained as their leader.   
Nevertheless, his involvement in the racist incident would certainly block any 
efforts at reinstatement, at least in the immediate aftermath.  After the incident, Grogan 
left protectorate and went to England with his wife who was sick.  He went on to try to 
do politics in England but did not succeed. Grogan later returned to the region in 1910. 
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The EAP was the only political arena where he could make noise.  Once back in the 
protectorate, he would again lead the settlers in their quest for political recognition and 
power. Nevertheless, in Grogan’s absence, the colonists still remained active.  In the 
EAP, if Grogan was not leading the settlers, Delamere carried the task. 
Delamere and the Colonists’ Association claim for cheap labor 
 After Grogan’s flogging of his workers, a year later in 1908, Delamere and the 
settlers challenged the governor not to introduce new labor rules that they considered 
detrimental to their interests. The colonists turned the table on Sadler. Jackson, the 
Deputy Commissioner for Eliot’s administration, once noted that the EAP was turning 
into a “country of nigger and game-shooters” and that Delamere was the ringleader 
among them.297  Jackson further added that he and Delamere were as “thick as thieves” 
and did what they could, along with Eliot, in promoting white settlement and 
diminishing the power of those who tended to be “quarrelsome with the settlers.”298   
 That Delamere put the shooting of African blacks on par with the dispatching of 
game animals is evidence of the racist mentality that prevailed in Eliot’s administration 
and even carried over into Sadler’s among the settler class.  By January of 1907, racist 
feelings among the white settlers were running at a fever pitch, culminating in the 
election of Captain Grogan as the President of the CA.299   
In 1908, Delamere and the settlers’ frustrations with the status of labor provision 
were ever-increasing.  In the EAP, beside the ongoing question related to the adequate 
transfer of land, the provision of a sufficient and reliable labor force for the expatriates 
was a puzzle that the administration had to sort out.  Such would not have been the case 
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if there were no European settlers in the region. The problem stemmed from the policy 
formulation of the second administration after the completion of the railways. “With the 
decision of the protectorate’s second commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot (1901-4), to permit 
and encourage white settlement, the employment pattern hitherto coastal and railway 
began a total change. Settlement involved three major labor problems: to obtain men 
either by recruitment or compulsion; to retain them, in the local context to prevent them 
from deserting; and to make them work diligently. All three problems were to lead to 
incessant conflicts and to crises in 1908 and 1912-13.”300 
There was another dilemma in the EAP, which consisted on how to manage a 
situation where Africans had to work for themselves and for the colonists while being 
also taxed.  Another paradox was that when all the best land was alienated, it limited the 
African holdings.  And adding insult to injuries, the European settlers were not keen 
with the idea of establishing reserves for the Africans. Reserves for the local population 
meant that they could remain far from the latecomers’ sphere of influence. The settlers 
were astute because they wanted to have the African segmented in small groups with 
insignificant holding so that they would benefit from the new setting by obtaining 
abundant cheap labor. That strategy was an illustration of the process of ghettoization 
and exploitation.   
It should be no surprise that the issue of labor supply was going to be a problem, 
when the origin of settlers and their mentality is taken into account. The colonists were 
invited to the EAP; land had been alienated to the benefit of the invitees, the acquired 
properties needed to be developed and a labor force established.  This was easier said 
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than done.  The colonists, who viewed the Africans as passive, seemingly were not apt to 
carry the task of developing their acquired land.  Long hours working under the sun was 
deemed impossible for the colonists to bear. This was a lame excuse and an 
exaggeration. When the protectorate opened, the first European who crisscrossed the 
region praised its quasi-temperate climate and beautiful highlands as suitable for 
European settlement. The EAP was talked about as a Nova Scotia.  After the first phase 
of settlement on the highlands, there was an immediate need for labor.  The settlers 
postulated that they needed the Africans to work for them. They wanted to assume a role 
of master with plenty of docile servants.   
Assuming the role of master in the early days of the protectorate was not a big 
challenge for the settlers. The situation in the EAP was unique because the region had 
experienced natural calamities that affected the local population. When the Europeans 
arrived, recovery was just catching steam. The Africans were starting to get back on their 
feet. The last thing they needed after the pacification phase or, perhaps we could call it 
the “hammering period,” was having to leave behind their families, crops, and cattle to 
work for European masters who were not even willing to accommodate and pay them 
right. Testimony before the Native Labor Commission of 1912-13 helps to illustrate these 
conditions. A witness claimed: 
There were well-known cases of employers who, engaging labourers for a 
month’s work, became increasingly severe at the end of the month approached.  A 
few days before pay days, some display of ferocity or injustice, resulted in the 
whole, or a large portion, of a gang of labourers absconding quietly at night from 
employment which had become intolerable.  Alternatively an impossible task of 
work might be set, and the natives discharged for not completing it.  The 
employer in extreme cases, secured the labour of upwards of 200 men for 25 days 
without payment to any of them. . . .  A common practice among European 
employers was to withhold a portion of the labourer’s earned wages when pay day 
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arrived.301   
 
These practices evidenced the reasons why there was no incentive for the Africans to 
work in European farms and that became a problem that led to the labor troubles in the 
EAP.  Added to this, 1908 marked the peak of European settler immigration to Kenya 
before 1914. These newcomers competed with earlier arrivals for African workers Some 
“280 Transvaal Boers” arrived in the protectorate in 1908.302 
In that scenario, the now-settled colonists considered the Africans as the 
available work force for the task.  When confronted with the question of remuneration 
for the provision of that labor, the newcomers quickly figured it out.  According to the 
big men of the likes of Delamere and Grogan who had vested interests in settling in the 
EAP, taxation was the answer.  Putting the Africans to work and taxing them would 
economically lift the protectorate and in the same process awake the lower races from 
ignorance and laziness. This was a whole new plan of economic development that could 
only work, not in a free market, but in an established white men’s country.  As Clayton 
and Savage explained this situation: 
In economic terms white settlement meant an injection of white capital, or capital in the 
form of skills, for development. This capital was spread over a large number of small 
projects, most of which in themselves were without sufficient cash capital. Apart from 
market-gardens around Nairobi large-scale farming was necessary if profits were to be 
made. To clear the ground, in the absence of skills and equipment, the farmer was 
obliged to seek a sizeable labour force of several score, sometimes several hundred men 
to work with their own rudimentary instruments. But the capital necessary for such a 
labour force was beyond the reach of most of the new settlers, whose difficulties 
worsened by the high interest rate charged by banks on loans. The situation was neither 
an economic climate in which the interest of labour was likely to flourish nor the 
labourer likely to receive a wage which genuinely and permanently attracted him. The 
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attitudes of the settlers themselves to their labour reflected these difficulties.303 
 
Nevertheless, the colonists wanted cheap labor no matter how. To their way of 
thinking, they found a way to justify their claim.  Some radical leaders of the CA had 
long nurtured a disdain towards the Africans whom they regarded as passive with no 
incentive for work.  It was Grogan who proposed an outrageous solution to the labor 
question in his early days in the protectorate.  In his memoir he stated the following: “A 
good sound system of compulsory labour would do more to raise the nigger in five years 
than all the millions that have been sunk in missionary efforts for the last fifty. . . .  Then 
let the native be compelled to work so many months in the year at a fixed and 
reasonable rate and call it compulsory education, as we call our weekly bonnet parades 
church. Under such a title, surely the most delicate British conscience may be at rest.”304  
There was no doubt that Grogan’s suggestion was a bold and inflammatory 
proclamation with no moral validity.  He simply suggested a system of forced labor and 
such was the point of view of the majority of the settlers who held land waiting to be 
developed. 
 To the colonists in the protectorate, Grogan’s idea of Africans working for 
European settlers without complaints was brilliant because such a system would provide 
the locals with a good education. The only thing that was needed from that labor force 
was total submission. “The natives’, says the planter, ‘evince a great reluctance to work, 
especially to work regularly.’ ‘They must be made to work,’ say others. ‘Made to work for 
whom?’ we innocently ask. ‘For us, of course,’ is the ready answer; what did you think 
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we meant?”305  From that observation of Churchill, it was not difficult to understand 
that the colonists wanted an implementation of a quasi-free labor as a fait accompli, but 
the obstacle in front of them was that the extant government, ipso facto, could not 
satisfy their pleas.   
By November 1906, and as a result of the recommendations advanced at the 
January 1905 meeting of the CA,306 such a proposed Masters and Servants Ordinance 
had still failed to prove acceptable to Elgin insofar as it was patterned too closely after 
some South African enactments.307  However, with the arrival of 1907, one suggestion of 
the Land Committee was acted upon, that being the appointment of a Secretary of 
Native Affairs in the EAP, whose express duty was to be that of dealing with the “labour 
supply.”308  At first glance, this may have seemed exactly the type of African labor 
department that the settlers were looking for; but the new secretary, A. C. Hollis, had 
other ideas.  He was clearly on the side of the African workers and did not wish for them 
to be exploited in any way by the settlers or any other employers.     
 Upon inspection, Hollis found many labor abuses that needed to be addressed.  
What distressed him most was the failure of employers to feed their African workers at 
the end of a contract or even provide them with return transportation to their homes of 
record.  In his efforts to change these and other sorry conditions of employment, he did 
succeed in getting Sadler to issue a regulation providing for the feeding of employees 
upon discharge.  However, as to transportation and any concerns related to recruitment 
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methods and other terms of service, no headway was made by the time that Churchill 
personally arrived in the EAP in October 1907 to check out the dire African labor 
situation.   On his way from Mombasa to Nairobi, Churchill took note of returning 
African workers in a bedraggled condition, plodding their way slowly along the railroad 
tracks, attempting to find their way their home on their own after completing some 
labor contract.  Of course, Churchill investigated this situation in some detail and upon 
his arrival in Nairobi, bombarded Sadler with endless questions regarding the lack of a 
suitable EAP labor policy to protect these workers.309   
 Beside personal meetings with Sadler and Hollis, individually and jointly, 
Churchill put forth his recommendations in writing to address any labor shortcoming 
that he perceived in the protectorate.  Clearly, Churchill did not trust the settlers when it 
came to treating their African laborers with any sense of fair play.  In his formal letter, 
he appointed K. R. Dundas to assist Hollis in the work of generating new rules that 
would protect these workers’ rights.310  Churchill’s recommendations were ultimately 
approved by Elgin, who noted to Sadler “these arrangements appear to me to be 
absolutely necessary unless some very shocking scandal in the employment of contract 
labour is to occur.”311  As Churchill had returned to London, Dundas, Hollis and Sadler 
were left with the task of implementing laws that would help protect at least some of the 
African workers’ rights.  This they managed to incrementally accomplish, despite the 
growing consternation of the settlers, who by March of 1908 had grown so fed up with 
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the government’s perceived anti-settler positions that they were marching on the 
Government House.    
 Sadler’s administration had put forward a code of conditions by which the Native 
Affairs Department was willing to assist in locating labor for the settlers in exchange for 
an enforced ban on the violent and compulsory methods previously utilized in filling 
ever increasing labor shortages.  Lord Delamere called a special meeting of the CA in 
March 1908 to demand that the government pass a motion that would abolish these new 
labor regulations.  Sadler would not take any immediate action, but did promise that he 
would at least consider the “relaxation” of some of the provisions.  Delamere, totally 
unsatisfied with Sadler’s response, led a demonstration of some one hundred settlers 
outside Government House in Nairobi, calling for Sadler’s resignation.312  On the 
following day, Sadler met with Delamere and a delegation of the CA.  He steadfastly 
refused to withdraw the regulations, but he did appoint a board of inquiry to look into 
the matter.313  
  The elitist Delemere was envious of Grogan’s popularity in the white settler 
group.  One can easily see that Sadler’s perspective on the demonstration was correct:  
Delamere used it to rile up the disgruntled settlers, so often frustrated in their attempts 
to eke out a meager existence off the land but too proud to do any back-breaking work 
themselves.  If the settler, therefore, thought of the African worker as inferior to himself, 
then he had no problem in forcing this worker into compulsory labor and further 
abusing him in the process.  He would never have to treat the black worker with respect 
as in the white settler’s mind the black was in no position to demand equal rights.  That 
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the Sadler administration might, even inadvertently, change this paradigm was 
completely unacceptable to the white settler class, and Delamere was going to milk it for 
all it was worth.   
Consider Sadler’s commentary on the matter: “The whole thing is due to political 
agitations working on certain amount of distress among poorer settlers.  The 
demonstration was the result of Delamere’s ungovernable temper and of excitement of 
meeting after lunch at which he presided, subsequently conducting the mob up to my 
house.  At this meeting a resolution was framed but afterwards withdrawn, calling on 
me to resign unless I immediately acceded to their demands.”314 
     Sadler, with his strong military background, thought it incomprehensible that a 
loyal subject of the realm would challenge the law in such a public and disgraceful 
display, especially enlisting the aid of Boers and their sympathizers in the process.  The 
CO was cognizant that white settlers in the highlands, for the most part, were not 
making a lot of money and many had even abandoned their farms and stations.  In their 
desperation, these settlers were turning back to some of the same tactics employed in 
South Africa such as forcing the Africans to work by direct compulsion or outright 
appropriating their land or cattle.  And when such maneuverings were carried out in 
South Africa or other parts of the far-flung British Empire, the Crown was quick in 
taking actions to bring these activities to a cessation, even if troops had to be deployed 
in military engagements to make this happen.  W. D. Ellis and others in the CO were 
growing weary of white settler abuses upon the African population in the EAP, and 
following Delamere’s demonstration in Nairobi urged the British government to come 
                                                 
314 Sadler to Elgin, telegram, 26 March 1908, CO 533/42. For full accounts of the demonstration and 
impact, see: Great Britain Correspondence relating to Affairs in the East Africa Protectorate, Cmd 4122 
(London: HMSO, 1908).  E. A. S., March-April 1908.   
 188 
down hard on these political opportunists.  The idea of white repatriation was actually 
given an impetus following the Delemere incident,315 but by the advent of World War I 
had to be sidetracked in order to enlist white settler aid in countering German influence 
in the south.  Said Ellis:  “These methods have led over and over again to wars in the 
Cape and Natal:  and it would probably pay the British taxpayer to repatriate all of the 
whites and forbid their entry except on payment of a heavy poll tax.  Such a cost is, 
however, impracticable….”316 The Liberal government in London was clearly 
apprehensive about white settlement in Africa, and particularly noted that the EAP was 
its most “troublesome” of the new responsibilities on that continent.   
Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State in Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government, 
frequently expressed his concern about the proliferation of so-called “white men’s 
countries” throughout the British Empire.317   It seems that just because a country has 
certain advantages as far as natural resources, the Empire was allowing and even 
encouraging unlimited immigration there.  After opportunist individuals like Delamere 
arrived in Africa, however, the authorities in the CO began to take a dimmer view of the 
situation.  Initially, they thought Delamere and other settlers would help the empire in 
the task of introducing regulation and order in all departments.  What a surprise it was 
when these settlers, from all walks of life, i.e. peers to commoners, ended up siding with 
the racist Boers.  By the time Lord Elgin turned over the CO to Lord Crewe in 1908, he 
had come to the conclusion that he and others in the Liberal government had failed in 
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their duty to the EAP and especially to the “natives who inhabit parts of it, and I 
suppose, formerly owned the whole.”318  
Labor troubles and significance of Delamere’s incident  
 
Looking at the constant labor demands from the settlers’ camp, one could clearly 
see the problems that the protectorate was facing and that had repercussions on the 
development of the region. The EAP was a political mess riddled with discontent and 
agitations caused by the demanding colonists and for that reason, a permanent attention 
was needed to keep it from falling apart. The CO and the local administration had to be 
on the same page to make sure that the protectorate would not completely fall in the 
hands of the settlers. Meanwhile, the leaders of the colonists wanted to be a force to 
reckon with. Delamere stood up to challenge the governor and that had a considerable 
significance. 
Delamere's reaction was swift. He took Sadler's refusal to withdraw the law so 
personally that he decided to directly challenge him.319 Since Grogan's incident, 
Delamere placed himself as the rising star and leader of the settlers. He spearheaded a 
famous settler revolt. The issue revolved around Sadler's decision to introduce new 
labor rules.  The rules were to protect the African workers from abuses, because by 
enforcing them, a more fair provision of labor contract would be limiting the settlers 
from breaking the law by mistreating their employees. Delamere's actions weakened 
Sadler's position. It was a political maneuver that benefitted the settlers. Delamere 
raised political dust and could have never foreseen the impacts because party politics 
was flown into chaos for the coming decades in the political history of Kenya.  Sadler 
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had to leave the protectorate because the settlers wanted a man reminiscent of 
Commissioner Eliot. Delamere's actions were aimed at enforcing the Africans to work, 
but also, it was a message to the Indians in the region.  The colonists nurtured a disdain 
vis-à-vis the Indians who also thought of settling in the highlands and feared their 
competition. To contain that threat, they pushed for the isolation of the Indians in the 
lowlands. The incident also stopped all prospect of cohabitation in the region while the 
pending land and labor issues were yet to be resolved.  Following the demonstration, 
Delamere was suspended from the Legco, but that would not change the colonists’ 
mindset. Making noise and causing trouble were their strategies.320 The settlers wanted 
relaxed land and labor rules that would oblige the colored people to work without 
complaints. In other words they wanted to set the terms of land acquisition and labor 
provision by themselves, which was synonym to a minority enforcing new rules thereby, 
bypassing the governor and the authorities in London.   
 Any changes in land or labor policy were bound to raise a stink with the white 
settlers.  The previous administrations of Eliot and Stewart reserved the Highlands for 
European settlement and gave them an “exclusive right” to this area largely because the 
deficit in EAP expenditures was borne by the British taxpayer and also because the 
white settlers who had come to the highlands did so with the understanding that it 
would be shared solely by other whites.  Also, the huge influx of Indians into the EAP 
was a cause of some concern to the CA as they did not want this new immigrant group to 
impinge on their area of control in the highlands, and they voiced this concern to Sadler.  
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Indian Question 
 Always between a rock and hard place with the CA, Sadler took care in 
formulating his response.  Sadler recognized that Asians played a key role in both the 
conquest and development of the EAP, but assured the members of the CA that he 
harbored no intentions of reversing the policies of Eliot or Stewart with respect to the 
highlands.  The concerns of the CA were advanced at a general assembly in May 1906, 
and they wanted Sadler to state in writing that the Indian policies of prior 
administrations would not be reversed insofar as highlands settlement was concerned.  
Nevertheless, Sadler would not be bullied by the association, and said that he was not 
going to guarantee the highlands solely for whites by legislation, but would follow “in 
principle” to guidelines for settlement established by Eliot and Stewart of not granting 
land “outside municipal limits” to Indians.321   
      While Ellis and others in the CO were not in accordance with excluding any class 
of His Majesty’s subjects from holding land in any part of a British protectorate, 
including the EAP, they were willing to keep in mind the “comparatively limited area 
suitable for European colonization” there.322   This produced the first “Elgin pledge” that 
reserved a portion of the highlands between Kiu and Fort Ternan on the railway for 
exclusive European settlement by administrative action rather than legislation.323  Of 
course, the white settlers were grateful for this small concession, but they still wanted a 
firm guarantee, in writing, that the Highlands were going to remain forever under white 
                                                 
321 Sadler to Elgin, 21 May 1906, enclosing letter from Secretary of Colonists’ Association and resolutions 
passed at meeting of 9 May 1906, CO 533/14. 
322 Elgin to Sadler, Confidential, 17 July 1906, CO 533/14. 
323 Robert M. Maxon and Thomas P. Ofcansky, Historical Dictionary of Kenya Third Edition (Lanham, 
MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2014) 91-92. 
 192 
control.  What the CA wanted was the total exclusion of Indians from the Highlands area 
and even from any representation on the Legco.324 
These Elgin Pledges, made at the behest of the European settlers during Sadler’s 
administration, proved a very critical aspect of the Indian Question in Kenya history. So 
also did the issue of Indian political rights in the EAP.  In 1907, for example, Churchill, 
specifically challenged Sadler on the omission of Indians from the Legco on the basis 
that “there can be no reason for excluding this large and meritorious class.”325  Churchill 
was of the opinion that the appointment by Sadler of an Indian to the Legco would serve 
to instill, from its outset, good principles in the EAP.  Sadler had no name to 
immediately suggest for a seat on the council.  Rather, he operated from the assumption 
that if he did nothing he would do nothing wrong.  But all that he accomplished was to 
raise the ire of the Indian community of the EAP that in April of the following year sent 
him a petition for a nominee to the council.  Then Sadler recognized that the Indian 
community projected “legitimate claims,” yet he still sat on his hands and pretended 
that all was well in the protectorate.  The first Indian to be named to the council was A. 
M. Jeevanjee in 1909, and his nomination was put forth by then Acting Governor 
Jackson.  Sadler was on his way to a new post as Governor of the Windward Islands, 
having been demoted for his overall tepidness.326  
      After the protest, the concerns were clear. The Liberal government recognized 
that Asian immigration to other parts of the empire was a growing problem, and 
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particularly so in East Africa.  White prejudice was probably more intense against 
immigrant Indians in the EAP than Africans.  Clearly, the EAP was no Australia or even 
South Africa, as the members of the CA would have preferred it to be.  But Elgin and 
others in the CO were at least willing to concede, in principle, that the highlands could 
remain a European enclave while Asian immigrants, most notably Indians, could be 
encouraged to trade and settle in more tropic climates.327   
      At least from the start of construction on the Uganda Railway, Indians in East 
Africa had sought, as British subjects, to gain equality of treatment and standing in the 
country of their adoption.  Besides the white settler class, many Africans were also 
opposed to their settlement and the so-called “Indian question” has been a recurring 
theme throughout the region’s history.  During Sadler’s administration, the Asians held 
the majority of the skilled or semi-skilled artisan jobs and were found as small traders 
throughout the country, much as they still are in contemporary Kenya.  In many 
instances, the African has felt crowded out by the strong Asian immigrant presence.  The 
whites, on the other hand, also feared the Asian presence for the economic and political 
threat that they posed.  Being non-white, the European mentality reasoned that the 
Indian or some other Asian may form an alliance with the blacks against them.  This 
mode of thinking was pure paranoia, of course, but when the white settler community 
shunned Chamberlain in favor of extremists like Grogan and Delamere, what more 
could be expected? Thus a decade later the Indian Question emerged as one of the key 
issue facing British rule in Kenya. 
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     Sadler consistently pushed Elgin and others in the CO for a legislature in which 
more Europeans were represented in order to get the CA off of his back.   Because His 
Majesty’s Imperial government certainly wanted to guarantee the rights of all British 
subjects in the EAP, regardless of race or ethnicity, a trusteeship power was granted to 
the Governor to make it so.  This resulted in what may essentially be referred to as a 
dual political system.  Thus, in the Highlands the white settlers gained a dominant 
influence over important areas but were blocked by the Liberal government in London 
from actually realizing the self-government they so desperately yearned for.  More so in 
the Sadler administration, this dichotomy led to a stalemate over the EAP’s projected 
political course and development.  Insofar as the Africans were concerned, Sadler acted 
as nothing more than an authoritarian and paternalistic guardian whose only success 
was in at least keeping the white settler class from overturning what few laws were laid 
down to protect the black worker.  And as far as the Asian-Indian community was 
concerned, total inaction was the order of the day.  The situation in the protectorate was 
no longer sustainable and the CO, once again, had to intervene. 
Conclusion 
     The EAP was a region invaded by a few colonists who turned the region into a 
political nightmare. The EAP was difficult to properly administrate. In 1909, The CO 
grew tired of Sadler’s inaction. He did not finish his term as governor.  The CO originally 
appointed him because of his military background, hoping Sadler would bring some 
backbone to the situation and put the settlers in check to allow for the gradual uplifting 
of all His Majesty’s subjects throughout the EAP.  Thus the CO felt the need to bring in a 
stronger man from outside, and that was Sir Percy Girouard.  Here was an administrator 
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who had performed a great work in reestablishing functional control in Northern 
Nigeria. 
      That Sadler failed to reestablish functional control in the EAP may be due to the 
“grilled cheese” political effect, with Sadler being the cheese.  On one hand, he had to 
answer to the Liberal government’s CO, whose officialdom from top to bottom, 
including administrative staffers in foreign outposts, were largely controlled by the 
“Oxbridge” elites, i.e. graduates of Oxford and Cambridge.  In the EAP, for example, 
between 1890 and 1909, of the known social backgrounds of 22 EAP administrative 
officers with university degrees, ten hailed from Oxford and 3 from Cambridge.  There 
were none from South Africa or other Commonwealth countries.  And of these 22, four 
hailed from military and technical academies. 328  This group formed the bottom slice of 
bread upon which the slice of cheese rested.  And then came the top slice.  This was the 
lousy settler class, mostly composed of white South Africans, principally Boers.  
On the concept of subject races, the South African John Buchan has penned: “The 
root of the trouble is that England and South Africa talk, and will continue to talk, in 
different languages….  The Englishman, using the speech of conventional politics, seems 
to the colonist to talk academic nonsense; while the South African, speaking the rough 
and ready words of the practical man, appears as the champion of brutality and 
coercion.  The difficulties are so real that one cannot but regret that they are 
complicated by verbal misunderstandings.”329   So here lies the crux of the matter.  
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Sadler needed to pick one side and go with it, and not try and placate both sides.  For in 
the process of doing so, he was aptly grilled and consumed.   
Here it could be said that the Europeans settlers succeed in maintaining pressure 
and disorder that had the governor cornered in a middle of political storm. The EAP 
remained economically stagnant and politically divided with a majority population that 
stood without representation.  The governor failed to strike a balance between the 
wishes of the CO and the interests of the colonists in the region.  Instead, there was 
chaos that held back the region from a peaceful economic take off.  A clear policy 
formulation was long overdue because the Africans and Indians living in the region 
could not be written off.  They also needed land and fair rights to compete and prosper. 
Changes were needed for a better administration of the region. Once again, it was time 
to reshuffle.  Mungeam summarized: 
By the end of 1908 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Protectorate as a 
whole was suffering from a bankruptcy of ideas. Within the Protectorate, apart 
from the enthusiasm of Hollis in the fields of labour and land, none of the senior 
officials appeared capable of offering concrete ideas that might revitalize the 
country. The constant struggle with the settler population, the comparative lack 
of leadership at the top, the long years of service in the Protectorate, all combined 
to turn men of the seniority of Jackson, Hobley and Ainsworth into sound but 
somewhat unimaginative administrators. In Whitehall, important changes had 
taken place. Asquith’s reshuffle of May 1908, which replaced Elgin and Churchill 
by Crewe and Seely, meant the loss of an Under-Secretary who had taken a keen 
interest in the affairs of the Protectorate. Indeed, Churchill was the one first-class 
man, amongst the many politicians concerned with the Protectorate in its early 
years, to have shown an active interest in its problems and to have taken the 
trouble to pay it a personal visit.330 
 
Nevertheless, the issues of land and labor regulation were still to be sorted out, 
and the newcomers were still not satisfied with the manner that the CO was supervising 
the protectorate. With the transfer of Sadler, the colonists were hoping for the CO to 
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back up the right horse to run the protectorate for their interests. Their wish came 
through when the CO sent a railway engineer to for the job.  With this quick fix, the 
troublesome protectorate was entering another era of political agitations and abuses on 
the expense of the colored people of the protectorate.  
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Chapter  5 
The peak of European settlers’ political influence and interference in the 
East Africa Protectorate’s administration under Governor Girouard from 
1909 to 1912 
 
Introduction 
The period from 1909 to 1912 was the time that Sir Percy Girouard was the 
appointed governor of the EAP.  The CO authorities who entrusted him with the mission 
of bringing order and getting things moving in the right direction in the protectorate 
had firm expectationsabout how Girouard would differ from the previous 
administrators. The CO expected him to deliver. Nevertheless, Girouard’s 
administration turned out to be the biggest political train wreck the protectorate had 
ever witnessed. The governor embarked in dangerous liaisons with the politically active 
European settlers, who wanted privileges and power. 
European settlers’ politics in the EAP was an activity profoundly related to the 
issues of governance. Ross asserted that: “from the earliest days the Government of the 
East Africa Protectorate displayed commendable willingness to listen to advice from 
local European residents. Critics of a sardonic turn of mind might perhaps interject that 
it had no option in the matter, the advice having been tendered in such strident tones as 
to compel attention.”331  The general tone was set during Eliot’s administration, which 
created a context of political obligation to solely benefit the colonists, inviting them to 
take up land and develop the region.  That was how the EAP’s political stage ended up 
being heavily dominated by the influential European settlers since Eliot’s resignation in 
1904; the colonists in 1909 were hoping to have a similar man in the spot who would 
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stand for their interests like their political progenitor did. With the noisy European 
settlers always pushing for more concessions, the EAP struggled to find the necessary 
political stability for a steady economic development. This would turn into a pattern that 
left a mark in Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial political history. 
 Since the departure of Hardinge, the protectorate experienced a succession of 
commissioners and governors who were sent to get things moving in the right 
direction.  Peace, order and a just society were requisites for the EAP if it was to have 
any hope of economic development.  Nevertheless, by 1909 it was clear that the EAP was 
a racially divided society with the Africans and the Indians being pushed off the political 
stage. This was indeed a far cry from the vision of Sir Harry Johnston that he expressed 
just after the completion of the Uganda Railway.  Johnston stated that he “had long 
believed in the development of Africa in racial harmony and so could speak of this land 
also as a possible America of the Hindu.”332  Unfortunately, as George Bennett noted, 
“the troubled story of racial politics in Kenya has belied his hopes.”333  What did become 
clear, however, was that the European settlers were not going to let the EAP become any 
sort of America, either for the Hindu or the African. The European settlers present in 
the protectorate did not want any form of political cohabitation.  The political isolation 
of the Indians and the Africans was the only guarantee for the establishment of a 
successful self-governing white man’s country. That simply meant segregation in the 
EAP could be the new reality. The European settlers’ presence coupled with their 
ideology rendered difficult the very issues of governance in the EAP.  
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After Sadler’s difficult tenure, the CO sent Governor Girouard to assess the 
situation and recommend needed action.  The CO wanted him to stabilize the region and 
implement fair policies that would economically benefit all parties, thereby reflecting 
well on the Empire. In compliance, Girouard reported back to the CO on the whole East 
Africa situation.  However, he started off on the wrong foot, showing favoritism for the 
settlers.   He wanted more European settlers and increased representation in the Legco, 
thus facilitating their active participation in running the protectorate.  Girouard fell into 
the settlers’ net.  He came under Delamere’s influence and became engaged in a 
dangerous political liaison that would ultimately result in his resignation in 1912.  
Girouard’s governorship was far more open and flexible to the settlers’ interests than 
even Eliot’s administration was. The new governor totally discarded the rights of the 
Africans and the Indians. The Indian community felt isolated and protests came forth 
from them against the settler’s political dominance.  
  With the deliberate backing of Girouard, the Convention of Associations (C of A) 
was formed in 1910.  The C of A was the united settlers’ party standing for all its 
members’ interests in the region. The colonists’ decision to come together as a one 
strong political party was evidence of their determination to use all strategies and tactics 
possible to defend their interests and achieve their goal of acquiring a self-governing 
country.  Keeping the political context and climate of the EAP in mind, it is apparent 
that the colonists were developing broad strategies and plans for the achievement of 
goals, along with specific methods and tactics to carry out the same.  The settlers’ tactics 
included a claim for electoral participation, i.e., voting, campaigning, influencing public 
opinion, lobbying governmental and non-governmental agencies and associations, 
verbal protests, threats, mass action, demonstrations, marches, disruption, litigation,  
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and even violence.  All of this carried with it, of course, an intense focus on the 
expansion and internal development of the white settler community. 
The European settlers had tremendous influence and confidence and did not 
hesitate in pushing for more concessions. So bold were the settlers that they came up 
with yet more demands in February and August of 1911. They demanded elective 
representation in the Legco, albeit it would still remain under the supervision of the 
CO.  The settlers were not above employing violence to meet these ends, either, as we 
will note in the case of the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole, a settler related to 
Delamere, with the rest of the Empire be damned in the process.  
As this chapter develops, it becomes apparent that the political situation in the 
EAP was unique. On one hand, the political challenges the settlers brought to the CO 
under Girouard’s watch marked an era of extremes, led by a few agitators that Churchill 
once referred to as “political animals”334 with the sole objective of turning the 
protectorate into a white men’s country. Paradoxically, as far as the Africans and 
Indians were concerned, it was an era of political and economic disenfranchisement 
with all odds stacked against them. Less land was being made available for them and 
they had to pay taxes. Girouard went too far in favoring the colonists, even to the point 
that the Africans again suffered clear violations of their rights. In this instance, a 
promise was made to transfer some of the Maasai land to the settlers. With such 
violations sanctioned for the sole propose of favoring the European colonists, Girouard 
ended up like Eliot, tendering his resignation to the CO. Girouard’s administration was a 
déjà vu, a worse facsimile of Eliot’s tenure. It was an attempt to make the settlers’ 
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interests paramount in the region.  Nevertheless, the lesson to be drawn from his 
governorship was that the CO was still in charge and the European settlers’ political 
dreams and goals were yet to be realized.   
Sir Percy Girouard as the new man in the spot 
In 1909, the CO came to the conclusion that it was time to remove Governor 
Sadler from the troublesome EAP. This was not a surprise. When it came down to 
matters related to who could best administer the protectorate, the CO had a method that 
consisted on shuffling servers of the crown from one protectorate or colony to another.   
It was a quick-fix designed to be utilized at any time that they realized that they had the 
wrong man in some trouble spot. 
Officials at the CO came to the realization that Sadler had bitten off a little more 
than he could chew in governing the EAP.   For in 1909, one year prior to his scheduled 
transfer from the governorship of the protectorate, Sadler received and accepted an 
appointment as governor of the Windward Islands.  These are the southernmost islands 
of the Lesser Antilles, a long chain of islands wrapped around the eastern end of the 
Caribbean Sea along the boundary of the Atlantic Ocean. Sadler himself seemed relieved 
to be leaving the constant turmoil that existed in the protectorate.  The Windward 
Islands would prove to be a near Eden for Sadler.  He was not anticipating any serious 
administrative difficulties in those remote Caribbean islands so neatly tucked away from 
the flurry of imperial machinations that existed in East Africa and other contentious 
areas of British global dominion.335 
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 Sadler’s designated successor to the governorship was the French-Canadian, Sir 
Edouard Percy Girourard (1867-1923); and like Sadler, he was also a man of some 
military distinction.  A graduate of the Royal Military College at Kingston, Girouard 
entered the British Army in 1888.  Eight years later he participated in the Dongola 
expedition in the Sudan, whence he received the Khedive medal with two clasps.  One 
year after that, he played a part in the Nile expedition and subsequently went to work in 
opening up and directing the operation of British railways in both Egypt and the Sudan.  
He was so effective in this position, that in 1899 he was transferred to South Africa, 
where he served as the Director of Railways until 1902 and the conclusion of the Second 
Anglo-Boer War. 336  
 Girouard demonstrated outstanding administrative abilities in the work of 
building and maintaining efficient railroad operations.  From 1902-1904, he served as 
Commissioner of Railways in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies.  Girouard 
clearly respected the hard-working South African railway workers.  Despite their 
political differences with the British Empire, Girouard expressed a grudging admiration 
for the hardscrabble settlers in South Africa.  Following his South African service, 
Girouard served as High Commissioner and Governor in Northern Nigeria on the West 
African coast where the economy depended heavily on African peasants’ agricultural 
production. During this time, most would have described him as a small yet dapper 
man, bursting with energy and self-confidence.  His reputation as a gentleman with a 
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remarkable flair for administration extended all the way to London, so naturally those in 
the CO were paying close attention to Girouard’s rising star.337   
 Keeping in mind his dutiful service to the Empire, in 1907 Girouard was 
appointed to succeed F. D. Lugard as the High Commissioner and later Governor of 
Northern Nigeria.  Girouard was ostensibly committed to carrying out Lugard’s goal of 
the establishment of a dual mandate in Northern Nigeria and other areas of tropical 
Africa.338  Basically, the dual mandate entailed indirect British rule in colonial Africa.  
Lugard believed that such indirect rule would assist in facilitating the spread of 
Christianity in Africa, in addition to hastening the end of the more so-called “barbaric 
practices” that still ensued on the continent.   Lugard believed that the British state-
sponsored colonization of African protectorates was one way to protect missionaries, 
local chiefs, and local people from each other as well as from foreign powers.  For the 
far-sighted Lugard, it was vital that Britain gain control of unclaimed areas before 
France, Germany, Portugal, or any other European powers claimed the land and its 
resources for themselves.  Lugard was of the opinion that there were vast profits to be 
made through the exporting of natural resources and through taxation of of the African 
populations, as well as importers and exporters. In addition, these resources and 
inexpensive African labor could be counted on to provide vital fuel for the industrial 
revolution in resource-depleted Britain as well as monies for public works projects.  And 
most importantly, Lugard reasoned that colonization efforts would not need to be 
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augmented if Britain were to retain its position as the greatest global empire in 
history.339  
 The CO at best thought of Sadler’s administration as weak whereas they viewed 
Girouard, a disciple of Lugard, as being fresh and dynamic.  Here was just the type of 
firm administrative leader that could give the EAP the boost it needed to regain some of 
the luster lost during previous regimes in place in East Africa.  They also viewed 
Girouard as the type of man who could be relied on to effectively deal with the settlers 
and their overwhelming South African contingent in the EAP.  After all, his work with 
the railways in South Africa proved beyond a doubt that he had a way with the local 
population and could be relied on to build up the necessary momentum behind various 
projects. Here, it is worthy to mention that there were no settlers in Nigeria.  
In most respects, Girouard was seen as the “best possible man” for the post.340  
The CO believed that he could control the settlers while at the same time add the needed 
vitality to the EAP administration.  His successful work on various colonial British 
railway operations also bode well for Girouard’s economic guidance of the protectorate 
to the harbors of efficiency and profitability.341  So Girouard was heading to the British 
East Africa highlands with the CO high expectations that the new man in the spot will 
deliver and guide the protectorate to prosperity.  There was hope of finally seeing the 
region generating revenues.  The CO wanted a well-administrated protectorate where 
the European settlers would remain content with what they already had.  The CO also 
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wanted an extension of the pax Britannia in the region and that meant the safeguard of 
all subjects’ rights under the crown.  
Sir Percy Girouard’s general constats de faits of the protectorate’s status quo and his 
inclination towards the European settlers 
Upon taking over the governorship of the protectorate, Girouard was ipso- facto 
shocked by the fact that there was no clear policy for an effective administration of the 
region. There was still the familiar issue of reserved land for the settlers to be defined. 
The need to protect the African and the Indian population was also crucial.  Looking at 
the situation, Girouard realized that the settlers were not sympathetic with the 
incorporation of the Indians in the emerging economic system.  Adding to that reality, 
they considered taxing the Africans as a way to generate revenue while securing labor. 
The expatriates from South Africa had gained such influence that any official sent in the 
protectorate was expected to side with their association. The settlers had the habit of 
scrutinizing any commissioner or governor sent by the CO in the EAP. Failure to come 
under the influence of the main leaders of the settlers was like opening the gate for 
troubles.  The CO wanted to avoid further disturbances from the expatriates’ camp. 
Unfortunately, Girouard fell under Delamere’s influence, which was a recipe for more 
conflicts under the watch of the officials of the CO.  
By sending his first alarming reports to the CO, the new governor took a 
stand for the European settlers.  In his 1910 report of the protectorate, for 
example, Girouard showed clear signs of being aware of the role that he wanted the 
colonists to play in the political arena of the region. The governor went on to 
criticize the state of the protectorate and the officials in place.  He complained 
about the lack of a definite policy to lift up the protectorate and generate revenue.  
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Nevertheless he seemed to only consider the settlers as an alternative for change.  
Girouard suggested to the CO “that a strong administrative machine should be 
created and that the settlers should be given the opportunity for greater 
participation in government.”342His references to the Legco made plain how strong 
the settlers’ influence had become: he wanted a strong colonial secretary to give 
lead on the council, where he found the officials weak both in numbers and in 
debate. But he wanted more European unofficial members there also, for their 
active participation in government was ‘essential’.”343  Girouard quickly came to 
the realization that European settlement was a reality that could not be ignored.  
Settlers’ participation in the development and administration of the protectorate 
was unavoidable.  But, the problem here was that the colonists were not the 
majority capable of developing the region.  They did not want to work or pay taxes, 
and many of them lacked the resources or skills necessary for their new adventure 
in East Africa.  The settlers’ stand was to play without having to pay and that 
meant representation without taxation. Girouard did not realize that at first.  The 
reason why Girouard sympathized with the settlers had nothing to do with his 
personal record, but one is driven to consider his experience with the South 
African settlers as a factor.   
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Liasons dangereuses, Girouard and the European Settlers’ alliance 
This combined with the fact that Girouard soon found a firm friend in Lord 
Delamere and engaged in political actions favoring the settlers.  That alliance turned 
into a huge fiasco, a massive political train wreck.  Girouard made the false assumption 
that Delamere would become his “firm friend.”344  Girouard made the overture of 
sending a telegram to Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, wherein he recommended that 
Delamere be reappointed to the Legco, from which body he had resigned in May 1909.  
In this same telegram, Girouard questioned the presence of A. M. Jeevanjee, the leader 
of the Indian faction in the EAP, on the Legco.  Girouard could have argued that 
Jeevanjee was largely illiterate, and the position called for a more educated and hence 
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articulate spokesman.  But his rationale for the challenge was that other ethnic groups, 
like the Arabs and Swahilis, who outnumbered the Indians by a two-to-one margin in 
the protectorate, would soon be demanding representation on the council for their 
particular factions.   For if the Arabs and Swahilis, who so outnumbered the Indians, 
were deserving of knocking out the Indian representative, what of the white settler 
representative whose constituency numbered but a few hundred?345   Once again, it 
appears as though Girouard acted too hastily.  Had he checked with the published 
official gazette, he would have noted that official recognition for Jeevanjee had already 
been granted in London and that it was too late to do anything about it.346  He also 
tipped his hand and inadvertently revealed his racist tendencies by demanding that 
Jeevanjee be dismissed from his legislative post.  
The Indians were mostly ordinary working class, the actual builders of the 
railroad. They were very industrious and could perform works vital for the development 
of the region.  Among them, there were mainly traders, masons, carpenters, porters, 
clerks, and surveyors.  They served the protectorate well, working in many different 
areas like road construction, post offices and customs.  In fact, many Indians adapted 
well to East Africa and did not feel the need to return back home.  Indian agglomeration 
in the growing cities was economically considerable and quite noticeable.  As Bhatt 
noted, “According to the earliest census carried out in the protectorate in 1911, there 
were approximately 11,000 Indians in the country.  In Nairobi with a population of 
14,161, Indians were 3,171 while 591 were Goans. The rest of the population comprised 
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of 799 Europeans, 76 Eurasians and 9,524 Africans. Mombasa’s Indian population was 
3,820.”347  
Although many Asiatics were not keen on becoming cash crop agriculturists, the 
vast majority opened bazaars along the railroad and other trade routes, developing 
profitable businesses. Indian small businesses reached many corners of the 
protectorate.  They were mainly established in the growing urban centers like Nairobi, 
Machakos, Kisumu, Naivasha, and Kisii, just to name a few.   They ventured and traded 
in rural areas that provided markets for some farm produce like dairy products, beans, 
potatoes and more. They were also successful businessmen who prospered in the EAP 
where many European settlers could not even scratch the surface yet, despite possessing 
the best land.  Bhatt pointed out that: “A.M. Jeevanjee, and Allidina Visram had 
established vast business empires that covered much of East African region. Others 
included Adamjee Alibhoy who had been invited to Machakos by the provincial 
Commissioner for Ukamba Province, John Ainsworth in 1898 to establish a retail outlet; 
Gulamhussein Abdulah Datto who established a successful auction business in Nairobi; 
Deroda Shami Harji who established a succesfull construction company in Kisumu, 
among others.”348   
The CO was cognizant of the Indian contributions in East Africa.  In fact, the 
Indian rupee was used as the official currency since 1898.   And according to Mangat, it 
replaced “the Maria Theresa dollar which had been operational until this time, and in 
1910 the National Bank of India became the official bank of the protectorate.”349  This 
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was not well welcomed by the settlers who wanted everything to be modeled in 
conformity to the English system back home. 
The Asiatics were important contributors in the economy of the region and some 
British officials who visited the protectorate took notice. Sir Edward C. Buck, Secretary 
of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture in the Indian government, witnessed the 
important involvement of the Indians in East Africa since 1905.  Also Churchill, on his 
visit to the protectorate in 1907, noticed the tenacious character of the Indians and was 
of the opinion that they deserved a fair political representation in its administration. But 
when it came to Girouard, he seemed to have not realized the valuable contribution of 
the Indians. He failed to recognize the importance of the Indians in the region. For a 
man of his experience, this was a big misstep because the Indian presence was manifest 
almost everywhere in the protectorate. The governor paid more attention to the small 
European settler community.  He was a bold, but shortsighted, governor.  
With Girouard as the locomotive engineer, he was now full-steam underway to 
the carrying of his settler passengers to their homes in the “white man’s country” he was 
going to carve out for them in the highlands.  The settlers needed a free ride to the 
Legco. This was utopia because so far the settlers’ contribution in the economy of the 
region was quasi-insignificant, and they feared the Indian competition.  They viewed the 
Indians as a force that was quickly proliferating and could, with all due justice in mind, 
stand for their rights.  If deprived of representation and ignored, the Indians would 
eventually rise up for their rights. Churchill foresaw the danger of a possible isolation of 
the Africans and Indians earlier in his visit to the region.  He was against the opinion 
that the protectorate could ever become a white man’s country in the sense of Canada or 
the United Kingdom. Confronted with the conflicting claims of European, Indian and 
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African, he argued that the tropical protectorates were big enough for all, that a place 
could be found for the European settler and for the Indian trader and agriculturalist in a 
country that fundamentally belonged to the Africans.  Churchill understood the 
complicated social context of the EAP and wrote the following: “In truth the problems of 
East Africa are the problems of the world. We see the social, racial and economic 
stresses which rack modern society already at work here, but in miniature . . . The 
British Government has it in its hands to shape the development and destiny of these 
new countries and their varied peoples with an authority and from an elevation far 
superior to that with which Cabinets can cope with giant tangles at home. And the fact 
stirs in mind.”350 
Nevertheless, the governor had a different view of the situation.  Girouard 
believed that the small group of whites was entitled to representation on the Legco 
solely based on their race.  Nothing else makes any sense, given what we know about 
this situation.   The reasoning behind Girouard’s position with regard to Jeevanjee 
actually served to undercut the right of the settlers to have a representative on the 
Legco.  Girouard was not making a good impression in London or with the colonial 
administration in place in the protectorate.  He appeared as a sad little fool. Moreover, 
his opinions and actions favoring the settlers in this case laid the foundation for the 
Indian question, which caused such great controversy later in Kenya’s history.   
What did Girouard get for his troubles on behalf of the settlers?  He got nothing, 
up to this point.  Yet he continued to go out on a limb for them.  Another example of this 
was Girouard’s favoring the settlers’ point of view in his handling of the CO’s desired 
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changes in the EAP’s land laws.  That was not all the governor tried to do for the 
colonists. When he was confronted with the issue of labor provision and taxation in the 
protectorate, he also tried to formulate policies that would benefit the colonists.  
The dragging issues of the land bill implementation, sufficient labor supply and 
taxation.  
The new governor was concerned about the rather “moribund” state of the EAP’s 
economy.  He believed that most of the settlers were “discontented and bitter” because 
the economy was not growing and was failing to provide them with opportunities for 
development.  Land policy and the terms of leases were important elements in this. In a 
telegram to the Secretary of State in early 1910, Girouard reported on the revision of the 
Crown Lands Ordinance that had been suspended pending his input.  The new governor 
took up Delamere’s position in opposing the writing in of rent revision after thirty-three 
years.  He agreed with Delamere that the settlers would, “very probably” get some form 
of self-government by then, thus making the provision nothing but an “unnecessary 
aggravation.”  He reasoned that it would most likely be undone.351  In this Girouard was 
compliant with the wishes of Delamere and the large landholders.  Even as early as 
November of 1909, Girouard urged that the size of any holding was of no importance.352  
It only mattered that the land was being developed.  In our contemporary parlance, this 
was tantamount to throwing the small farmers “under the bus,” most of whom were 
people of color who would be soon find themselves alienated from their land and homes 
all to make room for the expansive development plans of the white settler class, whose 
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dreams included turning the EAP into a “white man’s country,” like their beloved South 
Africa. 
So what did Girouard demand from the settlers for this huge concession?  Once 
again, no demands were made.  As it was during Eliot’s administration, Girouard had 
his own way of formulating policies he found suitable for the protectorate.  He also 
interpreted the orders of the CO in his own way. For instance, he failed to implement the 
land ordinance the CO had long desired. This was a dragging issue due to the fact that 
the late governor Sadler failed to get the land ordinance amended to meet the desires of 
Lord Elgin and the CO.  
With the governorship of Girouard, still no progress was made on the matter.  In 
part, as Sorrenson underlined, this was due to the fact that “Crewe had agreed to 
withhold a decision on the version passed by the Legco in 1909 until Girouard had 
examined the situation on the spot.”353 With time elapsing and the problem over the 
land bill unsolved, the Europeans settlers were busy with their efforts in trying to block 
the implementation of the revised ordinance desired by London. Girouard knew that the 
colonists did not want any implementation of the land bill.  He approached the CO, 
pointing out that: “there was a very strong feeling . . . in the country entirely averse to 
any revision of rentals within the period of a 99 years lease.”354 It is to say here that the 
general mood and discontent in the protectorate were the manifestation of the settlers’ 
frustrations who believed that they were being hampered by the CO. Any effort made to 
prevent dummying or an introduction of land tax was not desired by the settlers. They 
considered land accumulation, as normal phenomena in this new protectorate that they 
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believed would become a self-governing territory in a very near future. Girouard 
appeared to be so in tune with the settlers that he did not even need to ask them what 
they needed. He wanted the land bill to remain the same and that translated to the 
benefit of the expatriates pushing for cheap land.  
Reactions in the CO emerged when the governor formally asked not to modify the 
land bill. Butler, the private secretary of S of S Lewis Harcourt, noticed that the governor 
was leaning more and more towards the settlers’ camp. Butler affirmed that the 
governor was “prepared to throw over, in deference to the wishes of the White Settlers, 
the conditions imposed by the Secretary of State.”355   The governor was like a magic 
goose that could be counted on to continually lay golden eggs for the influential 
newcomers.  The fact that settlers, with Girouard by their side, were successful in 
blocking the land bill marked a significant turning point in Kenya political history. With 
the unsolved land issue in the EAP, a major problem was created without a solution and 
sooner or later it would resurface in the region as long as the settlers were present 
asking for privileges while aspiring for political power. Their longtime cry was “no 
taxation without representation” alluding that the Africans must be taxed and forced to 
work. 
The necessity of implementing the land bill was not the only issue facing 
Girouard. The European settlers had long been concerned with securing an adequate 
supply of labor.  They also believed that measures needed to be put in place to effectively 
monitor and tax the Africans.  In the EAP, no colonial administration enjoyed much 
success in dealing with these issues, deemed so important by the European settlers. 
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Girouard also inherited labor troubles from Sadler’s administration; and this was largely 
due to the settlers’ constant demands for the cheap provision of men ready to work.   
Land ownership, labor supply and taxation were issues of concern for the 
colonists because they never stopped advocating tax increases to manipulate the 
Africans into working for meager wages. The newcomers also expected the Africans’ 
holding of land to be limited so that they could benefit from the situation by getting a 
more readily available labor supply. The idea was that with Africans confined in small 
groups in alienated areas, a permanent labor supply would be secured. The colonists 
feared the possibility of the creation of reserves where the Africans could remain far 
away on their own, dodging taxes and working for themselves.  The Africans, whom the 
settlers thought of as "lazy children who must work harder if they wanted to get out of 
poverty," were not free to choose their own destiny. Keeping Africans in reserves or 
having them living in small groups for the sake of fulfilling the settlers' need for labor 
was altogether wrong. There was no policy suitable for the Africans as long as the 
European colonists were lobbying for their interests in the region. With the European 
settlers being able to wine and dine the governor, their political influence had its effect 
in shaping the policies of the EAP. One of their best tactics was to effectively manipulate 
the governor by befriending and winning his confidence.  Consequently, the political 
influence of the colonists had its effects on the governor’s theory of solving the pending 
labor crisis. As Clayton and Savage described it: 
 
…he wished to follow the South African pattern of a Native Affairs Department actively 
‘encouraging’ men to work for settlers, thinking in terms of a ‘Recruitment of Native 
Labour Ordinance’ and a ‘Masters Union’ of employers for recruiting. The Colonial Office 
offered no support for this latter proposal and it found little favour locally. Nevertheless 
Girouard personally urged chiefs to recruit labour, and his administrative officers 
returned to the old practices of ‘encouragement’ with few questions asked, even giving 
the chiefs quotas of men which their area were to produce. Girouard’s views on land, 
taxation and policy in the reserves also coincided with the views of the more moderate of 
the settlers and served their interests. His work included a general improvement in the 
efficiency of the administration, measures to strengthen the authority of the chiefs, 
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instructions to administrative officers on their duties which for example included a 
requirement that provincial commissioners were to include notes on where labour might 
be obtained in their handing-over reports, and increases in the number of these officers 
in the more heavily populated reserve areas to tax and perhaps ‘encourage’; these actions 
all greatly helped the settler and his labour supply.356   
 
 Looking at the other side of the coin, one comes to the realization that having the 
Africans do the work to develop the protectorate and pay the taxes only added to their 
misery; and that was a dangerous social situation in the making because the day would 
eventually arrive when the mistreated, underpaid, and landless workers would rise up 
and strike blows to secure their freedom. Keeping the Africans down in favor of the 
European settlers was not something desired by the CO, but the decisions being made 
always benefited the settlers. The colonists in the EAP would not even be satisfied with 
the fact that the Africans were required to pay taxes or face penalty of imprisonment.  A 
hut and poll tax ordinance was introduced in the Legco in 1909.  A poll tax was 
introduced in 1910 for adult men who had not paid hut tax. For adult African men, this 
tax was mandatory.  The tax was 3 rupees payable in cash or in kind.357  In March 1911, 
Delamere demanded increased freight rates be levied on the unbleached white garment 
worn by Africans and blankets. 358 That was synonym to a method of indirect taxation 
coercing the Africans further to work for Europeans. The European settlers who 
believed in representation without taxation decided earlier in 1909 to join forces and 
come together politically as a single strong party.  
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Together as one: The European settlers’ Convention of Associations 
The settlers for whom Girouard blocked the implementation of the CO’s desired 
changes in the land ordinance were not unified politically. The settlers differed in 
background, wealth, priorities and political inclination.  The smaller landowners of the 
Pastoralists’ Association, largely centered around the region of Nakuru in the highlands, 
voiced concern over Delamere and some of the more wealthy arrivals and their 
acquisitions of vast lands along with attendant political influence.  Robert Chamberlain, 
another South African immigrant, had emerged as the spokesman for this group.  But 
realizing their overall small numbers, the pastoralists and other small organizations 
came to the conclusion that it would be better to work with the likes of Delamere and the 
CA than to fight them.   After all, presenting a unified front to the administration of the 
EAP as well as the CO was to be essential if any progress were to be made among the 
white population.  Chamberlain was of the opinion that such a “Confederation” would 
best serve the interests of all concerned.359  And apparently others in settler leadership 
were in agreement, for in September 1908 the idea of forming a “Central Committee” 
was advanced for consideration; and just two years later, a Convention of Associations 
was convened.  As Ross described the process: 
Ideas of combined action progressed slowly at first.  In 1909 the Colonists’ Association, 
the Pastoralists’ Association and the Malindi Coast Planters’ Association decided to form 
a Central Committee of Federated Associations.  A split took place in the Colonists’ 
Association because it was becoming too political.  Mr. Grogan’s scheme of April 1907 for 
a political federation of all the European associations in the country had not been taken 
up.  He appealed again, on August 3rd, 1910, for an association, not of individuals, but of 
associations.  Lord Delamere had just previously placed his resignation, on some pretext 
or other, before the Colonists’ Association (on July 25th, 1910), and withdrawn it four 
days later.  On August 4th he again resigned, demanding the adoption of the Convention 
of Associations.  This being conceded, he withdrew this resignation also.  No count has 
been kept of the number of times that Lord Delamere has resigned from various bodies 
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in East Africa.  In a circle that was formerly wide, but which is now narrowing, the threat 
has often sufficed to effect compliance with his wishes.  Eight associations and two 
chambers of commerce were invited to meet for the first Convention on October 3rd, 
1910.  The proposal was then formally put and adopted, and an inaugural dinner was 
held next month, with Governor Sir Percy Girouard as an invited guest.  One Association, 
the Limoru Farmers, formally revoked its previous non-political character.  The others 
slid into the new activities in which the promoters of this new venture chose to utilize 
their services.360 
 
This was the dawn of a new day. From now on, the governor and administration 
of the EAP would then have to deal more with the representatives of a powerful 
organization, the Convention of Associations (C of A), rather than with individual 
settlers. This body was sometimes referred to solely as the “Convention,” and at other 
times as the “Settler’s Parliament” or “White Parliament.”  Dilley maintained that it 
“exerted an influence far beyond any unofficial organization.”361  By this, she meant that 
it served to provide a medium for the expression of European settler political opinion.  
By and large, this C of A operated in accordance with the principal that the “squeaky 
wheel gets the grease.”  In this, the settlers did not hesitate to employ the tactics of 
agitation in achieving their objectives.  They were so proficient in this political technique 
that seemingly “spontaneous campaigns” could quickly be assembled and mobilized.  
Ross, who was present in the EAP during that time, consistently maintained that the 
convention was so powerful that every governor of the protectorate ended up being 
subservient to it. The settlers’ influence was high to such a degree that Girouard became 
their envoy to London to defend their cause.  The continued settler agitations for 
legislative representation persisted throughout 1910, so much so that in August of that 
year the governor made a trip to London where he took hold of the opportunity to 
discuss this issue with the powers-that-be in the CO.  As Girouard proclaimed that he 
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was making this trip at the behest of the settlers,362 the CO decided to listen carefully to 
his message and graciously received him. Usually, the governor would find that the C of 
A was quite helpful to him in addressing most issues facing the protectorate, except for 
that of African and Asian labor. On their part, the settlers remained politically active.  
In 1910, the chairmanship of the C of A passed to the hands of the ruthless 
Grogan and that meant that more settlers’ grievances were going to emerge. The first 
meeting of the C of A was convened in February 1911.  There were 19 delegates from 
eight regional organizations in attendance.  Some of the issues coming before the 
Convention were the so-called “Colonists’ Plot,” the Asiatic question, railway 
management, the construction of a deep water pier, the protectorate’s representation at 
a forthcoming Imperial Conference, a pass law for the Africans, the so-called “Kaffir-
farming” question, European educational standards and the matter of a poll tax.  But 
most on the minds of the delegates was their uniform concern with securing greater 
representation on the Legco; and this is the issue that would persist in settler demands 
well into the next decade.363  
The settlers, now politically organized to a higher degree than ever before, began 
to think of themselves more as a “parliament,” of sorts, when they assembled for this 
first meeting of the C of A.364  At this gathering, many of the EAP’s officialdom were in 
attendance, as pressing issues such as the enforcement of the “native pass laws” and the 
nagging “Asiatic questions” were brought up for panel discussions.365  Delegations were 
sent to the governor about the attainment of elected representation, which the settlers 
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believed was “almost within a hand’s reach.”366  Girouard was sympathetic with the 
delegates, but expressed his opinion that the CO would most likely not do anything to 
make this happen anytime soon.   
However, by this time the CO realized that London was dealing with another 
“loose cannon” on the deck of the EAP.  Girouard was supposed to be their man in the 
protectorate, representing the interests of the crown.   But here he came to London, 
pressing the demands of the small but vocal group of settlers, who had now bonded 
together in a semi-parliamentary type of political organization.  Interestingly, as time 
advanced, the power of the Convention continued to grow.  Later governors would come 
to rely even more heavily on this representative body, whose ranks became filled with 
colonial officials and heads of various departments who would serve in an advisory 
capacity in hearing, discussing and putting forth “reasonable views” for both the EAP 
administration and the CO to dutifully consider. But to say that the Convention was 
truly reflective of the “official world” would not be accurate, for some of its most vaunted 
members were actually appointed by the crown to be there as representatives of the 
EAP’s vast African population.   
          Clearly, the C of A membership was very effective in generating propaganda to 
advocate for the cause of the settlers as well as rally against those officials who may have 
worked against their interests.  Ross referred to the C of A propaganda apparatus as the 
protectorate’s “Big Noise.”  Wrote Ross, “The Convention was in no way representative 
of the official world, nor of the vast African population for which some of the official 
members stood as representatives.  It shows to what an extent the mind even of a keen 
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observer, when new to the Colony, could be obsessed by the importance of one noisy 
political group.”367  Clearly then, the propaganda machine only went into gear when it 
operated in the interest of the small amount of white colonists in the EAP.  Heaven 
forbid that it should have anything positive to say advancing the interests of the Africans 
or Asians.  
  Without a doubt, Girouard was nothing like anyone in the CO had even vaguely 
imagined.  He was acting without authority, and doing more than any other 
administrator to represent the settlers’ interests over every other subject of the crown 
within the territory of the EAP.368  This way of favoring the European settlers 
deliberately awakened the Indian’s conscience and they finally expressed themselves. 
Indians in the EAP, deprived of representation in the Legco since 
September 1911, put forward demands for an Indian to be a member of the 
council. In early April 1912, moreover, the Mombasa Indian Association 
sent a petition to the governor protesting against the new non-native poll 
tax. The major basis for their protest was as there was no Indian member 
of the Legco, the measure was equivalent to taxation without 
representation. In forwarding the petition to London, acting governor 
Bowring maintained that the absence of an Indian member was ‘not 
because we refuse the principle of Indian representation but because no 
suitable member of the British Indian community is available.’369 
 
Such was the attitude of the CS vis a vis the question of Indian representation. 
Nevertheless, the Indians later organized themselves like the European settlers to better 
channel their grievances. They later went on to form the East African Indian National 
Congress (EAINC).370  As regard to the Africans, they had no political representation yet 
and they were subject to all kind of abuse under Girouard’s watch. 
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Death of an African and the case of a flagrant miscarriage of justice 
Just how far Girouard would go in advancing settler interests over not just those 
of Indians but those of the crown was more than aptly demonstrated in his handling of 
the so-called “Cole case,” an action that was construed as a severe violation of the 
human rights that should have been afforded all Africans in the protectorate. The 
incident that reflected poorly on the Girouard governorship was the 31 May 1911 trial of 
the white settler, Galbraith Cole, charged with murdering an African that he suspected 
of robbing some of his sheep, and further complicating the matter by not reporting it to 
the police.  Turning a blind eye to a crime as severe as the murder of an African in the 
protectorate was not going to pass unnoticed at the CO.  Nevertheless, the governor 
tried to minimize the impact of the crime just to protect Cole. 
While, the French Canadian engineer ruled the rails of the British East Africa 
Protectorate, a massive train wreck was in a making. Girouard played the role of 
supervisor and administrator of the EAP, and that led to his downfall.  The governor did 
not understand that the CO was his employer.  In the Cole case, Girouard went on too 
far in not wanting to be clear with the CO. Why didn’t Girouard play fair and accept his 
role?  He wanted to please the settlers no matter the price. It was for this reason that 
Girouard had earlier decided to cater to the big men from the colonists’ camp.  
Regarding the murder case, it was important to point out that the settler involved here 
had influence.  Galbraith Cole was not just an ordinary settler, at least in the sense of 
being cut from the traditional South African cloth of the vast majority of whites finding 
their way into the EAP.  He was the son of the Earl of Enniskillen and the brother-in-law 
of Lord Delamere, himself the wealthiest and most influential of the settlers and the 
anointed of the newly emergent C of A.  Reflective of his high status among the settler 
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class, Cole owned and supervised the operations of a large ranch estate near Lake 
Elementeita.371   
The court had convened in the heart of the white highlands, Nakuru district; and 
at the trial, which lasted but the space of a couple of hours during one afternoon, Cole 
brazenly admitted that he had shot a black man that he suspected of stealing some of his 
sheep.  And while the judge did admonish the jury of nine white men to confine 
themselves to the evidence at hand pertinent to the charge of murder, they nevertheless 
took but five minutes to reach a decision of acquittal for Cole.372  And while the jury’s 
decision sparked outrage throughout the whole of East Africa, it took Girouard one 
entire week before he even bothered to inform the CO by telegram of the incident. 
While Girouard did mention that it might be possible to appeal the verdict, he 
went on to state that he, upon receipt of legal counsel, would strongly advise against 
taking such an action.  It was better to just ignore the incident, hoping that the memory 
of it among the Africans and others incensed by it in East Africa would quickly fade.  
Girouard actually sided with the settlers in this case, letting the CO know, in his 
telegram, that “the crime is due to the prevalence of unrestrained stock theft.”373  In 
other words, the life of a black man in East Africa counted for less than that of a sheep.   
Girouard was already up the proverbial creek without a paddle, for the East 
Africa Department (EAD) had already garnered some details of the Cole case through 
pre-trial press reports of the preliminary inquiry, held five days before the actual trial 
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took place.  The head of the EAD, H. J. Read, was outraged by Girouard’s apparent low 
prioritization of this case. Read noted that, “It seems to me that murder is murder and 
that it is out of the question to let the matter slide in the easy manner he [Sir P. 
Girouard] appears to contemplate.”374   
Others in the CO were in agreement with Read. Sir George Fiddes, the assistant 
under-secretary of state, felt that “Girouard had a plain duty to appeal such a 
particularly atrocious case.” To correct this situation, Read wanted the CO to reply with 
a strong telegram to Girouard. And even the Secretary of State Lewis Harcourt jumped 
in, dashing off a telegram to Girouard on 12 June 1911 that made it more than clear that 
“a callous and unjustifiable murder” had transpired in the EAP and that a “gross 
miscarriage of justice”375 had been allowed to occur.   
And that is what happened.  The CO’s telegram urged Girouard to “appeal from 
the order for acquittal if you are advised that it is possible,”376 regardless of whether he 
felt that it would result in a more favorable decision for the crown.  Of course, the 
British Empire must always be seen as standing on the side of justice for all its subjects.   
Nevertheless, one week later Girouard, in replying to the telegram, stated that 
such an appeal was legally impossible.  For the remainder of the month and most of the 
next month, Girouard did not hear anything more from Harcourt or anyone else at the 
CO.  He was beginning to worry.  He knew that the case had stirred up a hornet’s nest at 
the CO and he was not hearing anything more.  He knew that the CO wanted some 
corrective action and that it was up to him to provide something.  If Girouard did not 
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throw the dog a bone pretty soon, he was going to get his legs gnawed off. That per se 
would not have been pleasant for Sir Percy Girouard. 
And so it was that at the end of June the governor sent an official dispatch and 
private letter to London providing further details about the case.  This dispatch also 
included a thorough copy of the Nakuru district court proceedings.  Unfortunately, 
Girouard could not help but including a reference to the crime as being “due to the 
prevalence of unchecked stock thefts.”377  Apparently, he learned nothing from the 
receipt of prior communiqués that this was considered by the CO as nothing but a lame 
excuse for the unjust murder perpetuated by Cole and sustained by the exclusively white 
settler jury.  Nevertheless, in his private letter of 25 June, Girouard did recommend to 
Secretary of State Harcourt that within the EAP there be a “suspension of trial by jury” 
and that the “deportation of Mr. Cole” be facilitated.  He also asked Harcourt for some 
guidance on this matter, insofar as he was “unsure of my exact rights and your possible 
orders in the case.”378 
The hornets were now abuzz in the EAD of the CO.  H. F. Batterbee was 
befuddled as to why the defense counsel “did not attempt to set up any defense and 
evidently relied upon the jury to acquit simply because he was a white man.”  And the 
permanent under-secretary Sir John Anderson stridently urged that Girouard’s second 
recommendation for the deportation of Cole be expeditiously carried out in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 25.1 of the 1902 East Africa Order-in-Council, insofar as 
Cole was “conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace, order and good 
government in East Africa.”  To make this happen, Anderson pointed out that all that 
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Governor Girouard needed to do was sign a single affidavit attesting to Cole’s despicable 
actions, thereby ordering his deportation.  The Secretary of State was in total agreement 
with Anderson and noted that it was “a very horrible case…. Cole must be deported.”379   
Therefore, on the very same day he received Anderson’s recommendation, 28 July 1911, 
Harcourt send the following telegram to Nairobi:  “On reading papers in the Cole case, 
have come to the conclusion that he must be departed under Section 25.1 of Order-in-
Council.  If you have any observations to make, telegraph them at once as I wish to 
direct deportation immediately.”380 
What was it about the word “immediately” that Girouard failed to understand?  It 
took him until the 10th of August, after many telegraphic promptings at that, to finally 
respond to Harcourt; and his response was totally unsatisfactory when it was received at 
the CO.  Harcourt and the others at the CO were in a state of shock.  Girouard had 
conducted an end-run around them, consulting various judges in the High Court and the 
Executive Council instead of immediately carrying out the deportation order.  As the 
judges informed him that an individual acquitted could not be deported, Girouard 
deemed it sufficient to close the case.  However, as the CO saw it, Girouard did not need 
to consult any judges on a case that might someday appear before them, as all they could 
do is offer up an opinion, and not a legal binding decision.  Girouard, they believed, was 
duty-bound to carry out their directive per Section 25.1 of the statute and deport Cole 
from the EAP forthwith.381   
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Concerning this failure to comply with orders on the part of Girouard, the CO had 
quickly responded, duly informing the governor that he had entirely misunderstood the 
reason for the deportation.  Concerning this matter, the CO observed that the only 
connection with the trial was that evidence there established that Cole “is conducting 
himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order whose continued presence in the 
protectorate may provide reprisals by natives.” The CO legal advisors held that no 
appeal could be made against a deportation order under section 25.1 of the 1902 order-
in-council.  Thus Girouard was ordered “to undertake the necessary steps to effect the 
deportation.”382 
 On 22 August, Girouard telegraphed the CO, still indicating his reluctance to 
carry out the deportation order unless law officers of the crown in London would make a 
determination that it was a legal action.  Harcourt, of course, was not at all happy with 
Girouard’s delaying tactics.  He sent a telegram back to the governor stating that he was 
not going to refer the matter to legal advisors in London and that Girouard should not 
further resist in issuing the deportation warrant.383   
 The governor, however, still remained obstinate.  On 5 September 1911, he 
telegraphed London with word that he had once again consulted his Executive Council 
and that he was going to issue the deportation order, but in protest, and only under 
orders from London.  He then sent a convoluted critique of the interpretation of Section 
25.1 as previously provided by the CO.384 
 Everyone at the CO was aghast at the nerve of Girourd in defying specific 
instructions.  Since when has the governor of a protectorate acted in such defiance?  
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Read noted that Girouard was clearly attempting to “divest himself of all responsibility 
in the matter;” and that was something that simply would not do.  Harcourt, for his part, 
consulted with legal counsel, and immediately issued a strong telegram urging the 
governor to comply with the provisions of the 1902 order exactly.  The Secretary of State 
also reiterated Read’s concerns about the governor divesting himself of the 
responsibility of carrying out instructions issued by his office and noted that, “I regret 
that throughout this case I have failed to receive from you the cooperation to which I 
consider myself entitled.”385 
 While Girouard eventually carried out the order, Harcourt could not help but 
lament the governor’s reluctance in following through with Cole’s deportation.  After the 
dust of the Cole case had settled, Harcourt personally rebuked Girouard:  “So far as 
lending me ready assistance, you continued to raise difficulties which appeared to me to 
be adequately covered by the instructions and opinions already sent to you.”386 Harcourt 
realized that the incompetence and unwillingness of the governor to obey his orders 
were clear proof that Girouard was not the right man to run the protectorate. He was an 
embarrassment for the CO because he blatantly favored the colonists at all cost.  In fact, 
the period of the Cole’s murder case turmoil that kept the CO officials on edge was not 
the only time Girouard would risk his career and reputation to protect the settlers. The 
Europeans settlers who always wanted cheap land and more living space for potential 
relatives, who might join them in settling permanently in the region, were directly the 
benefactors of Girouard’s decision to relocate the Maasai. The settlers’ political 
influence greatly influenced the governor’s daring policy formulation. Girouard went on 
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to deliberately move the Maasai dispossessing them of their land for the benefit of the 
colonists. This was déjà –vu all over again because the first Maasai move took place in 
1904 under Stewart administration.  
The second Maasai move:  Stirring up a hornet’s nest 
The second Maasai move was a clear example of the governor’s deliberate and 
unfair policy formulation in favor of European settlers, as in the Cole case. If Girouard 
had looked at the history of the first Maasai move, he would not have engaged in 
negotiations and new tactics to again displace the pastoralists. Creating a new reserve 
was synonymous to a clear violation of the Maasai’s rights, a disruption of their long 
traditions and way of life.  You can call this the second Maasai predicament. 
Commissioner Stewart, who witnessed and slightly participated in the negotiations that 
sanctioned the first displacement of the Maasai, warned about the danger of having the 
settlers in the region demanding more land.   
The initiative of moving the Maasai in 1904 was problematic. The issue dragged 
over from Eliot’s administration to Stewart’s brief tenure. Stewart then made a 
prophetic prediction and, as narrated by Ross, stated the following: “After Masai stock 
had grazed and improved the rough land on Laikipia, to which they were going, settlers 
would be certain to cast envious eyes upon it as they had already done on the Rift Valley, 
and he had therefore inserted a phrase in the Agreement of August 1904 that would 
obviate further trouble.  It was the ‘settlement now arrived at shall be enduring so long 
the Masai as a race shall exist, and that Europeans or other settlers shall not be allowed 
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to take up land in the Settlements.’”387 The agreement fell into oblivion, and for a second 
time in less than seven years the pastoralists were being forced to move again.  It was 
clear that moving the pastoralists was going to directly benefit the European settlers. 
One might speculate that Girouard’s falling out with the CO on this issue had less 
to do with his moving of the Maasai out of the area than with his promise of their 
vacated land on the Laikipia plateau to the white settlers.  Girouard, on 7 October 1911, 
in replying to a telegram sent to him by Harcourt on 5 October 1911, assured the 
Secretary of State that no land rights of former Maasai lands had been given or 
promised.  This was good enough for Harcourt, who then advised the House of 
Commons in mid-April 1912 that, “no alloctions of land occupied by the Northern Masai 
had yet been made.”388 
But much to the dismay of the Secretary of State, it appears that such promises 
were made.  According to the Provincial Commissioner C. R. W. Lane, farms had been 
promised to settlers as early as April 1910, to be carved out of Maasai lands at Laikipia.  
But this was not actually confirmed to Harcourt by Girouard until he was on home leave 
to London in May 1912.  The governor was at a complete loss in reconciling his denials 
of 7 October 1911 with what he was relating to Harcourt in this 8 May 1912 interview.389   
As in the Cole case, Girouard was not being truthful with the CO.  The Maasai 
eventually contracted European attorneys to help them file suit for the return of their 
appropriated lands; but the Secretary of State down to the lowest functionary of the 
EAD at the CO was thoroughly embarrassed by the affair.   
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After Girouard’s forced resignation from the colonial service in July 1912, his 
successor as governor, Sir Henry Belfield, would of necessity be required to spend about 
a third of his time refusing to recognize promises previously made to the settlers during 
the prior administration.  One CO official, six years after the tenure of Girouard, noted 
that “there is nothing in his [Girouard’s] record in East Africa to show that his efforts 
would be directed to the permanent welfare of the country rather than to the expediency 
of the moment and his own popularity.”390  Girouard was captured by the colonists’ 
political machine and as long that he was going to favor them by economically 
suffocating the Africans and Indians, more struggle for a clear plan of economic was in 
the horizon.  
The CO, however, did realize that some of the promises made to the settlers 
would have to be kept, even if at least partially, to preserve the integrity of the crown.  
Harcourt later conceded that this would apply only to any contacts entered into by 
Girouard on the part of the EAP with the settlers during the year of 1910.391  Girouard’s 
eastern express locomotive that was carrying the most extreme and boldest European 
political animals in the EAP finally crashed. His administration was a disaster worse 
than Eliot’s chaotic tenure as commissioner of the most troublesome British possession 
in Africa. 
The demise of the European settlers’ ally:  A  fait accompli 
Girouard was highly regarded by the CO, which expected him to hit the ground 
running.  With his appointment, the CO wanted to foster peace and development 
throughout the protectorate.  The main concern of the CO was to make sure that 
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Africans were not left behind, all the while generating profits for the British Empire. In 
the EAP, Girouard hit the ground hard and crashed.  And so it was that Girouard’s star 
fell from the heavens like a blazing comet.  His poor handling of both the Maasai move 
and the Cole case demonstrated his unparalleled ability to treat the CO personnel like 
mushrooms, always keeping them in the dark and feeding them manure.  Both issues 
raised concerns about the validity of British justice in the EAP.  Furthermore, all of 
Girouard’s policies were sympathetic to the settlers and gained nothing for the empire 
or its interests in the area.     
Confident that they had Girouard on their side, the settlers through their C of A 
went on to demand elective representation in the Legco in November of 1911. To that 
demand, Girouard gave an astonishing answer.  He explicitly wrote the following:  “A 
petition was presented to me for transmission to the Secretary of State praying for the 
application of the elective principle for the unofficial members of the Legco. This was 
duly forwarded, but I could not see my way to recommend the proposal at present.”392  
The governor, for the first time in his mandate, rebuked the colonists’ demand for 
elective representation.  Perhaps Girouard by now realized that he did not gain anything 
from his liaisons with the colonists.  He appeared like a sad fool because he painted 
himself into a corner and had to wait until the paint dried before he could get out of the 
room.  The response of Girouard clearly contradicted the remarks he made in his first 
report about the political state of the protectorate.  When he took over the governorship 
of this trouble-ridden British dependency, he criticized some of the officials in the 
Legco, finding them weak and passive.  He then wanted to see more unofficial members 
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from the colonists’ camp to have seats and participate in the political debate of the 
Legco.393  
Girouard now flip-flopped, making a 360-degree about face.  Paying attention to 
the last line he wrote concerning the petition:   “I could not see my way to recommend 
the proposal at present,” one could easily surmise that he was just waiting for the 
political cloud covering the troublesome protectorate to clear.   For by attesting that 
there was nothing he could do at that present time, he left the political door open for the 
settlers. What he wrote meant that if not now, maybe or surely later, the colonists’ 
petition will be able to resurface.  Knowing the nature and character of the settlers, 
coupled with their traditional season for trouble from February to April, it would be just 
a matter of time before the CO would be hearing from them again, knocking on their 
door with the same tired plea.  The colonists’ persistence in pushing their agenda was 
pointed out by Dilley, who remarked that:   
From the first Europeans have looked forward to the time when they would have full 
self-government, or responsible government, for themselves. Always, even while urging a 
particular change, such as appointed unofficial on a legislative council in 1905 or elected 
representatives in 1913, they have insisted that they were asking for a moderate change 
in no way endangering the control of the Colonial Office over the population of the 
Colony. However, they have always had the ultimate goal in view. As soon as one gain 
has been made, sometimes before it has been completed, demands have begun for 
additional reforms. While they were waiting for elective representation, responsible 
opinion was demanding changes in Colonial Office practice granting more power to the 
Legislative Council, including the elected representatives. Lord Delamere, when the 
terms of the legislation were being discussed, in his first election manifesto said: ‘The 
chief duty of your representative is, I am sure, to help forward any policy which by 
increasing the population and wealth of the country brings nearer self-government.’394   
 
The settlers’ strong belief in the possibilities of running the protectorate by themselves 
in the near future emboldened them to act like “pure political animals”, on and off the 
EAP’s political stage. They wanted the protectorate to be left to them.  
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 Such an agenda was pushed in a variety of ways during Girouard’s term. To the 
settlers, success meant creating a white man’s country; and the likes of Grogan and 
Delamere carried themselves as if they had already established it.  Grogan’s flogging of 
Africans and the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole were clear indications of the 
violations of Africans rights. These cases are definitive examples of how most of the 
colonists behaved in the EAP.  The colonists thought that they were above the law and 
believed that they could act with impunity, meaning that no punishment whatsoever 
could be levied against them, no matter how grave the crime they committed.  These two 
cases, although they occurred during two different administrations, with the former 
during Sadler’s tenure and the latter under Girouard’s watch, brought the debate of the 
true meaning of crime and the application of punishment in the EAP.  Could the 
European settlers get away with crime without enduring the reaction of the CO officials 
or the humanitarians in England?  Nevertheless, in the EAP when justice was served to 
the colonists, it never matched the gravity of the crime.  Impunity in the early political 
days of the protectorate left a blue-print in the history of crime and punishment in 
Kenya.  More than a century after settlers’ violations of Africans’ rights, the president of 
Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, found himself before the international criminal tribunal having 
to respond to allegations of masterminding human rights violations and murder against 
ordinary Africans who simply stood for their rights.  
In the case of governor Girouard, who himself believed that unfair political 
formulation benefiting the settlers was going to remain without consequences, it was 
this kind of attitude that led to his downfall. Violations of Africans or Indians’ rights, 
whether physical or discriminatory in the EAP, could not continue to be the news that 
the CO was receiving from the protectorate because anything leading to a political 
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embarrassment was not desired at Whitehall.  Political embarrassment was a sour pill to 
swallow because it could derail the political career of any official serving the British 
Empire in the EAP.  
Girouard, an appointed official of the British Empire, embarked on a fruitless 
quest to crown himself the “king of the settlers,” without even taking into account that 
their acclamations were kept for the likes of Delamere and Grogan.  Girouard, now 
considered a pariah in the colonial service, hobbled on until he finally saw the light and 
resigned in July 1912.  Everyone in the CO, and especially the EAD, let loose with a huge 
sigh of relief.  
Conclusion 
Governor Girouard had done his best to safeguard the interests of the European 
settlers throughout his tenure in the protectorate. The colonists grew stronger politically 
and were pleased with the fact that the governor was their man. By the time that 
Girouard resigned, three years after he took over, there was no doubt that the EAP was 
not being administrated along the lines of British West Africa.  The man that the CO 
regarded as the right choice to bring peace and steady economic development in this 
troublesome dependency did not fully count upon the contributions of the East African 
people in the fulfillment of his mission. In the EAP, pro-European settlers policies 
replaced pro-African policies such as were implemented in West Africa.  In the EAP, the 
presence of the European settlers changed the sociopolitical dynamic of the region due 
the fact that it led to the economic disenfranchisement of the Africans, as well as the 
Indians who also considered the region as their new home. Their demands to be 
provided with cheap land, a plentiful labor supply and more political power shifted the 
 237 
balance of the priorities of the governor. His policy formulation directly benefited the 
colonists. Ross elaborates on the “star power” Girouard exercised among the colonists: 
 
With the European community Girouard was able to claim a considerable 
measure of success.  Apart from his championing of settler interests over the 
Masai move there had been a decline in the settler spirit of factious opposition to 
Government, and greater co-operation between Government departments and 
the European population had been achieved. The reason for this was not hard to 
see. The settlers had found themselves being led by a Governor who appreciated 
many of their difficulties, and who was prepared to take active steps to improve 
their lot.395  
 
Nevertheless siding with the influential settlers to the point of depriving the 
Africans and other groups present in the protectorate of their basic human rights was 
not something desired by the CO. The office took action in removing undesirable settlers 
like Cole from the protectorate and sacked Girouard; but the problems of the 
protectorate were far from over. What kept the European settlers relatively quiet during 
Girouard’s tenure was the fact that Girouard himself made numerous promises to them.  
Of course, to the colonists these promises were regarded as a contract that the 
successive administration would be obligated to follow through with.  Girouard’s tenure 
put the CO in a bind.  The passage of years would not diminish the CO’s low estimation 
of Girouard and his tendency to promise what he knew that neither he nor the empire 
would be able to satisfy. A private Secretary at the EAD, W.C. Bottomley, later expressed 
the fallouts from Girouard’s administration stating that: 
The mark he left on the protectorate at the end of the administration in 1912 was 
rather one of promise than of performance. His promises in fact were the chief 
difficulty in the way of his successor and Sir Henry Belfield was continually in a 
position of having to refuse to recognize alleged promises made to settlers by Sir 
Percy Girouard…. There is nothing in his [Girouard’s] record in East Africa to 
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show that his efforts would be directed to the permanent welfare of the country 
rather than the expediency of the moment and his own popularity.396     
 
It was clear to everyone in London and the protectorate itself that the policies, which 
Girouard put in place, were going to cripple the following administration; and that 
meant that the struggle to contain the settlers was not at all finished.   
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The various administrations imposed on the EAP between the period of 1902 and 
1912 manifested as a continual struggle between the European colonists’ explicit desires 
for cheap or free labor and land, as well as immediate and disproportionate political 
representation against the CO’s desire for a caretaking and intermediate regime that 
would ultimately, in the fullness of time, transfer power to the Africans and others of 
His Majesty’s subjects in the region.  The CO wanted to see the EAP converted into a 
self-sustaining and democratically administered Crown Colony, with equal 
representation for all, much on the same footing as Australia, Canada or New Zealand.  
Dilley noted that: “This desire to establish a British colony in East Africa had certain 
Imperial aspects. A white colony loyal to the British Empire would be the most effective 
way of holding the country. It would assist in the support of the Uganda Railway. There 
was a certain element of Imperial pride in the establishment of a British colony on the 
equator, and it was important link in the north-and-south route in Africa. But there was 
little active encouragement of colonization, as such, by the British authorities; their part 
came in supporting those colonists who had gone out on their own initiative to settle 
and develop a new country.”397 The European settlers who came to the EAP engaged in 
politics of imperialism. 
The politics of imperialism was a hotly debated subject in the Great Britain of the 
early twentieth century.  Both civil and political freedoms were viewed as mutually 
dependent.  But for the majority of His Majesty’s subjects, scattered across a global 
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empire, these freedoms were virtually nonexistent.  Perhaps it can be said that some 
degree of representative government existed in Australia, Canada and New Zealand; but 
even in these areas considerable population blocs seemed to be disenfranchised from 
the body politic, i.e. Aboriginals in Australia, Quebecois in Canada and Maori in New 
Zealand, to name a few.  Let us not forget the exploited non-Northern European 
immigrant labor force in all of these countries.  The failure of even these larger British 
colonies with majority white populations to incorporate these groups did not bode well 
for any claims of the emergence of any genuine democracy in these places.  In those 
areas under British rule where the whites were vastly outnumbered, the idea that any 
sort of democratic system was in place was purely laughable.  For example, with regard 
to South Africa, the point of origin for most of the white settlers in the EAP, one political 
scientist of the day astutely noted that, “In Cape Colony and Natal events testify how 
feebly the forms and even the spirit of the free British institutions have taken root in 
States where the great majority of the population were always excluded from political 
rights.  The franchise and the rights it carries remain virtually a white monopoly in so-
called self-governing colonies, where the coloured population was, in 1903, to the white 
as four-to-one and ten-to-one, respectively.”398 
In some of the older Crown colonies extant in 1905, there did exist, at least, some 
representative element in government. Of course, the administration was totally vested 
in a Crown-appointed governor, who in turn was assisted by a council of his own 
choosing.  Nevertheless, the colonists were afforded the right to elect a portion of the 
legislative assembly.  This system was in place in many of the British Caribbean islands, 
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in addition to the further reaches of Malta, Mauritius and Ceylon.  But even in these 
areas, the representative element never out-numbered the non-elected element.  In 
other words, these colonies’ respective legislative assemblies exercised more of an 
advisory role rather than an authentic legislative function.  Hobson elaborated on the 
political implications of this situation:  “Not merely is the elected always dominated in 
numbers by the non-elected element, but in all cases the veto of the Colonial Office is 
freely exercised upon measures passed by the assemblies.  To this it should be added 
that in nearly all cases a fairly high property qualification is attached to the franchise, 
precluding the coloured people from exercising an elective power proportionate to their 
numbers and their stake in the country.”399 In the EAP, this system of representation 
was advocated by the CO. 
Now it has been demonstrated that the CA comprised no more than 300 
members at any time.  Most of these members arrived in the EAP from South Africa 
with big dreams of striking it rich, and in the process converting the protectorate into 
one of the more prosperous of the Crown colonies; a true “white man’s country.”  In lieu 
of their small numbers and outrageous demands, and in consideration of the slow 
democratization taking place in other areas with large colored contingents throughout 
the Empire, it appears that the association members held an exaggerated view of their 
own importance in the larger scheme.  By acting against the Rudyard Kipling-inspired 
“White Man’s Burden”400 of extending all manner of education and service to lift the 
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quality of the colored races and bring them to the light and knowledge of Anglo-Saxon 
civilization, they were also going against the wishes of the CO.  The colonists were out of 
step with the prevailing attitudes of their day; and as a consequence, their days in the 
EAP were already numbered.  Nevertheless, these European settlers that Churchill 
described as “political animals” would not accept the reality on the terrain.  They 
decided to put up a fight and stand for their rights, in that instance, they engaged in 
frequent political agitations which impacted the socio-economic stability of the 
protectorate. The colonists’ political aggressiveness was not hard to detect due to the 
fact that they had an incommensurable influence upon the imperial government and the 
local administration.  The newcomers’ political strategy led to a clear racial division 
within the protectorate and that caused a problem that the CO did not want to see 
happening in the region. 
The various racial divisions within the protectorate worked against the long-term 
goals of the CO and the empire in general. This was expressly noted in the highly vocal 
European settler camp, many of whose members hailed from nearby South Africa.  
Despite their meager numbers, the white settlers continually pushed the envelope, 
generating incessant demands for concessions from London that would work in 
transforming the protectorate into a so-called “white man’s county.”  For that reason, 
the ten year period from 1902 to 1912 might best be categorized in what Berman and 
Lonsdale referred to as the emergence of “storm-tossed relationships of power” that 
                                                                                                                                                             
expansion, but to many other people, the poem was a lame justification for land grabbing, abuse of power, 
greed, vanity, racism and elitism. 
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only served to inhibit the social construction of a viable CS in line with the overall 
objectives of the British Empire for the region.401  
 This was the main contradiction that needed resolution before the protectorate 
could begin to advance to the status of a full-fledged colony.  The plight of the Kikuyu 
peoples is most demonstrative in this area, being highly representative of the complex 
issues dealing with racial tension generated in both the African and European settler 
communities.  The Kikuyu, like most African peoples in the protectorate, came to be 
viewed in terms of a “tribe” or as children who needed assistance from the civilized 
colonists of the Empire.  This negated, in turn, any further investigation into the interior 
structures inherent in their society, as well as any rights they may have within it to claim 
a nation state for themselves based on any true sense of Kikuyu nationalism.  In other 
words, their tribal status relegated them to the paternalistic whims of the CS.402   The 
early political history of the protectorate was marked by the case of a majority of people, 
referring in this instance to the Africans and the Indians, who had no political power.  
One can call it representation without political power.  These two groups were left 
behind only to pay taxes to their new masters representing the British Empire. 
The political isolation of the Africans and Indians was a total contradiction to the 
way that the European colonists organized themselves.  They formed their political 
parties and many of them thought of themselves as political leaders apt to run their own 
party. Winston Churchill noticed the acrimonious political atmosphere that prevailed in 
the EAP during his 1907 visit.  The colonists’ political aggressiveness was not hard to 
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detect due to the fact that their tactics had an incommensurable influence upon the 
imperial government and the local administration.  They were good agitators.  The 
colonists were able to guide their opinion everywhere and with anybody as long as their 
demands were going to be secured.   
The introduction of the Europeans settlers in the protectorate raised many issues 
of great political significance that the early successive administrations had to deal with 
under the supervision of Whitehall.  The commissioners and later governors sent to the 
protectorate had to wrestle with complex issues ranging from the adequate definition of 
land tenure, rent, exclusive rights to the white highlands, labor provision, taxation and 
the expatriates’ perplexing political demands for representation in the Legco.  Mungeam 
noted that: “The biggest test for Government officials in the realm of local organization 
came with the entry of the European settlers. These newcomers, encouraged in so casual 
a way by Eliot in 1903, soon threatened to dominate the scene, and increasingly 
occupied the attention of the officials.”403  From Eliot’s administration stretching to 
Girouard’s governorship, the newcomers increasingly gained influence and forged a 
fortification to defend their interests.  They argued and fought to assert that their 
presence in the protectorate was legitimate and most of the big men “could argue with 
some justification that they had entered the country at the invitation of the government, 
and it was the government’s responsibility to assist them, at least to the extent of 
ensuring that they had adequately demarcated land and a sufficient supply of 
labor.”404  The most politically active and influential settlers had the support of Eliot. 
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Powerful men like Delamere, Grogan and other settlers took the lead and started their 
own political journey to defend the colonists’ interests.   
The settlers formed their political associations and started to voice their 
demands.  At first, these were divided by personality and type of farming, amongst other 
things. They wanted large concessions of land with limited government interference, no 
taxation without representation and application of British law for them only.  Far away 
in London, the authorities recommended to Eliot that he exercise caution in not 
frustrating the Africans and Indians already living in the region.  Nevertheless, Eliot 
formulated land policies suitable for the settlers who were acquiring cheap properties 
without enforcing the terms of the 1902 land ordinance as wished by the FO.  The highly 
regarded commissioner resigned mainly because he was promising land to his favorite 
settlers without London’s approval.  The FO found a quick replacement and Stewart 
took over the administration of the protectorate in 1904.  
 It is significant to note that the replacement of Eliot by Stewart was an important 
step taken by the FO. One could interpret Eliot’s departure as an anticipated resignation 
because he lost the trust originally vested in him by the FO. Additionally to consider, 
there was the intervention from the FO not to let the issues related to the proper 
distribution of land fester. The action taken by the FO about Eliot’s insufficient handling 
of the issue of land was clear. Regulation and moderation were needed. The well-
educated commissioner was technically sacked; but no matter from which angle one 
looks at the commissioner’s actions, it was time for the FO and Eliot to part ways. The 
FO chose to send Stewart in order to serve mainly as a “safety valve.” He was instructed 
not to repeat Eliot’s bold policy formulations solely benefiting the European settlers. 
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During Stewart’s tenure, the European settlers pressed for CO control; they 
desired a Legco and Crown Colony status.  Stewart appointed a land committee to sort 
out the issue, but influential settlers made their first move and stood in charge of the 
committee.  A pro-settler team led the investigation and presented a one-sided report.  
The CO was not impressed by the work of the pro-settler land committee and so the 
issue of an adequate land survey, and land policy, dragged on.  Stewart appeared weak; 
and neither the CO officials nor the settlers were happy with his bureaucratic 
nonchalance.  The bold European settlers also were politically concerned with their role 
in the protectorate and went on to present their demands to the CO in 1905.  Their hope 
was to begin the process that would lead them to a self-governing country and that 
meant obtaining some form of representation on a council.  Before Stewart received any 
response from London to communicate to the settlers, he passed away. 
 Stewart did not finish his term; but there were clear indications that he was on a 
collision course with the white settler’s political machine. His decision of appointing a 
pro-settler land committee indicated that he was letting the settlers test the political 
waters of the protectorate and that marked the beginning of the settlers’ direct 
participation and interference in the EAP’s political matters. It was an important 
political debut for the European settlers and for the political history of the region. The 
commissioner sent some hungry land grabbers to survey the region; and this was an 
obvious farce. Stewart sent the fox straight into the hen house.  Nevertheless, the land 
committee team was delighted to carry out the task of surveying land and delivered a 
report full of pro-settler recommended concessions. The response of the CO regarding 
the issues of land and the Europeans settlers’ first formal political demands fell in 
Sadler’s hands.  He governed the region from 1906 to 1909.  
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Under Sadler, the settlers learned that the CO found their petition for some form 
of representation on a council reasonable; and they celebrated the news because that 
gave them the right to participate in the internal politics of the region.  Not content with 
just having a seat in the Legco, the expatriates again voiced their motto of “no taxation 
without representation.”  In the EAP, the questions of labor supply and taxation became 
crucial issues because the settlers wanted to be exempt from tax burdens while 
possessing the best land and obtaining cheap labor.  Land, labor and taxation were 
correlated.   
In East Africa, next to owning land, labor is the most important commodity.  
Without it, land remains unproductive.  But because of the climatic conditions 
prevailing in the region, it was generally agreed that white men could not long endure 
the manual labor required to work the land properly.  Consequently, the African worker 
was of paramount importance in the development of the settled areas; and the history of 
white settlement was closely connected with the struggle for an adequate labor supply. 
Many difficulties between government and settler sprang up over African labor.  And 
most of the general anxiety which prevailed in the colony was caused by concern over 
this supply.405 The adequate provision of labor was meant to satisfy the settlers’ need to 
develop their properties.  The expatriates refused to work under the hot African sun, 
preferring to sit under the shade of the verandas built onto the sides of their houses 
constructed by imported Indian workers.  The Africans developed the land; but this 
white propertied class reaped all the economic benefits.  The European settlers also 
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pressed for some relaxed labor rules where Africans should be obedient and forced to 
work. There was no room for Africans to disobey, complain or quit their jobs.  
This was graphically demonstrated in 1907 when reports of the flogging of some 
Africans at the hand of Grogan emerged. This grave incident was left unpunished 
because the punishment did not reflect the gravity of the crime. Grogan’s flogging of 
Africans brought on the table the debate of the need to protect the Africans’ rights, much 
as it was intended with the opening of the protectorate. But here the argument was that 
without the presence of the settlers, one could not argue about the necessity of 
protecting the very basic human rights of the Africans who only wanted to live in peace 
in their land. When many Africans lost their lands, some of them had no other option 
but to work for the newcomers.  
The Africans who were flogged by Grogan worked for him. They were at the 
mercy of their flamboyant master who acted like a plantation owner inflicting pain on 
his enslaved workers without remorse and thinking that nothing was wrong about 
correcting workers or servants from the so called “lower races.”  Grogan acted like an 
outlaw in the wild EAP by hijacking the law and acting with impunity.  Other settlers 
who also wanted to raise hell for the governor went on to challenge him with the issue of 
adequate labor supply. Delamere was the ring leader opposing Sadler, whom the 
majority of settlers apparently thought was not sympathetic to their grievances. 
 In 1908, when Sadler decided to redefine the labor supply rules so that it would 
be fair, the European settlers erupted and demonstrated in front of the governor’s house 
and asked him to resign. The settlers wanted to block any new rules that would render 
difficult the provision of labor. For the expatriates, no rule was the best rule. New land 
or labor rules were not desired by the settlers.  A laissez-faire policy for the exploitation 
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of the region meant potential rapid economic development for the big land owners who 
were very aggressive and most of the time irrationally violent. 
  Sadler’s governorship marked the era of violence, crime and political 
disturbances perpetuated by the settlers without consequences. The CO realized that 
Sadler was having many difficulties running the protectorate and transferred him. The 
reality was that the settlers wanted a “man on the spot,” much as Eliot was, whom they 
considered their most respected servant. The CO decision to transfer Sadler to the 
Windward Islands meant that this body was still in political control.  Nevertheless, once 
again, London did not act fast enough in removing him.  Indications here were that 
Whitehall tended to let the problems affecting the administration of the protectorate 
brew to a boiling point before intervening.  Sadler was too easily manipulated by the 
white settlers and proved to be a weak governor.  It was time for the CO to make a 
change. Governor Girouard took over after Sadler and was welcomed by the colonists.   
Girouard arrived in 1909 with instructions to bring order and efficiency to the 
running of the EAP administration. The CO expected him to get things moving and deal 
firmly with the European settlers. The issue of the implementation of the land 
legislation and the need to make the protectorate profitable were crucial for the CO.  
Girouard arrived and immediately began promoting settlers’ interests. He showed 
favoritism for the settlers as he wanted more European input on the Legco, as well as 
their active participation in running the protectorate.  As was the case with Eliot, 
Girouard also fell under Delamere’s influence.  For their part, the colonists combined 
their various political parties and formed the C of A in 1910 so as to be politically more 
relevant, vocal and aggressive.  
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With the backing of Girouard they demanded elective representation in the 
Legco. With Girouard, the second Maasai move also took place, albeit without the 
consent or knowledge of London authorities. Naturally, this would come back to haunt 
him and push him out of office. In addition, in 1911 Galbraith Cole, the brother-in-law of 
Lord Delamere, shot and killed one African whom he merely suspected of stealing one of 
his sheep.  A jury of white men fully acquitted Cole, but much to the consternation of 
London authorities, who decried that Girouard let Cole get off so easily without even an 
enforceable deportation order, let alone having him serve even one day of any jail time. 
There was no justice for the family of the victim. When compared to Commissioner 
Eliot, one realizes that Girouard assisted the settlers more in their quest for political 
control.  
As Eliot did, Girouard also resigned; and the reason of his departure was very 
similar to Eliot’s case. Catering to the European settlers was a recipe for disaster. And 
once again, the CO was not fast enough in removing him. Problems continued to mount 
with the way he was running the protectorate. The expatriates were pleased with 
Girouard and felt like they lost their man, and almost for the same reasons Eliot was 
sacked. Still, the CO was in control of the EAP.  
The study of the early political history of the protectorate showed that the 
stability needed to properly run the region was never achieved.  Instead, a pattern was 
set where a strong man leading a strong political party would always try to dominate the 
political scene and break the law with utter impunity and without any meaningful 
consequences being levied against them.  Girouard’s administration thus left behind the 
Africans and the Indians.  His favoritism to the colonists was so apparent that Indian 
protests now emerged and were directed against settler dominance.  A balancing 
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political force was needed to counter the settlers’ interference in the internal issues 
related to the administration of the region. The European settlers were busy. Their 
political coalition under the umbrella of the C of A was a political maneuver that sought 
to dominate the political scene of the protectorate.  
The European settlers were well-organized and politically active. The Europeans 
expatriates were flexible enough to form a coalition of associations to come under one 
political umbrella.  This was a smooth political move because the unification of all the 
parties provided them with a solid pedestal where they could have their voice heard loud 
by the CO and any man on the spot trying to effectively run the protectorate.  With a 
strong political base, the settlers could pile up demands after demands working on the 
edification of their dream land.  The settlers were the political progenitor of the notion 
of one strong political party under one vocal and strong leader dominating the political 
stage.  This created a context where a vocal big man had to rise and dominated the 
political scene.   
In their intent of dominating the region, the expatriates did not hesitate to 
harshly criticize or threaten the serving officials, the commissioner or the governor.  
They went on to even use violence against the local population.  These illegitimate and 
unjustified tactics from the settlers’ camp brought a new dilemma worthy of 
consideration.  White supremacy and the desire to achieve a white man’s country meant 
depriving the Africans and the Indians of rights and fostered a culture of impunity and 
this conflicted with the ideals of the modern British Empire and British practice.  That 
belief and attitude meant that they were entitled to enjoy their rights as Englishmen at 
home, but no other group in Kenya could do so.  For instance, Grogan’s flogging of 
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Africans and the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole were clear indications of the 
violations of Africans rights. 
These cases are definitive examples of how most of the colonists behaved in the 
EAP.  The colonists thought that they were above the law and believed that they could 
act with impunity, meaning that no punishment whatsoever could be levied against 
them, no matter how grave the crime they committed.  These two cases, although they 
occurred during two different administrations, with the former during Sadler’s tenure 
and the latter under Girouard’s watch, brought the debate of the true meaning of crime 
and the application of punishment in the EAP.  Could the European settlers get away 
with crime without enduring the reaction of the CO officials or the humanitarians in 
England?  Nevertheless, in the EAP when justice was served to the colonists, it never 
matched the gravity of the crime.  Impunity in the early political days of the protectorate 
left a blue print in the history of crime and punishment in Kenya.  More than a century 
after settlers’ violations of Africans’ rights, the actual president of Kenya, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, found himself before the International Criminal Court (ICC), having to 
respond to allegations of masterminding human rights violations and murder against 
ordinary Africans who simply stood for their rights.  
Following the Kenyan national election in 2007, discontent manifested as 
political street agitation, allegedly orchestrated by the Kenyatta faction.  This resulted in 
some violence, extending into 2008, whereby some ordinary citizens lost their lives, 
being caught up in urban crossfire.  Kenyatta fell under suspicion for both instigating 
the political disturbances and the unfortunate deaths of the innocent bystanders.   Of 
course, while the Kenyan authorities no longer needed to answer to a distant colonial 
office in far-away London, they still found themselves required to address these issues 
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before the ICC.  At the beginning of the 20th century, the officials in the protectorate 
maintained communications with the Colonial Office in London via telegraphic cable 
and dispatches.  It would literally take weeks, however, for the general public to get 
word of incidents and allegations insofar as the flow of pertinent data regarding cases of 
violence were being classified, compartmentalized and pigeon holed  in the overall 
bureaucratic imperial structure.  But now, more than 100 years later, with an 
independent Kenya in the age of satellite transmissions and digital communications, 
time is no longer is a factor favoring the powers-that-be.  Rather, important news 
reaches the attention of the public at the speed of light.   
Despite the technological marvels of the age, where evidence of human rights 
violations comes to the instantaneous attention of the United Nations and the entire 
world, the legacy of impunity, established in the colonial regimes of the protectorate era, 
yet persist in contemporary Kenya.  While the world received a continuous flow of 
detrimental information concerning the allegations against Kenyatta, the investigation 
purposely dragged on back in Kenya, allowing Kenyatta to win the presidency in the 
2013 national election.  The charges-while serious and substantial-were finally dropped 
by the ICC in December 2014.  And this hearkens back to the Cole murder case that took 
place under the nose of the Girouard regime, whereby the CO continually demanded the 
truth but received nothing but obfuscated correspondence, thus stalling the matter to 
oblivion.   
The authorities in Kenya were successful in defending themselves against charges 
of political conspiracy in any violations of human rights that may have occurred in 
Kenya.  Six years after the end of the period of political violence in question, it seemed 
as if there was still no explanation or justice for the families of the victims.  The 
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dropping of the ICC charges against Kenyatta naturally brought on a political reaction in 
Kenya, strengthening Kenyatta’s grip on power.  He has emerged as the “strong man” in 
Kenya, and even throughout the East Africa region.  Looking deeply at Kenya’s present 
political system and its leaders, one has the impression that by tradition the name 
Kenyatta is deeply rooted in the political history of Kenya and in the heart of many 
Kenyans.  The actual present Kenyatta family member has fervent supporters in the 
country.  For instance, the UN Ambassador from Kenya, Macharia Kamau, in defending 
his country, stated that, “There is nothing in the history of our country, nothing in the 
manner in which we have cooperated with the prosecutor of the ICC in general, that 
should ever be construed as a lack of cooperation without clear determinable evidence 
being provided.”406     
In contrast to the official view, leaders of the opposition saw the entire affair as a 
“cover-up” of huge proportions.  Nicholas Gumbo, the Rarieda MP from Siaya County, 
asserted that the withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta at the ICC can be attributed to 
the lack of government cooperation with that august body, and, of course, this is nothing 
new in the history of Kenya.  Said Gumbo, “It is not only about post- election violence, 
we have historical injustices that have not been addressed to date.  Honestly, before we 
come out and address those, then we are still postponing our problems.”  The MP added 
that, “If the court found the president not guilty, then it was crucial to ensure the people 
responsible for the 2007-2008 post-election violence are brought to book.  If the court 
has found him not guilty, the question is who was responsible for the violence and 
crimes against humanity?  You cannot depart with the past.  We must sort out the 
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injustices because we live in a country where some communities live as squatters in 
their own country and it is time this is stopped.”407  
Nevertheless, in the Nandi community in the North Rift Region of Kenya, the 
news of Kenyatta’s clearing by the ICC against the alleged charges was received with 
great enthusiasm and excitement. The pro-Kenyatta faction led by Nandi Senator 
Stephen Sang and Major John Seii went on to even express high confidence that other 
cases against a couple Kenyans will eventually be withdrawn by the ICC.  Sang and Seii 
were jubilant.  Reports from the Standard emerged and stated that: 
Nandi Senator Mr. Stephen Sang and Major John Seii, the Emeritus chairman of 
Kalenjin council of elders said that they were excited and happy with the 
dropping of charges against President Uhuru. ‘I am very excited that the court 
has reconciled itself with reality that Kenyan cases were not properly investigated 
and not credible. The remaining cases will crumble down too,’ said Sang. 
The Senator said the ICC cases ‘started crumbling from the start after former 
Minister Henry Kosgey and former Police commissioner Hussein Ali’s cases 
failed to be confirmed and later the dropping of the case against Francis 
Muthaura’. 
‘The president is now a free person, citizen and can freely run the country. The 
other remaining cases are just like two sides of a single coin and will equally come 
down due to lack of credible evidence and witnesses,’ said Sang.408  
 
Here again Sang seemed to have not been aware of the testimony of ordinary Kenyan 
citizens.  After all, there was a case that: 
A prosecution witness has disowned evidence he allegedly gave, detailing how he 
attended two meetings in which Deputy President William Ruto instigated the 
2007-2008 post election. In his statement recorded with the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) in April 2010, the witness claimed to have attended the secret 
meetings, one at Sirikwa Hotel in Eldoret and the other at Ruto’s Sugoi home. 
In tape –recorded interview, he had claimed that the meeting at Sirikwa was held 
on September 2, 2007 and was chaired by Ruto, who was then Agriculture 
Minister.  
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The witness had claimed that he paid Sh3, 000 to gain entry into the alleged 
Sirikwa secret meeting. The second meeting, he claimed was held on September 
2,2007 but later changed and said it was on November 2,same year. 
He had told the prosecution that the meeting was to organise coordinators and 
attacks in South and Central Rift Valley. He had claimed to have heard all the 
speeches made at the event. The Prosecution had taken his evidence so seriously 
and asked him to tell all the details accurately and precisely. And so precise was 
the evidence that the witness had offer to draw sketches of both Sirikwa meeting 
venue and Ruto’s house. The evidence was then filed before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in 2011 and used to confirm the charges against Ruto and journalist 
Joshua Sang in January 2012.409       
 
Nevertheless, the case lost momentum when the same witness here turned 
around and said that he could not remember about the details of his testimony.  From 
the above, the Kenyan analyst comes to understand that the political legacy of impunity 
is the very bridge connecting the colonial regimes to the present situation.  Whereas for 
every action there is an equal or opposite reaction, it should come as no surprise to 
discover that the other key element in the political legacy of Kenya is that of mass 
action. 
 The Europeans settlers were the first to engage in mass action tactics for the 
promulgation of their rights in the protectorate and that left an enduring legacy in 
modern days Kenya’s politics.  Today’s political tactics of mass action in Kenya could be 
considered as an ongoing tradition originating from the European settlers political kit 
bag.  The frequent use of political tactics directed to the local government was even 
acknowledged by Michael Blundell, a later settler political leader, who clearly stated 
that: “[Y]ou made a tremendous political row and forced the government to do what you 
wanted.”410    
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 The political strategies adopted by European politicians in the EAP have exerted 
a lasting impact on politics in the region, extending to present-day Kenya.  One of the 
most utilized and effective of these political tactics is that of the mass action campaign.  
For the most part, there was an emergent trend for these campaigns to coalesce around 
two partisan groups.  The first group consists of those who believe that there exists a 
deep crisis insofar as the spiraling cost of living is concerned and the growing inability of 
the average Kenyan citizen to keep her or his head above the rising and swirling 
financial flood.  This group manifests a particular disgust with the president and the 
weak use of his constitutionally granted executive power to guarantee security and 
promote an overall confidence in the course of the nation’s economic development.    
 With respect to this situation, one prominent Kenyan editorialist wrote, “To 
resolve this problem, nothing less than a national convention of some kind will help pull 
us out of this mess.  To press their point home, the leaders of this group have set 7 July, 
the storied ‘Saba Saba Day,’ as the date on which they will commence on a campaign of 
mass action to compel the government to accept their proposal.”411   The second group 
argued that while the nation had serious problems that required immediate attention, 
these could and must be solved only within the context of existing institutions.  The 
second group also contended that the need for national dialogue on these matters is 
limited, insofar as the power to handle any situation has already been granted to the 
people’s duly-elected representatives.  They also believed that any mass mobilizations 
and subsequent actions would bear little profitability in helping to resolve any of these 
issues.  With respect to the political dichotomy existing between these two factions, the 
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Weekend Star editorialist wrote “Recent events starting from the massive crowds that 
turned up at former PM Raila Odinga’s homecoming political rally at Uhuru Park 
remind us that there has been very little reconciliation between those who found 
themselves on opposing sides in the 2013 General Election.”412 
 The use of mass action as a political tool in contemporary Kenya can be seen as a 
throwback mechanism reminiscent of the political tactics employed by the settlers from 
the very foundation of the EAP, more than a century ago.  Just as the settlers so long ago 
discovered that political mass actions can be a powerful weapon in the destabilization 
and even the overthrow of governments, so too have the current crop of Kenyan 
politicians found some utilitarianism in playing this card.  For example, in the 1990s, 
the non-violent mass action campaigns led by former cabinet ministers Kenneth Matiba 
and Charles Rubia demonstrated that this type of political protest is a definitive strategy 
in undermining a government’s credibility and legitimacy.  Even after the instigators of 
these mass actions were detained, the political momentum even picked up its pace.  
However, in contrasting the political leadership of the settlers with that of the present-
day Kenyan politicians, one must keep in mind that the settlers could at any time resort 
to mass action tactics without fear simply on the basis of their white privileged status, 
whereas the black Kenyan politicians were at the most detained.   Nevertheless, despite 
the detention of the Kenyan politicians, the effectiveness of their mass action campaigns 
was not diminished.  And hearkening back to the days of the protectorate, one must also 
consider that the consequences of instigating mass actions on the part of people of color 
                                                 
412 Ibid. 
 259 
could have confirmed the fears of the European elites, thereby resulting in severe and 
perhaps lethal repercussions.   
 On the relatively recent Kenyan political situation, the editorialist writes, “Even 
though President Daniel Moi remained in power for another ten years, after the return 
of multi-party politics, it is this mass action by ordinary Kenyans which put an end to 
Moi’s single party rule and fundamentally changed the Kenyan political landscape.”413  
In a similar vein, one can see the effectiveness of mass action at work on the part of the 
white settler class in early 20th century EAP politics.  None of the regimes installed in 
the protectorate by order of the CO were able to withstand the mass actions instigated 
by Delamere, Grogan and other leaders among the small but growing and vocal C of A.  
This was particularly evident in the fall of Sadler, who was seen as weak and vacillating 
by the CO and who granted concessions to the settlers far beyond his authority to do so.  
This obviously did not go unseen by the Kenyan black population, who later formulated 
their own nationalist groups to work in their own self-interest and ultimately establish 
an independent black republic, thus putting a nail deep into the coffin of any prospects 
for a so-called “White Man’s Country.”  Since the opening to the EAP, there was not yet 
a single British official capable of running the protectorate while efficiently reconciling 
the need to protect the Africans and Indians with the bold political demands of the 
settlers. Talks of European settlers paramountcy in the EAP was a lousy brouhaha, it 
was not a realistic agenda that took into consideration the ethnic composition of the 
country. The EAP at the beginning of the 20th century was the least governable British 
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dependency in the whole Empire.  Any intent of favoring the late newcomers by any 
commissioner or governor sent by Whitehall was tantamount to a certain failure.  
In the case of governor Girouard, who himself believed that unfair political 
formulation benefiting the settlers was going to remain without consequences; it was 
this kind of attitude that led to his downfall. Violations of Africans or Indians’ rights, 
whether physical or discriminatory in the EAP, could not continue to be the news that 
the CO was receiving from the protectorate because anything leading to a political 
embarrassment was not desired at Whitehall.  Political embarrassment was a sour pill to 
swallow because it could derail the political career of any official serving the British 
Empire in the EAP.  That reality remains as such today in Kenya.  Nevertheless, fifty 
years after gaining independence from Britain, Kenya’s political leaders of today seem to 
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